policy factors in Wisconsin

2026Vieau, 289 Wis. 2d 552 , ¶23 n.6. 10 No. 2024AP992 3.

2020The respondents make this point in reference to our recent decision in Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol- Husting Co., which turned in part on the effect of partial vetoes in the 1999-2001 budget. 2018 WI 60 , ¶¶12–22, 381 Wis. 2d 732 , 914 N.W.2d 631 (discussing 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 2166m and § 2166s).

2020The respondents make this point in reference to our recent decision in Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol- Husting Co., which turned in part on the effect of partial vetoes in the 1999-2001 budget. 2018 WI 60 , ¶¶12–22, 381 Wis. 2d 732 , 914 N.W.2d 631 (discussing 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 2166m and § 2166s).

2018Id. , ¶ 7.

2012Pouwels is directly on point and controls in this situation, as the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin recognized in Koehring, 564 F. Supp. 303 . ¶ 82.

2011Addressing Wendy's wrongful death claim, the court found that "Wendy Day is clearly not an insured under Clinton Day's insurance policy with Allstate." It explained that it was required to interpret the phrase "accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person." Relying on this court's discussion of that phrase in Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 152 , 539 N.W.2d 883 (1995), the circuit court determined: "This court cannot, as a matter of law, find that any moneys that Wendy Day may receive would 'be funneled through' directly or indirectly" to Hannah or Desirae.

2011Addressing Wendy's wrongful death claim, the court found that "Wendy Day is clearly not an insured under Clinton Day's insurance policy with Allstate." It explained that it was required to interpret the phrase "accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person." Relying on this court's discussion of that phrase in Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 152 , 539 N.W.2d 883 (1995), the circuit court determined: "This court cannot, as a matter of law, find that any moneys that Wendy Day may receive would 'be funneled through' directly or indirectly" to Hannah or Desirae.

2010We recognize that in both Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434 , 453-54 n.4, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989), and Utica, 157 Wis. 2d at 564 , it was observed that Pouwels is of "limited instructive value" in determining whether a policy clause is an exclusion provision or a forfeiture provision.

2006Co. v. Gray, 386 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1967), a case decided under Florida law.

2005In Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212 , 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999), this court adopted a § 26(1)(f) "special circumstances" exception, addressing the narrow issue of multiple injuries with long latency periods that result from exposure to asbestos. 36 The court recognized that to "blindly apply" the doctrine of claim preclusion without exceptions does not further a policy of claim preclusion to render justice, but rather undermines it. 37 ¶ 41.

2005In Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212 , 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999), this court adopted a § 26(1)(f) "special circumstances" exception, addressing the narrow issue of multiple injuries with long latency periods that result from exposure to asbestos. 36 The court recognized that to "blindly apply" the doctrine of claim preclusion without exceptions does not further a policy of claim preclusion to render justice, but rather undermines it. 37 ¶ 41.

2004"Occasionally a clear and un ambiguous provision may be found ambiguous in the context of the entire policy." Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶ 19 . ¶ 27.

2004"Occasionally a clear and unambiguous *183 provision may be found ambiguous in the context of the entire policy." Folkman, 264 Wis. 2d 617, ¶ 19 . ¶ 27.

2003Is not covered under the terms of the policy as a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle. 22 The legislative policy behind Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (5)(f) is contained in the Legislative Council Information Memorandum 96-25 to 1995 Wisconsin Act 21, which states: "Section 632.32(5)(f), Stats., as created by the Act, permits motor vehicle insurance policies to prohibit 'stacking' of uninsured or under-insured motorist coverage or any other coverage, such as medical payments coverage, provided under the policies." (Emphasis in original.) 23 See also Playman, 171 Wis. 2d at 40 n.1, 43-44; Agnew v

2002And I would conclude that none of the policy factors found in Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 264-65 , and no other public policy reason required that Hicks's complaint against Nunnery should be dismissed.

2002And I would conclude that none of the policy factors found in Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 264-65 , and no other public policy reason required that Hicks's complaint against Nunnery should be dismissed.

2001This court held that the primary insurer's duty to defend was fully discharged — "exhausted" within the meaning of this clause — by a settlement for less than full policy limits, plus the execution of a Loy [Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400 , 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)] release.

2001This court held that the primary insurer's duty to defend was fully discharged — "exhausted" within the meaning of this clause — by a settlement for less than full policy limits, plus the execution of a Loy [Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400 , 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)] release.

2001Specifically, the policy clause in question stated that the insurer was not obligated "to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements." Teigen, 124 Wis. 2d at 8 .

2001Specifically, the policy clause in question stated that the insurer was not obligated "to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements." Teigen, 124 Wis. 2d at 8 .

2000General Casualty Co. v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167 , 172-73 n.9, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).

2000General Casualty Co. v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167 , 172-73 n.9, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).

1998The husband's insurance policy contained a clause restricting insurance for bodily injury and property damage liability to only the named insured on the policy and a clause entitled "Named Operators Coverage for non-owned vehicles." Id. at 531-32 , 527 N.W.2d at 322 .

1998The husband's insurance policy contained a clause restricting insurance for bodily injury and property damage liability to only the named insured on the policy and a clause entitled "Named Operators Coverage for non-owned vehicles." Id. at 531-32 , 527 N.W.2d at 322 .

1997Cognizant of the far reaching implications of holding that an employee's termination for acting in accordance with general public policy was actionable under the wrongful discharge doctrine, we expressly limited the scope of the policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136 , 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986).

1997Cognizant of the far reaching implications of holding that an employee's termination for acting in accordance with general public policy was actionable under the wrongful discharge doctrine, we expressly limited the scope of the policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136 , 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986).

1983The Supreme Court of Oregon analyzed the various policy factors favoring strict liability and concluded they did not apply to the seller of used goods in the case of Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Or. 747 , 596 P.2d 1299 (1979).

1983The Supreme Court of Oregon analyzed the various policy factors favoring strict liability and concluded they did not apply to the seller of used goods in the case of Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Or. 747 , 596 P.2d 1299 (1979).

1983All that is required is a jury verdict of negligence and damages in excess of the primary coverage....'" 103 N.J.