policy defense in Illinois

2008App. 3d at 794 , 806 N.E.2d at 226 ) and it “is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage” (Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 150 , 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1134-35 (1999)).

2008App. 3d at 794 , 806 N.E.2d at 226 ) and it “is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage” (Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 150 , 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1134-35 (1999)).

2017A.B.A.T.E. of Illinois, Inc. v. Quinn, 2011 IL 110611, ¶ 22 . ¶ 22 Green4All argues that State Farm owed it a duty to defend because the allegations of the underlying complaint contained facts that fell within the Policy definition of a covered “personal -6­ No. 1-16-2499 and advertising injury.” In response, State Farm argues that it had no duty to defend Green4All, both because the underlying complaint did not contain allegations that fell within the Policy definition and because several exclusions within the Policy applied to bar coverage based on the underlying complaint. ¶ 23 In interpret

2017A.B.A.T.E. of Illinois, Inc. v. Quinn, 2011 IL 110611, ¶ 22 . ¶ 22 Green4All argues that State Farm owed it a duty to defend because the allegations of the underlying complaint contained facts that fell within the Policy definition of a covered “personal -6- No. 1-16-2499 and advertising injury.” In response, State Farm argues that it had no duty to defend Green4All, both because the underlying complaint did not contain allegations that fell within the Policy definition and because several exclusions within the Policy applied to bar coverage based on the underlying complaint. ¶ 23 In interpret

2004“Strong proof is not required to establish a waiver of a policy defense, but only such facts as would make it unjust, inequitable[,] or unconscionable to allow the defense to be asserted. [Citations.]” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gray, 211 Ill.

2004"Strong proof is not required to establish a waiver of a policy defense, but only such facts as would make it unjust, inequitable[,] or unconscionable to allow the defense to be asserted. [Citations.]" State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gray , 211 Ill.

2008For instance: “If the insurance company is fully advised of the facts bearing on its policy defense and does not then insist on noncoverage but recognizes the continued validity of the policy by requiring the insured to go to the trouble and expense, if any, of preparing proofs of loss and related matter, an intention to waive the policy defense would follow.” Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McDougal, 20 Ill.

2008For instance, “If the insurance company is fully advised of the facts bearing on its policy defense and does not then insist on noncoverage but recognizes the continued validity of the policy by requiring the insured to go to the trouble and expense, if any, of preparing proofs of loss and related matter, an intention to waive the policy defense would follow.” Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McDougal, 20 Ill.

2022Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 460-62 .

2017Pekin Insurance Co. v. United Contractors Midwest, Inc., 2013 IL App (3d) 120803, ¶ 29 (citing Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 458-62 (2010)).

2017Pekin Insurance Co. v. United Contractors Midwest, Inc., 2013 IL App (3d) 120803, ¶ 29 (citing Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 458-62 (2010)).

2017Pekin Insurance Co. v. United Contractors Midwest, Inc., 2013 IL App (3d) 120803, ¶ 29 (citing Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 458-62 (2010)).

2018“Accordingly, bare notice of a reservation of rights is insufficient; the notice must make specific reference to the policy defense which ultimately may be asserted ***.” Royal Insurance Co. v. Process Design Associates, Inc., 221 Ill.

2018"Accordingly, bare notice of a reservation of rights is insufficient; the notice must make specific reference to the policy defense which ultimately may be asserted * * *." Royal Insurance Co. v. Process Design Associates, Inc. , 221 Ill.

2013American Service, 332 Ill.

2004See State Farm, 332 Ill.

2014The court stated: "For instance, a defendant may raise the defense that the policy was not in effect when the injury occurred or that the policy does not cover the type of damages sustained, as when compensatory but not punitive damages are covered." Id. at 931-32. ¶ 34 Underwriters gleans from the Platinum decision that the Seventh Circuit "concluded that whether there was indemnity coverage under an insurance policy for a settlement was not a policy defense." (Emphasis in original.) It additionally cites the proposition, stated in Santa's Best, that "it is inequitable to require an insurer t

2014The court stated: “For instance, a defendant may raise the defense that the policy was not in effect -6- when the injury occurred or that the policy does not cover the type of damages sustained, as when compensatory but not punitive damages are covered.” Id. at 931-32. ¶ 34 Underwriters gleans from the Platinum decision that the Seventh Circuit “concluded that whether there was indemnity coverage under an insurance policy for a settlement was not a policy defense.” (Emphasis in original.) It additionally cites the proposition, stated in Santa’s Best, that “it is inequitable to require an insur

2014A "basic maxim of equity [is] that he who seeks equity must do equity." Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp., 398 Ill.

