policy claim in Vermont

2006HAT argues that despite its mootness, its claim should survive because it fits within the narrow exception allowing review of moot claims that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. at 118 , 589 A.2d at 319 (quotations omitted).

2006HAT argues that despite its mootness, its claim should survive because it fits within the narrow exception allowing review of moot claims that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. at 118 , 589 A.2d at 319 (quotations omitted).

2006Serv., 150 Vt. at 631 , 555 A.2d at 978 (“[VPCIGA’s] obligation to a policyholder or claimant is limited to the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy from which the claim arises.” (citing 8 V.S.A. § 3612(4)(B))).

2006Serv., 150 Vt. at 631 , 555 A.2d at 978 (“[VPCIGA’s] obligation to a policyholder or claimant is limited to the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy from which the claim arises.” (citing 8 V.S.A. § 3612(4)(B))).

2024The absolute privilege “belongs to the public, not to the individual.” Logan’s Super Mkts., Inc. v. McCalla, 343 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tenn. 1961); see Veeder, supra, at 467 (observing that while absolute privilege is “founded on public policy, it is too often viewed 4 Plaintiff also presents a variety of hypothetical factual scenarios involving maliciously false police reports and argues, without citation or further explication, that application of the privilege to these circumstances would create uncertainty and lead to absurd results.

2020Appellee’s Brief at 11, filed Oct. 21, 2019; Nehemiah II, 168 Vt. at 291 (discussing finality and flexibility). -9- With respect to criterion (b) of the Stowe Club test, the DRB considered whether there were any “changes in the construction or operation of the permittee’s project, not reasonably foreseeable at the time the permit was issued.” Hildebrand, 2007 VT 5, ¶ 7 .

2010In addition, the policy factors strongly favor a classification of “permanent.” The policy considerations in this case are much like those in cases “where the property invasion will and should continue indefinitely because defendants, with lawful authority, constructed a socially beneficial structure intended to be permanent.” Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 220 (Colo. 2003).

2010Co. of America, 947 A.2d 906, 911 (R.I. 2008) (reviewing application of estoppel to insurance coverage disputes).

2010In other words, insurers are not permitted “to hold out the hope of payment and thus cause the plaintiffs to delay suit until the limited time had expired, and then interpose the condition in the policy in defense to an action.” Id.; accord McLaughlin v. Blake, 120 Vt. 174, 179 (1957); Nat’l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Travelers Indem.

2001Co. v. Moore, 912 S.W.2d 531, 535-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“Owning or harboring a dog may be an activity usually incident to a non-business pursuit, but the policy exception focuses on the activity which caused the injury.

1997The Town cites our decision in In re Green Peak Estates, 154 Vt. 363, 368-69 , 577 A.2d 676, 679 (1990), where we noted that a provision in the regional plan stating that residential development “should” not be permitted on slopes greater than twenty percent was a specific policy requirement.

1997The Town cites our decision in In re Green Peak Estates, 154 Vt. 363, 368-69 , 577 A.2d 676, 679 (1990), where we noted that a provision in the regional plan stating that residential development “should” not be permitted on slopes greater than twenty percent was a specific policy requirement.

1992As the court stated in Marchessault v. National Grange Mutual Liability Co., 229 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1956): In the absence of a statute on the subject, and no such Vermont statute has been called to our attention, the parties were at liberty to determine by contract the conditions upon which cancellation might be had.