policy rule in Connecticut

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025One exception to this general rule arises when a definite relationship between the parties is of such a character that public policy justifies the imposition of a duty to aid or to protect another.’’ (Citation omitted.) Ryan Transportation, Inc. v. M & G Associates, 266 Conn. 520, 526 , 832 A.2d 1180 (2003). ‘‘In delineating more precisely the parameters of this limited exception to the general rule, [our Supreme Court] has concluded that, [in the absence of] a special relationship of cus- tody or control, there is no duty to protect a third person . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quo

2025One exception to this general rule arises when a definite relationship between the parties is of such a character that public policy justifies the imposition of a duty to aid or to protect another.’’ (Citation omitted.) Ryan Transportation, Inc. v. M & G Associates, 266 Conn. 520, 526 , 832 A.2d 1180 (2003). ‘‘In delineating more precisely the parameters of this limited exception to the general rule, [our Supreme Court] has concluded that, [in the absence of] a special relationship of cus- tody or control, there is no duty to protect a third person . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quo

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2025Principally, the defendant relies on an article in the Connecticut Law Review and argues that it is far more likely (and less speculative) that a suspect will lie or confess falsely in a prearrest inter- view, given the fear and power imbalances inherent in custodial interrogation, which have a particularly strong effect on ‘‘ ‘members of social groups with dispropor- tionately high conviction rates, such as young black men, [who] may despair of release and conclude they must confess to something to escape a worse fate.’ ’’10 ment purposes’’); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232 , 250–51, 487 A.2d 5

2021Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420 , 434 n.13, 165 A.3d 148 (2017). 20 The dissent raises some compelling observations about what it considers to be this court’s unduly restrictive approach to the first prong of the test, under which ‘‘we [generally] have held that a party is an identifiable person when he or she is compelled to be somewhere,’’ and ‘‘[t]he only identifiable class of foreseeable victims that we have recognized . . . is that of school- children attending public schools during school hours because: they were intended to be the beneficiaries of particular duties of care imposed b

2021Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420 , 434 n.13, 165 A.3d 148 (2017). 20 The dissent raises some compelling observations about what it considers to be this court’s unduly restrictive approach to the first prong of the test, under which ‘‘we [generally] have held that a party is an identifiable person when he or she is compelled to be somewhere,’’ and ‘‘[t]he only identifiable class of foreseeable victims that we have recognized . . . is that of school- children attending public schools during school hours because: they were intended to be the beneficiaries of particular duties of care imposed b

2019"A ministerial act is one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of the act being done." 7 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Mason , 82 Conn. 324 , 327, 73 A. 782 (1909) ; see also Benedict v. Norfolk , 296 Conn. 518 , 520 n.4, 997 A.2d 449 (2010) (municipal acts are "deemed ministerial if a policy or rule limiting discretion in the completion of such acts exists"); Pluhowsky v. New Haven , 151 Conn. 337 , 347, 1

2019"A ministerial act is one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of the act being done." 7 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Mason , 82 Conn. 324 , 327, 73 A. 782 (1909) ; see also Benedict v. Norfolk , 296 Conn. 518 , 520 n.4, 997 A.2d 449 (2010) (municipal acts are "deemed ministerial if a policy or rule limiting discretion in the completion of such acts exists"); Pluhowsky v. New Haven , 151 Conn. 337 , 347, 1

2019"A ministerial act is one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of the act being done." 7 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Mason , 82 Conn. 324 , 327, 73 A. 782 (1909) ; see also Benedict v. Norfolk , 296 Conn. 518 , 520 n.4, 997 A.2d 449 (2010) (municipal acts are "deemed ministerial if a policy or rule limiting discretion in the completion of such acts exists"); Pluhowsky v. New Haven , 151 Conn. 337 , 347, 1

2019"A ministerial act is one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of the act being done." 7 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Mason , 82 Conn. 324 , 327, 73 A. 782 (1909) ; see also Benedict v. Norfolk , 296 Conn. 518 , 520 n.4, 997 A.2d 449 (2010) (municipal acts are "deemed ministerial if a policy or rule limiting discretion in the completion of such acts exists"); Pluhowsky v. New Haven , 151 Conn. 337 , 347, 1

2019This court previously *48 has held that a municipality may be held liable for the negligent performance of a duty only if the "the official's duty is clearly ministerial." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonington v. Westport , supra, 297 Conn. at 308 , 999 A.2d 700 .

2019This court previously *48 has held that a municipality may be held liable for the negligent performance of a duty only if the "the official's duty is clearly ministerial." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonington v. Westport , supra, 297 Conn. at 308 , 999 A.2d 700 .

