policy factors in California

2023Further, most courts that have analyzed a bank’s limited duty of care to monitor accounts have, as we do here, considered the policy factors set forth in Biakanja (or Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113 (Rowland)) in determining the breadth of that duty.

2022(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) The first step assesses whether there is “a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect.” (Ibid.) If either exists, the court moves on to the second step and considers “whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty” (ibid.), looking to the policy factors identified in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 , 112–113 for guidance.

2026The policy analysis evaluates whether certain kinds of plaintiffs or injuries should be excluded from relief.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629 .) Rowland and its progeny “recognize that even when two parties may be in a special relationship, the unforeseeability of the kind of harm suffered by the plaintiff or other policy factors may counsel against establishing an 19 affirmative duty for one party to protect the other.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 219.) IV.

2024Rowland identifies three foreseeability considerations: (1) whether “‘“the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed”’”; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; and (3) the closeness of the connection “‘between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered.’” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 629-630.) Although these foreseeability factors are “‘[t]he most important’” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629 ), foreseeability is not dispositive of the policy analysis

2024Rowland identifies three foreseeability factors: (1) whether “‘“the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed”’”; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; and (3) the closeness of the connection “‘between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered.’” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 629-630.) Although these foreseeability factors are “‘[t]he most important’” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629 ), foreseeability is not dispositive of the policy analysis and may

2023The policy analysis evaluates whether certain kinds of plaintiffs or injuries should be excluded from relief.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629 ; see Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1145 .) It bears noting that different timeframes are relevant to different aspects of the analysis.

2026(Id. at p. 218 [Rowland’s “multifactor test” is “a guide for determining whether to recognize an ‘exception’ to the general duty of care”]; see also Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128 [if courts find a special relationship, they go on to “balance[] the policy factors set forth in Rowland [citation] to assist in their determination of the existence and scope of a defendant’s duty in a particular case”]; accord, Brown, at p. 212.) Actual knowledge is a limit on a duty of care that may be imposed under a Rowland analysis (see A.L. v. Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation (2024)

2021(See, e.g., Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 70, 77 [“Thus, plaintiffs alleging a defendant had a duty to protect them must establish: (1) that an exception to the general no-duty-to-protect rule applies and (2) that the Rowland factors support imposition of the duty.”]; Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128 [noting that if courts find a special relationship, they go on to “balance[] the policy factors set forth in Rowland [citation] to assist in their determination of the existence and scope of a defendant’s duty in a pa

2019The Rowland factors support a finding USAT had a duty to protect plaintiffs from sexual abuse Even if an organization has a special relationship with the tortfeasor or plaintiff, “[t]he court may depart from the general rule of duty . . . if other policy considerations clearly require an 22 exception.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628 .) We therefore consider the Rowland factors “that may, on balance, justify excusing or limiting a defendant’s duty of care.” (Regents, at p. 628; accord, United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128 [“In cases involving nonfeasance and a speci

2019The Rowland factors support a finding USAT had a duty to protect plaintiffs from sexual abuse Even if an organization has a special relationship with the tortfeasor or plaintiff, “[t]he court may depart from the general rule of duty . . . if other policy considerations clearly require an 22 exception.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628 .) We therefore consider the Rowland factors “that may, on balance, justify excusing or limiting a defendant’s duty of care.” (Regents, at p. 628; accord, United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128 [“In cases involving nonfeasance and a speci

2024“Given that ‘[f]oreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily’ considered the ‘crucial’ considerations in evaluating legal duty (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1213 ), it is unnecessary here to separately review the remaining Rowland factors. [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 673 ; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1025 [the policy factors serve to assess whether, despite the foreseeability factors weighing in favor of recognizing a duty of care, public policy requires a different result]; Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113– 114.) 37

2024(Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1149 [“‘[f]oreseeability alone is not sufficient’”]; accord, Regents, at pp. 633-634 [although it is foreseeable that students could hurt anyone, a university’s duty to protect is confined to other registered students]; Kesner, at pp. 1154-1155 [although it is foreseeable that anyone may be harmed by asbestos carried home from the workplace by an employee, an employer’s duty to protect is confined to the employee’s household members].) Those factors ask whether “‘the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensom

