policy rule in Kentucky

2023While KSU’s evidence may support its contention that the Policy is a standard form, KSU does not point to evidence supporting a conclusion that even if Allied World drafted the Policy, Allied World is the party of superior bargaining strength or that the contract was offered on a “‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording [KSU] a realistic opportunity to bargain.” See Bituminous Cas., 821 S.W.2d at 801 .

2022The principal’s “actions were at least at an operational level, if not a policy- or rule-setting level.” Id.

2015And, as the Court of Appeals held in Miracle , following this Court in Meadows, 666 S.W.2d at 731 , there is “a narrow policy exception” to the at-will doctrine that allows an at-will employee to bring a claim based upon a constitutional provision or statute, such as a claim under KRS 61.102.

2015Miracle, 237 S.W.3d at 558-59 .

2013Calloway, 705 S.W.2d 470 (Ky.1986) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).

2011Certainly, for a trial court to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is a seldom-used remedy because, as noted in Montjoy v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 470 , 109 S.W.2d 1209, 1211 (1937), if the “alleged testimony is strictly cumulative ... it is not the policy or the rule, as hereinbefore declared by this court in many cases, to grant new trials for discovered cumulative evidence, unless it be of such a nature and character or so overwhelming, as to render it probable that a different verdict would have been reached.” One rationale for the stringent requirements for a trial to be g

2011Therefore, as explained above, a new trial is only available when the “evidence is sufficiently compelling [that it] create[s] a reasonable certainty that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been available at the former trial....” Id. at 815 .

2009Id.

2009Id.

2008No. 1, 612 F.Supp. 285, 287 , 26 Ed. Law Rep. 628 (D.Wyo.1985) (breach of contract claim not covered because the policy required that the claim be caused by an occurrence, and “an occurrence refers to tortious conduct,” not a breach of contract).

2008No. 1, 612 F.Supp. 285, 287 , 26 Ed. Law Rep. 628 (D.Wyo.1985) (breach of contract claim not covered because the policy required that the claim be caused by an occurrence, and “an occurrence refers to tortious conduct,” not a breach of contract).

1998In Home Mutual, a case whose facts are strikingly similar to those of the case under consideration, New York’s highest court held that a premium finance agency is under no duty to the insurer, under section 576 of the New York Banking Law, 8 with respect to cancellation of an automobile insurance policy after default by the insured in payment to the agency of a premium installment, nor does its inaccurate representation to the insurer that the policy has been properly can-celled impose on it any liability to the insurer for moneys paid in settlement of a policy claim arising out of an accident

1998In Home Mutual, a case whose facts are strikingly similar to those of the case under consideration, New York’s highest court held that a premium finance agency is under no duty to the insurer, under section 576 of the New York Banking Law, 8 with respect to cancellation of an automobile insurance policy after default by the insured in payment to the agency of a premium installment, nor does its inaccurate representation to the insurer that the policy has been properly can-celled impose on it any liability to the insurer for moneys paid in settlement of a policy claim arising out of an accident

1982This doctrine has carried through case law and in Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633 , 4 S.W.2d 731 (1928), we firmly solidified the policy of this doctrine as such: The doctrine of “the law of the case” is founded upon the policy that there should be an end to litigation, and cases may not be presented by piecemeal.

1982This doctrine has carried through case law and in Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633 , 4 S.W.2d 731 (1928), we firmly solidified the policy of this doctrine as such: The doctrine of “the law of the case” is founded upon the policy that there should be an end to litigation, and cases may not be presented by piecemeal.

1966Acc. Ass’n, 122 Misc. 159 , 202 N.Y.S. 410 (1923); Couch on Insurance (2d), § 49.14 (Vol. 13, p. 643). . § 143 of the New York Insurance Law provides that if a policy is in violation of the statutory requirements it shall be enforceable as if it had conformed.

1966Acc. Ass'n, 122 Misc. 159 , 202 N.Y.S. 410 (1923); Couch on Insurance (2d), § 49.14 (Vol. 13, p. 643). [3] § 143 of the New York Insurance Law provides that if a policy is in violation of the statutory requirements it shall be enforceable as if it had conformed.

1953The Koser and Bidwell cases are close to our Metcalf case, Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn. v. Metcalf, 240 Ky. 628 , 42 S.W.2d 909 .

1953The Koser and Bidwell cases are close to our Metcalf case, Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn. v. Metcalf, 240 Ky. 628 , 42 S.W.2d 909 .

1936In Southern Insurance Co. v. Estes, 106 Tenn. 472 , 62 S. W. 149 , 52 L.

1936In Stebbins v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 115 Wash. 623 , 197 P. 913, 915 , the policy contained a forfeiture provision similar to the one in the present case.

1936In Stebbins v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 115 Wash. 623 , 197 P. 913, 915 , the policy contained a forfeiture provision similar to the one in the present case.

1935The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in the case of Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Rankin, 39 Ga. App. 373 , 147 S. E. 157, 158 , had before it the exact question involved in this case, i. e., the right of an insurance company in an action against it by the personal representative of an insured intestate to set off against the policy claim a debt of the latter in favor of defendant which was created before insured’s death, and was an obligation entirely divorced from the policy, and the right to plead such claim as an offset was denied.

1935The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in the case of Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Rankin, 39 Ga. App. 373 , 147 S. E. 157, 158 , had before it the exact question involved in this case, i. e., the right of an insurance company in an action against it by the personal representative of an insured intestate to set off against the policy claim a debt of the latter in favor of defendant which was created before insured’s death, and was an obligation entirely divorced from the policy, and the right to plead such claim as an offset was denied.

1934See Germania Fire Insurance Co. v. Nickell, supra; Miracle v. New York Underwriters’ Co., 241 Ky. 406 , 44 S. W. (2d) 280 .

