policy clause in Maryland

2006Significantly, the Court scrutinized the “plain meaning of the term ‘bodily injur/ ” and concluded that because “ ‘bodily injury’ occurs when asbestos is inhaled and retained in the lungs, ... at a minimum, coverage under the policy to provide a defense and indemnification of the insured is triggered upon exposure to the insured’s asbestos products during the policy period by a person who suffers bodily injury as a result of that exposure.” Id.

1997After surveying the case law around the country, the Court of Appeals emphatically held that bodily injury occurs whenever asbestos is inhaled and retained in the lungs: Considering the plain meaning of the term “bodily injury,” as used in the policy, and in light of the medical evidence concerning the development of asbestos-related diseases, we align ourselves with the overwhelming weight of authority in the country and conclude that “bodily injury” occurs when asbestos is inhaled and retained in the lungs. ... [AJt a minimum, coverage under the policy to provide a defense and indemnificatio

2010Kopp, 6 Wis.2d at 56-58 , 94 N.W.2d 224 .

2010Kopp, 6 Wis.2d at 56-58 , 94 N.W.2d 224 .

2007Id. at 210-11 , 34 A.2d 438 .

2007Id. at 210-11 , 34 A.2d 438 .

2021A policy exception, according to the State, would make the standard more difficult to apply, and most importantly, it would encroach on the responsibility and capacity of fact finders “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 319 , 99 S. Ct. at 2789 .

2021A policy exception, according to the State, would make the standard more difficult to apply, and most importantly, it would encroach on the responsibility and capacity of fact finders “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 319 , 99 S. Ct. at 2789 .

2018The Court stated, "We have made clear that the fact that an individual or class of individuals is foreseeably within a zone of danger, though important, is not the sole criterion in determining a duty to warn, even in a product liability case." Id. at 540, 69 A.3d 1028 .

2018App. at 743 , 848 A.2d 681 , this Court held that an insured breached the contract when he appeared at an EUO, but refused "to answer relevant, material questions." We reasoned that the failure to answer "questions that are relevant and material to an insurer's liability for a loss and the extent of that loss" "constitutes a failure to comply with a policy requirement to submit to an EUO." Id. at 745 , 848 A.2d 681 .

2018App. at 743 , 848 A.2d 681 , this Court held that an insured breached the contract when he appeared at an EUO, but refused "to answer relevant, material questions." We reasoned that the failure to answer "questions that are relevant and material to an insurer's liability for a loss and the extent of that loss" "constitutes a failure to comply with a policy requirement to submit to an EUO." Id. at 745 , 848 A.2d 681 .

2013First, the record did not contain the Policy or sufficient evidence to “elucidate the full contours of the policy or rule and how it is applied.” Id.

2011Moreover, a landowner who quietly acquiesces in the use of a path, or road, across his uncultivated land, resulting in no injury to him, but in great convenience to his neighbor, ought not to have thereby lost his rights” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2006First, the Circuit Court held that the privilege protected only materials generated by the committee, i.e. in the court’s language, “materials institut *95 ed by an act of a committee.” Second, the Circuit Court alternatively held that, even if the privilege were otherwise applicable, “the policy of lawful competition outweighs the policy of the privilege.” As previously mentioned, the court, as did Cardiac Surgery, relied on Price v. Howard County General Hospital, supra, 950 F.Supp. 141 , in support of this position.

2006First, the Circuit Court held that the privilege protected only materials generated by the committee, i.e. in the court’s language, “materials institut *95 ed by an act of a committee.” Second, the Circuit Court alternatively held that, even if the privilege were otherwise applicable, “the policy of lawful competition outweighs the policy of the privilege.” As previously mentioned, the court, as did Cardiac Surgery, relied on Price v. Howard County General Hospital, supra, 950 F.Supp. 141 , in support of this position.

2003To determine whether the doctrine of waiver may apply, the pivotal issue is whether a policy clause or condition proffered as a defense pertains to coverage or whether it arises from “the failure of the claimant to satisfy some ‘technical’ condition subsequent.” See Medical Services, 322 Md. at 651 , 589 A.2d at 467 ; see also Wright v. Newman, 598 F.Supp. 1178, 1198 (W.D.Mo.1984).

2002So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one ... there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.” 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2535 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44 , 104 S.Ct. at 2508-09 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 .

2002So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one ... there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.” 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2535 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44 , 104 S.Ct. at 2508-09 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 .

1997Thus, the state may not present evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is ‘substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.’ ” (Citations omitted). 276 Md. at 669 , 350 A.2d at 684 (quoting McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (E.

1997Thus, the state may not present evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is ‘substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.’ ” (Citations omitted). 276 Md. at 669 , 350 A.2d at 684 (quoting McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (E.

1997“The policy of the rule, of course, demands that both the court and prosecution take appropriate steps to assure that there is no inordinate delay.” Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md. 473, 483 , 551 A.2d 460 (1989) (citing Robertson, 72 Md.App. at 350 , 529 A.2d 847 ).