2019Policy factors The existence of a duty also depends on “‘“‘a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.’”’” (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1086 ; accord, Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 631 [“Although Rowland’s foreseeability factors weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, we must also consider whether public policy requires a different result.”].) “‘A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries . . . where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to

2019Policy factors The existence of a duty also depends on “‘“‘a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.’”’” (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1086 ; accord, Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 631 [“Although Rowland’s foreseeability factors weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, we must also consider whether public policy requires a different result.”].) “‘A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries . . . where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to

2019The Rowland factors support a finding USAT had a duty to protect plaintiffs from sexual abuse Even if an organization has a special relationship with the tortfeasor or plaintiff, “[t]he court may depart from the general rule of duty . . . if other policy considerations clearly require an 22 exception.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628 .) We therefore consider the Rowland factors “that may, on balance, justify excusing or limiting a defendant’s duty of care.” (Regents, at p. 628; accord, United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128 [“In cases involving nonfeasance and a speci

2019The Rowland factors support a finding USAT had a duty to protect plaintiffs from sexual abuse Even if an organization has a special relationship with the tortfeasor or plaintiff, “[t]he court may depart from the general rule of duty . . . if other policy considerations clearly require an 24 exception.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628 .) We therefore consider the Rowland factors “that may, on balance, justify excusing or limiting a defendant’s duty of care.” (Regents, at p. 628; accord, United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128 [“In cases involving nonfeasance and a speci

2025Code, § 1442 [“[a] condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is created”].) Thus if there are “two possible constructions, one of which leads to a forfeiture and the other avoids it. . . , the policy and rule are settled . . . in the interpretation of ordinary contracts . . . that the construction which avoids forfeiture must be made if it is at all possible. [Citations.]” (Ballard v. MacCallum (1940) 15 Cal.2d 439, 444 (Ballard).) With these principles in mind, the application of the first interpretation to paragraph 22A (fourth sente

2021While forfeitures are disfavored (see Ballard v. MacCallum (1940) 15 Cal.2d 439, 444 [in the event of two possible constructions, one of which leads to a forfeiture and one of which avoids it, “the policy and rule are settled . . . , the construction which avoids forfeiture must be made if it all possible”]), there is no other reasonable construction of the word “nonrefundable” to describe the first $75,000 deposit.

2026Co., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072 ; accord, Chateau Chamberay, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 [“where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under the policy for the claim asserted by the insured, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute”].) “ ‘ “[A]n insurer denying . . . policy benefits due to the existence of a genuine dispute with its insured as to the existence of coverage liability . . . is not liable in bad faith even though it might be liable for breach of contract.” ’ ” (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins.

2018Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335 , 347, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 .) That is because "whe[n] there is a genuine issue as to the insurer's liability under the policy for the claim asserted by the insured, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute." ( Ibid ., italics deleted.) *403 Here, the key issues concern State Farm's conduct regarding Case's claim for UM benefits, which she pursued while seeking workers' compensation benefits.

2023Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 578, 587 (Brizuela).) 6 Here, the parties do not dispute that Snyder’s policies with FIE contained a requirement that she submit to an EUO upon request, FIE requested Snyder submit to an EUO,2 and Snyder did not attend or participate in an EUO.

2015Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 578, 591-592 .) Here Continental was deprived of the opportunity of cross-examining the insured’s statements.

1996(Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 860 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 282 ]; J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) The policy factors are: ‘“(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant

1996(Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 860 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 282 ]; J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) The policy factors are: ‘“(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant

1987(Ibid; see also Constance B. v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 200, 206-207 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 645 ].) 7 An analysis of the decisional trend of theoretical negligence liability in California shows clearly that “Dillon ( 68 Cal.2d at p. 741 ) postulated reasonable foreseeability as the primary, court-determined test of liability and relegated to a secondary, negative role the policy factors involved in the duty-of-care issue.” (Adams v. Southern Pac.