1934See Germania Fire Insurance Co. v. Nickell, supra; Miracle v. New York Underwriters’ Co., 241 Ky. 406 , 44 S. W. (2d) 280 .

1933As to this,, the opinion held, not only that such defense was not pleaded, but that “the only defense asserted’ in the lower court was that the insured made false and material statements in the applications signed by her.” In view of the declared practice as announced in the case of Schrodt’s Ex’r v. Schrodt, 189 Ky. 457 , 225 S. W. 151 , being against appellant’s contention, that under section 134 of the Civil Code of Practice, it had the right to inject a new issue into the case, by filing, upon this fourth trial, an amended answer pleading the invalidating facts of the policy, we are of the

1933As to this,, the opinion held, not only that such defense was not pleaded, but that “the only defense asserted’ in the lower court was that the insured made false and material statements in the applications signed by her.” In view of the declared practice as announced in the case of Schrodt’s Ex’r v. Schrodt, 189 Ky. 457 , 225 S. W. 151 , being against appellant’s contention, that under section 134 of the Civil Code of Practice, it had the right to inject a new issue into the case, by filing, upon this fourth trial, an amended answer pleading the invalidating facts of the policy, we are of the

1931The opinion was so regarded in Fadanelli v. National Security Fire Insurance Co., 113 Neb. 830 , 205 N. W. 642 , which held a policy clause identical with that before us as ineffective and void because repugnant to a statute similar to that involved here.

1931The opinion was so regarded in Fadanelli v. National Security Fire Insurance Co., 113 Neb. 830 , 205 N. W. 642 , which held a policy clause identical with that before us as ineffective and void because repugnant to a statute similar to that involved here.

1914In discussing the doctrine of lis pendens Judge Richardson in the ease of Herrington v. Herrington, 27 Mo. 560 , said: “The policy on which the doctrine of lis pendens is founded, is to give full effect to the judgment which might be rendered in the suit depending at the time of the purchase.” [Turner v. Babb, 60 Mo. 348 .] “It is simply the power or force of the jurisdiction of the court.

1906From these Code provisions and the various decisions relating thereto, the rule may he deduced that with the exception of-errors committed in the admission or rejection of evidence to which proper objection and exception must he made and taken at the time and appear in the hill of exceptions it is necessary to point out in a motion for a new trial all errors committed during the progress of the trial upon which it is intended to rely in this court, or they cannot be considered on appeal, nor will -this court, except in the matter of instructions, consider errors that appear' for the first time

1906From these Code provisions and the various decisions relating thereto, the rule may he deduced that with the exception of-errors committed in the admission or rejection of evidence to which proper objection and exception must he made and taken at the time and appear in the hill of exceptions it is necessary to point out in a motion for a new trial all errors committed during the progress of the trial upon which it is intended to rely in this court, or they cannot be considered on appeal, nor will -this court, except in the matter of instructions, consider errors that appear' for the first time

1906From these Code provisions and the various decisions relating thereto, the rule may he deduced that with the exception of-errors committed in the admission or rejection of evidence to which proper objection and exception must he made and taken at the time and appear in the hill of exceptions it is necessary to point out in a motion for a new trial all errors committed during the progress of the trial upon which it is intended to rely in this court, or they cannot be considered on appeal, nor will -this court, except in the matter of instructions, consider errors that appear' for the first time

1906The purpose of the Code in requiring exceptions to be taken, during the trial and at the time the error occurs and to be exhibited in the bill of exceptions is thus stated in Buckles v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 795 , 68 S. W. 1084 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 571 : “We know that in the hurry and distraction of courtroom practice errors must occur, and therefrom arises the policy of the rule that the trial court’s attention must be called to the proceeding which is- objected to and to the ruling upon which a reversal is to be sought,' in order-that a fair trial of the accused person'may be had as speedily as

1906The purpose of the Code in requiring exceptions to be taken, during the trial and at the time the error occurs and to be exhibited in the bill of exceptions is thus stated in Buckles v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 795 , 68 S. W. 1084 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 571 : “We know that in the hurry and distraction of courtroom practice errors must occur, and therefrom arises the policy of the rule that the trial court’s attention must be called to the proceeding which is- objected to and to the ruling upon which a reversal is to be sought,' in order-that a fair trial of the accused person'may be had as speedily as

1906From these Code provisions and the various decisions relating thereto, the rule may he deduced that with the exception of-errors committed in the admission or rejection of evidence to which proper objection and exception must he made and taken at the time and appear in the hill of exceptions it is necessary to point out in a motion for a new trial all errors committed during the progress of the trial upon which it is intended to rely in this court, or they cannot be considered on appeal, nor will -this court, except in the matter of instructions, consider errors that appear' for the first time

1906From these Code provisions and the various decisions relating thereto, the rule may he deduced that with the exception of-errors committed in the admission or rejection of evidence to which proper objection and exception must he made and taken at the time and appear in the hill of exceptions it is necessary to point out in a motion for a new trial all errors committed during the progress of the trial upon which it is intended to rely in this court, or they cannot be considered on appeal, nor will -this court, except in the matter of instructions, consider errors that appear' for the first time

1906From these Code provisions and the various decisions relating thereto, the rule may he deduced that with the exception of-errors committed in the admission or rejection of evidence to which proper objection and exception must he made and taken at the time and appear in the hill of exceptions it is necessary to point out in a motion for a new trial all errors committed during the progress of the trial upon which it is intended to rely in this court, or they cannot be considered on appeal, nor will -this court, except in the matter of instructions, consider errors that appear' for the first time

1903The ordinance in' the case at bar required the council to accept the bid of the lowest and best bidder, and the reasoning given by the court in the case of Fishburn v. Chicago, 171 Ill., 338 , 49 N. E., 542 , 39 L.