2019Co., 350 S.C. 268, 271 , 565 S.E.2d 306 (2002) (‘‘[w]e find a requirement of imminent collapse is the most reasonable construction of the policy clause covering risks of direct physical loss involving collapse’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2019Co., 350 S.C. 268, 271 , 565 S.E.2d 306 (2002) (‘‘[w]e find a requirement of imminent collapse is the most reasonable construction of the policy clause covering risks of direct physical loss involving collapse’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2017Moreover, as stated, a plaintiff seeking to avoid the immunity typically afforded to police officers must demonstrate that "by statute or other rule of law the official's duty is clearly ministerial rather than discretionary ...." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mills v. Solution, LLC , supra, 138 Conn.App. at 48 , 50 A.3d 381 ; see also Grignano v. Milford , supra, 106 Conn.App. at 654 , 943 A.2d 507 .

2017Moreover, as stated, a plaintiff seeking to avoid the immunity typically afforded to police officers must demonstrate that "by statute or other rule of law the official's duty is clearly ministerial rather than discretionary ...." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mills v. Solution, LLC , supra, 138 Conn.App. at 48 , 50 A.3d 381 ; see also Grignano v. Milford , supra, 106 Conn.App. at 654 , 943 A.2d 507 .

2012In support of their argument that the defendants’ maintenance of the storm drains and sewers in the HiUcrest Park neighborhood is ministerial in nature, the *272 plaintiffs rely on Spitzer v. Waterbury, 113 Conn. 84 , 154 A. 157 (1931).

2012In support of their argument that the defendants’ maintenance of the storm drains and sewers in the HiUcrest Park neighborhood is ministerial in nature, the *272 plaintiffs rely on Spitzer v. Waterbury, 113 Conn. 84 , 154 A. 157 (1931).

2012If the acts or omissions complained of are not imposed in the form of a general legal duty, they must, in order to be characterized as ministerial, be “required by [a] . . . charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or any other directive . . . that prescribe [s] the manner in which [they are to be performed].” (Citations omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 323-24 , 907 A.2d 1188 (2006); see also Benedict v. Norfolk, 296 Conn. 518 , 520 n.4, 997 A.2d 449 (2010) (“for the purposes of § 52-557n, municipal acts that would otherwise be considered discretionary will only be

2012If the acts or omissions complained of are not imposed in the form of a general legal duty, they must, in order to be characterized as ministerial, be “required by [a] . . . charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or any other directive . . . that prescribe [s] the manner in which [they are to be performed].” (Citations omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 323-24 , 907 A.2d 1188 (2006); see also Benedict v. Norfolk, 296 Conn. 518 , 520 n.4, 997 A.2d 449 (2010) (“for the purposes of § 52-557n, municipal acts that would otherwise be considered discretionary will only be

2002Vacco v. Microsoft Corp. , 260 Conn. 59 , 90-92 , 793 A.2d 1048 (2002).

2002The Supreme Court specifically held that "applying the three-part policy analysis to the facts of the present case, we are convinced that the plaintiff's claimed injuries are too indirect and remote with respect to the defendant's alleged anticompetitive conduct for the plaintiff to recover under CUTPA." Id., 90 .

2001"A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 195 Conn. 276 , 283 , 487 A.2d 559 (1985).

2001"A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 195 Conn. 276 , 283 , 487 A.2d 559 (1985).

2001The policy exception is narrowly construed and applies only when the award would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and that is ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest." South Windsor v. Police Union Local 480, 255 Conn. 800 , 815 (2001).

1994State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 73 , 530 A.2d 155 (1987); Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 374 , 306 A.2d 857 (1972). “[W]e have followed the policy that inquiry on insurance interest and its extent is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Robinson v. Faulkner, supra, 374 .

1994State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 73 , 530 A.2d 155 (1987); Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 374 , 306 A.2d 857 (1972). “[W]e have followed the policy that inquiry on insurance interest and its extent is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Robinson v. Faulkner, supra, 374 .

1994State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 73 , 530 A.2d 155 (1987); Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 374 , 306 A.2d 857 (1972). “[W]e have followed the policy that inquiry on insurance interest and its extent is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Robinson v. Faulkner, supra, 374 .

1994State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 73 , 530 A.2d 155 (1987); Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 374 , 306 A.2d 857 (1972). “[W]e have followed the policy that inquiry on insurance interest and its extent is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Robinson v. Faulkner, supra, 374 .

1990Cohn, 213 Conn. at 547 -48 .

1972Lowell v. Daly, 148 Conn. 266, 268 , 169 A.2d 888 ; Girard v. *375 Grosvenordale Co., 82 Conn. 271, 279 , 73 A. 747 .

1972Lowell v. Daly, 148 Conn. 266, 268 , 169 A.2d 888 ; Girard v. *375 Grosvenordale Co., 82 Conn. 271, 279 , 73 A. 747 .

1972Lowell v. Daly, 148 Conn. 266, 268 , 169 A.2d 888 ; Girard v. *375 Grosvenordale Co., 82 Conn. 271, 279 , 73 A. 747 .

1972Lowell v. Daly, 148 Conn. 266, 268 , 169 A.2d 888 ; Girard v. *375 Grosvenordale Co., 82 Conn. 271, 279 , 73 A. 747 .