1979Dillon ( 68 Cal.2d at p. 741 ) postulated reasonable foreseeability as the primary, court-determined test of liability and relegated to a secondary, negative role the policy factors involved in the duty-of-care issue.

2023Asso. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811 (Bernhard); see also § 1908.) As otherwise stated, the underlying policy of claim preclusion (as well as issue preclusion) is “[t]o preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate[, thereby] protect[ing] 6 Because courts have alternatively referred to issue preclusion as “collateral estoppel” and “res judicata,” the Supreme Court, has elected to use the terms “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion.” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824 .) 7 In contrast to claim preclusion, “issue preclusion does not bar

2023Asso. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811 (Bernhard); see also § 1908.) As otherwise stated, the underlying policy of claim preclusion (as well as issue preclusion) is “[t]o preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate[, thereby] protect[ing] 6 Because courts have alternatively referred to issue preclusion as “collateral estoppel” and “res judicata,” the Supreme Court, has elected to use the terms “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion.” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824 .) 7 In contrast to claim preclusion, “issue preclusion does not bar

2023It did not engage in a “comprehensive look at . . . ‘ “ sum total” ’ of the [Rowland] policy considerations at play . . . .” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 399 .) While Eisenhower purported to assess foreseeability to argue it did not owe a duty as a matter of law, it did not consider the policy factors going to that issue, or any of the other public policy factors.

2021I write separately to explain how those presumptions and exceptions realize a fundamental substantive principle: In California, “[t]ort law” — the law of when and how individuals who have suffered harm may seek compensation for their injuries through private actions — “serves society’s interest in allocating risks and costs to those who can better prevent them, and it provides aggrieved parties with just compensation.” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 394 (SoCal Gas).) The majority specifically holds that when a plaintiff argues defendant owes a duty based on a “specia

2018The policy analysis evaluates whether certain kinds of plaintiffs or injuries should be excluded from relief." ( *611 Regents of University of California , supra , 4 Cal.5th 607 , 629, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 ; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132 , 1145, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 384 P.3d 283 ( Kesner ).) It is necessary to evaluate these basic Rowland factors ( Rowland , supra , 69 Cal.2d 108 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ), foreseeability and public policy, " 'at a relatively broad level of factual generality.' " ( Regents of University of California , supra , 4 Cal.5th

2018The policy analysis evaluates whether certain kinds of plaintiffs or injuries should be excluded from relief." ( *611 Regents of University of California , supra , 4 Cal.5th 607 , 629, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 ; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132 , 1145, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 384 P.3d 283 ( Kesner ).) It is necessary to evaluate these basic Rowland factors ( Rowland , supra , 69 Cal.2d 108 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ), foreseeability and public policy, " 'at a relatively broad level of factual generality.' " ( Regents of University of California , supra , 4 Cal.5th

1996(Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 860 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 282 ]; J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) The policy factors are: ‘“(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant

1996(Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 860 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 282 ]; J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) The policy factors are: ‘“(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant

2022(Childs v. Eltinge (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 843 , 854–855; Garamendi, at pp. 770 & 775 (conc. opn. of Armstrong, J.) [concurring in judgment because trial court properly balanced countervailing policies and found exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule inapplicable]; BBBB Bonding Corp., at p. 374 [“Because [the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction] is a policy rule, the application of the rule in a given case depends upon the balancing of countervailing policies”].) “ ‘Although the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement [Code Civ.

1993Because it is a policy rule, the application of the rule in a given case depends upon the balancing of countervailing policies. ( Childs v. Eltinge (1973) 29 Cal. App.3d 843, 854 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 864 ].) The record establishes that this case is an exceptional case involving important issues of public policy relating to the regulation of insurance, the prompt enforcement of the California insurance laws by the commissioner and the protection of the public from those engaged in the unauthorized transaction of insurance business.