2014A “basic maxim of equity [is] that he who seeks equity must do equity.” Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp., 398 Ill.

2011See, e.g., Frank v. South Suburban Hospital Foundation, 256 Ill.App.3d 360, 369 , 195 Ill.Dec. 489 , 628 N.E.2d 953 (1993); Semerau v. Village of Schiller Park, 210 Ill.App.3d 493, 497-98 , 155 Ill.Dec. 183 , 569 N.E.2d 183 (1991); Rudd v. Danville Metal Stamping Co., 193 Ill.App.3d 1009, 1012 , 140 Ill.Dec. 789 , 550 N.E.2d 674 (1990). ¶ 75 For instance, in Frank, 256 Ill.

2011See, e.g., Frank v. South Suburban Hospital Foundation, 256 Ill.App.3d 360, 369 , 195 Ill.Dec. 489 , 628 N.E.2d 953 (1993); Semerau v. Village of Schiller Park, 210 Ill.App.3d 493, 497-98 , 155 Ill.Dec. 183 , 569 N.E.2d 183 (1991); Rudd v. Danville Metal Stamping Co., 193 Ill.App.3d 1009, 1012 , 140 Ill.Dec. 789 , 550 N.E.2d 674 (1990). ¶ 75 For instance, in Frank, 256 Ill.

2010See Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 117 (in light of broad scope of comprehensive general liability policy, and the popular meaning of “damages,” under the facts of the case, the underlying actions were “suits seeking damages” which triggered the insurer’s duty to defend its insured).

2010See Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 117 (in light of broad scope of comprehensive general liability policy, and the popular meaning of “damages,” under the facts of the case, the underlying actions were “suits seeking damages” which triggered the insurer’s duty to defend its insured).

2014Moreover, “[s]trong proof is not required to show a waiver of a policy defense, but only such facts as would make it unjust, inequitable or unconscionable to allow the defense to be interposed.” Vasilakis, 46 Ill.

1992App. 3d 369 , 361 N.E.2d 1 .) “Strong proof” is not required to establish a waiver of a policy defense, but only such facts as would make it unjust, inequitable or unconscionable to allow the defense to be interposed.

1998An insurer's denial of liability on grounds other than the insured's failure to file proof of loss "`waives or renders unnecessary compliance with the policy requirement respecting the filing of proof of loss.'" Tarzian, 74 Ill.App.2d at 326-27 , 221 N.E.2d at 299 , quoting Stoltz v. National Indemnity Co., 345 Ill.App. 495, 502 , 104 N.E.2d 320, 323-24 (1952).

1998An insurer's denial of liability on grounds other than the insured's failure to file proof of loss "`waives or renders unnecessary compliance with the policy requirement respecting the filing of proof of loss.'" Tarzian, 74 Ill.App.2d at 326-27 , 221 N.E.2d at 299 , quoting Stoltz v. National Indemnity Co., 345 Ill.App. 495, 502 , 104 N.E.2d 320, 323-24 (1952).

2026It is unilateral, as no act of the insured is necessary to complete it.” Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu, 105 Ill. 2d 486, 499 (1985). ¶ 29 Argus contends that West Bend waived the vacancy exclusion because “[a]n insurer may waive a policy defense, however, ‘by continuing under a policy when it knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have known the facts in question giving rise to the defense.’ ” Chaudhry v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.

1991In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486 , 475 N.E.2d 872 , the insurer accepted the insured’s defense in an action brought by a third party.

2020Uninsured motor vehicle -9- 2020 IL App (2d) 190050 coverage does not apply to bodily injury *** of an insured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by, or furnished or available for the regular use of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative, if that motor vehicle is not described in the policy under which a claim is made or is not a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy.” Id. § 143a. ¶ 20 Our supreme court has stressed that this section is plain and unambiguous in mandating that every policy contain the specified uninsured-motorist cover

2020Uninsured motor vehicle -9- 2020 IL App (2d) 190050 coverage does not apply to bodily injury *** of an insured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by, or furnished or available for the regular use of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative, if that motor vehicle is not described in the policy under which a claim is made or is not a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy.” Id. § 143a. ¶ 20 Our supreme court has stressed that this section is plain and unambiguous in mandating that every policy contain the specified uninsured-motorist cover

2012Roth v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 366 Ill.App.3d 787, 795 , 304 Ill.Dec. 39 , 852 N.E.2d 289 (2006).

2012Roth v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 366 Ill.App.3d 787, 795 , 304 Ill.Dec. 39 , 852 N.E.2d 289 (2006).