1997“The policy of the rule, of course, demands that both the court and prosecution take appropriate steps to assure that there is no inordinate delay.” Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md. 473, 483 , 551 A.2d 460 (1989) (citing Robertson, 72 Md.App. at 350 , 529 A.2d 847 ).

1995Bentz, 83 Md.App. at 530 , 575 A.2d at 798 .

1995Bentz, 83 Md.App. at 530 , 575 A.2d at 798 .

1993See, e.g., Lynch, 762 F.Supp. at 102 ; Batton, 736 P.2d at 3 ; Harris, 833 So.2d at 851.

1991Nor do we deem necessary any discussion of the “phantom” car case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 277 Md. 602 , 356 A.2d 560 (1976), which invalidated a policy clause excluding UM coverage unless there had been physical contact with an unidentified vehicle.

1991Nor do we deem necessary any discussion of the “phantom” car case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 277 Md. 602 , 356 A.2d 560 (1976), which invalidated a policy clause excluding UM coverage unless there had been physical contact with an unidentified vehicle.

1988Appellee also contends that Washington v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co., 60 Md.App. 288 , 482 A.2d 503 (1984), cert. den., 302 Md. 289 , 487 A.2d 292 (1985), and Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Miller, 52 Md.App. 602 , 451 A.2d 930 (1982), “reveal an inclination by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to regard Section 482 as applicable to claims made policies.” Because this case presents an issue of first impression, an explication of “claims made” policies is both necessary and appropriate.

1988Appellee also contends that Washington v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co., 60 Md.App. 288 , 482 A.2d 503 (1984), cert. den., 302 Md. 289 , 487 A.2d 292 (1985), and Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Miller, 52 Md.App. 602 , 451 A.2d 930 (1982), “reveal an inclination by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to regard Section 482 as applicable to claims made policies.” Because this case presents an issue of first impression, an explication of “claims made” policies is both necessary and appropriate.

1988Appellee also contends that Washington v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co., 60 Md.App. 288 , 482 A.2d 503 (1984), cert. den., 302 Md. 289 , 487 A.2d 292 (1985), and Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Miller, 52 Md.App. 602 , 451 A.2d 930 (1982), “reveal an inclination by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to regard Section 482 as applicable to claims made policies.” Because this case presents an issue of first impression, an explication of “claims made” policies is both necessary and appropriate.

1988Appellee also contends that Washington v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co., 60 Md.App. 288 , 482 A.2d 503 (1984), cert. den., 302 Md. 289 , 487 A.2d 292 (1985), and Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Miller, 52 Md.App. 602 , 451 A.2d 930 (1982), “reveal an inclination by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to regard Section 482 as applicable to claims made policies.” Because this case presents an issue of first impression, an explication of “claims made” policies is both necessary and appropriate.

1984In Kornke , the Court of Special Appeals held that the passenger (the first permittee) was using the car even though another was driving and that the “ ‘actual use’ was with ... permission ... [since] operation of the car by the second permittee was for a purpose germane to the permission granted.” Id. at 193 , 319 A.2d at 612 .

1984In Kornke , the Court of Special Appeals held that the passenger (the first permittee) was using the car even though another was driving and that the “ ‘actual use’ was with ... permission ... [since] operation of the car by the second permittee was for a purpose germane to the permission granted.” Id. at 193 , 319 A.2d at 612 .

1976Examination of the 3rd Interim Report of the Kefauver Committee of the United States Senate demonstrates the wisdom of the Legislature in thus providing adequate controls where it determines that the anti-gambling laws are to be relaxed.” The highest Court of Florida, after finding an insurer type rule as to trainers to be valid, reversed itself on rehearing on the strength of the Byers decision in State v. Baldwin, 31 So. 2d 627 , and found the rule arbitrary and unconstitutional.

1975Chief Justice Alvey warned: ‘The court will never, by assuming to rectify an instrument, add to it a term or provision which had not been agreed upon, though it may afterwards appear very expedient or proper that it should have been incorporated.’ Stiles v. Willis, 66 Md. 552, 556 , 8 A. 353, 354 .” “The general rule is accepted in Maryland that a mistake of law in the making of an agreement is not a ground for reformation, and where a mistake, either of law or of fact, is unilateral, equity will not afford relief except by rescinding the agreement on the ground of fraud, duress or other inequ

1975Chief Justice Alvey warned: ‘The court will never, by assuming to rectify an instrument, add to it a term or provision which had not been agreed upon, though it may afterwards appear very expedient or proper that it should have been incorporated.’ Stiles v. Willis, 66 Md. 552, 556 , 8 A. 353, 354 .” “The general rule is accepted in Maryland that a mistake of law in the making of an agreement is not a ground for reformation, and where a mistake, either of law or of fact, is unilateral, equity will not afford relief except by rescinding the agreement on the ground of fraud, duress or other inequ