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2016And, because by law the generic and [brand-name] versions of drugs are biologically equivalent [citations], it is also eminently foreseeable that a physician might prescribe generic [medication] in reliance on [the manufacturer's] representations about [its brand-name drug]." ( Conte,supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 105 , 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 .) 2 In addition to foreseeability, the court considered other policy factors such as "the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; the moral blame attach

2016And, because by law the generic and [brand-name] versions of drugs are biologically equivalent [citations], it is also eminently foreseeable that a physician might prescribe generic [medication] in reliance on [the manufacturer's] representations about [its brand-name drug]." ( Conte,supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 105 , 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 .) 2 In addition to foreseeability, the court considered other policy factors such as "the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; the moral blame attach

2026Co. in the City of New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1237 , italics omitted.) However, “[a] genuine dispute exists only where the insurer’s position is maintained in good faith and on reasonable grounds.” (Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 723 .) Thus, the genuine dispute rule “does not relieve an insurer from its obligation to thoroughly and fairly investigate, process and evaluate the insured’s claim.” (Ibid.; see Bosetti, at p. 1237 [“An insurer cannot claim the benefit of the genuine dispute doctrine based on an investigation or evaluation of the insured’s claim that is not full, fair an

2016Co. in City of New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1237 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 744 ] (Bosetti).) The genuine dispute doctrine “does not relieve an insurer of its obligation to thoroughly and fairly investigate, process and evaluate the insured’s claim.

2026Co., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072 ; accord, Chateau Chamberay, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 [“where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under the policy for the claim asserted by the insured, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute”].) “ ‘ “[A]n insurer denying . . . policy benefits due to the existence of a genuine dispute with its insured as to the existence of coverage liability . . . is not liable in bad faith even though it might be liable for breach of contract.” ’ ” (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins.

2009Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 312 ] (Jordan).) “Where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under the policy for the claim asserted by the insured, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The ‘genuine dispute’ doctrine may be applied where the insurer denies a claim based on the opinions of experts.” (Fraley v. Allstate Ins.

2025(James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 918 .)” (Esmeralda S., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 93 .) The Esmeralda S. court explained, “The [James F.] court cites 15. the ‘strong public interest in prompt resolution of these cases so that the children may receive loving and secure home environments as soon as reasonably possible.’ ” (Ibid.) The Esmeralda S. court further explained that “[t]he alternative test—that an error is harmless if the guardian would have been appointed despite the error—could easily lead to needless reversals, because the fact that a guardian might not have been appointed does

2024(Id. at p. 93.) But, after considering the policy analysis in James F. stressing the importance of avoiding needless reversals of dependency judgments, the court concluded that the appointment error “may be deemed 14 harmless if the outcome of the review hearings [was] not affected by the violation.” (Ibid.) We agree that this is the “more efficient and sensible test.” (Id. at p. 94.) Applying this test, father contends the error was nevertheless prejudicial because “it is not clear the outcome of the section 366.26 hearing would have been the same if the [guardian] had not been appointed.” Ac

2024Moreover, even if we indulge Right Healthcare and allow it to rely on the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, “the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is a judicial rule of priority or preference and does not divest a court, which otherwise has jurisdiction of an action, of jurisdiction.” (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 769 ; see BBBB Bonding, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 374 [priority-of-jurisdiction rule “a policy rule” and “application of the rule in a given case depends upon the balancing of countervailing policies”]; see also County of San Diego v. State of Califor

2024Moreover, even if we indulge Right Healthcare and allow it to rely on the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, “the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is a judicial rule of priority or preference and does not divest a court, which otherwise has jurisdiction of an action, of jurisdiction.” (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 769 ; see BBBB Bonding, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 374 [priority-of-jurisdiction rule “a policy rule” and “application of the rule in a given case depends upon the balancing of countervailing policies”]; see also County of San Diego v. State of Califor

2023(Dalrymple v. United Services Auto Assn. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 497, 520 (Dalrymple).) Where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under the policy for the claim asserted by the insured, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute.

2001Assn., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 .) However, where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer's liability under the policy for the claim asserted by the insured, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute. ( Dalrymple, supra, at pg. 520 , 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 845 ; Opsal, supra, at pp. 1205-1206 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 .) While an insurer must give as much consideration to the interests of its insured as it does to its own ( Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.