policy doctrine in West Virginia

2013However, “when it clearly is apparent that an error has been made or that the application of an outmoded rule, due to changing conditions, results in injustice, deviation from that policy is warranted.” Woodrum v. Johnson, 210 W.Va. 762 , 766 n. 8, 559 S.E.2d 908 , 912 n. 8 (2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2013In syllabus point 2 of Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 157 W.Va. 1023 , 207 S.E.2d 169 (1974), we held that “[a]n appellate court should not overrule a previous decision ... without evidence of changing conditions or serious judicial error in interpretation sufficient to compel deviation from the basic policy of the doctrine of stare decisis, which is to promote certainty, stability, and uniformity in the law.” Of course, “when it clearly is apparent that an error has been made or that the application of an outmoded rule, due to changing conditions, results in injustice, deviation from that policy is

1978United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Eades, 150 W.Va. 238 , 144 S.E.2d 703 (1965).

1978United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Eades, 150 W.Va. 238 , 144 S.E.2d 703 (1965).

2024Pt. 4, Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W.

2024Pt. 4, Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W.

2023Corp., 188 W.

2019Va. 404 , 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993). 15 many times before, “[o]ur retaliatory discharge cases are generally based on a public policy articulated by the legislature.”44 And, as we stated in Birthisel, The term “substantial public policy” implies that the policy principle will be clearly recognized simply because it is substantial.

2014Va. 306 , 737 S.E.2d 640 , that “[a]ttorneys fees and costs awarded under West Virginia Code § 46A-5- 104 (1994) of the [WVCCPA] shall be included in the compensatory to punitive damages ratio in cases where punitive damages are available,” attorney fees and costs should be considered compensatory damages subject to offset. 34 34 Quicken challenges this holding in this appeal, arguing that the use of attorney fees and costs “as a supposed justification to enhance punitive damages is illogical and unconstitutional.” We have held that “[a]n appellate court should not overrule a previous decision

2012In this regard, we have adamantly held that “[ojnee this Court determines a statute’s clear meaning, we will adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis.” Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573 , 588 n. 17, 466 S.E.2d 424 , 439 n. 17 (1995).

2012In this regard, we have adamantly held that “[ojnee this Court determines a statute’s clear meaning, we will adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis.” Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573 , 588 n. 17, 466 S.E.2d 424 , 439 n. 17 (1995).

2011Cf. Syl. pt. 13, Long v. City of Weirton, 158 W.Va. 741 , 214 S.E.2d 832 (1975) ("The rule of stare decisis does not apply where the former decisions have misinterpreted or misapplied a rule or principle of law."), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Pritchard v. Arvon, 186 W.Va. 445 , 413 S.E.2d 100 (1991).

2011Cf. Syl. pt. 13, Long v. City of Weirton, 158 W.Va. 741 , 214 S.E.2d 832 (1975) ("The rule of stare decisis does not apply where the former decisions have misinterpreted or misapplied a rule or principle of law."), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Pritchard v. Arvon, 186 W.Va. 445 , 413 S.E.2d 100 (1991).

2006I therefore disagree with the majority of my colleagues and believe that Richfield Oil's "stream-of-export" rule, rather than, as they believe, the policy rule [13] set forth in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 , 96 S.Ct. 535 , 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976) and Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734 , 98 S.Ct. 1388 , 55 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978), provides the precedent that should control the judicial outcome of the issues raised on this appeal.

2006I therefore disagree with the majority of my colleagues and believe that Richfield Oil's "stream-of-export" rule, rather than, as they believe, the policy rule [13] set forth in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 , 96 S.Ct. 535 , 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976) and Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734 , 98 S.Ct. 1388 , 55 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978), provides the precedent that should control the judicial outcome of the issues raised on this appeal.

2006I therefore disagree with the majority of my colleagues and believe that Richfield Oil's "stream-of-export" rule, rather than, as they believe, the policy rule [13] set forth in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 , 96 S.Ct. 535 , 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976) and Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734 , 98 S.Ct. 1388 , 55 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978), provides the precedent that should control the judicial outcome of the issues raised on this appeal.

2006I therefore disagree with the majority of my colleagues and believe that Richfield Oil's "stream-of-export" rule, rather than, as they believe, the policy rule [13] set forth in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 , 96 S.Ct. 535 , 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976) and Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734 , 98 S.Ct. 1388 , 55 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978), provides the precedent that should control the judicial outcome of the issues raised on this appeal.

2005Co., 210 W.Va. 476 , 557 S.E.2d 883 (2001): Where an insured has previously brought a claim for consequential damages under Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994), and a final judgment has been entered with respect to such claim, the insured is not thereby precluded under principles of res judicata or claim preclusion from bringing a subsequent action asserting causes of action predicated upon a defendant insurer's alleged bad faith or other intentional misconduct in the course of settling the insured's policy claim.

2005Co., 210 W.Va. 476 , 557 S.E.2d 883 (2001): Where an insured has previously brought a claim for consequential damages under Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994), and a final judgment has been entered with respect to such claim, the insured is not thereby precluded under principles of res judicata or claim preclusion from bringing a subsequent action asserting causes of action predicated upon a defendant insurer's alleged bad faith or other intentional misconduct in the course of settling the insured's policy claim.

2005Co., 210 W.Va. 476 , 557 S.E.2d 883 (2001): Where an insured has previously brought a claim for consequential damages under Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994), and a final judgment has been entered with respect to such claim, the insured is not thereby precluded under principles of res judicata or claim preclusion from bringing a subsequent action asserting causes of action predicated upon a defendant insurer's alleged bad faith or other intentional misconduct in the course of settling the insured's policy claim.

2005Co., 210 W.Va. 476 , 557 S.E.2d 883 (2001): Where an insured has previously brought a claim for consequential damages under Marshall v. Saseen, 192 W.Va. 94 , 450 S.E.2d 791 (1994), and a final judgment has been entered with respect to such claim, the insured is not thereby precluded under principles of res judicata or claim preclusion from bringing a subsequent action asserting causes of action predicated upon a defendant insurer's alleged bad faith or other intentional misconduct in the course of settling the insured's policy claim.

2003As Justice Cleckley pointed out in Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535 , 546 n. 13, 474 S.E.2d *810 465, 476 n. 13 (1996), "[s]tare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent." That is, "[a]s a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere ... to the holdings of our prior cases[.]" County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 668 , 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3141 , 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).

2003As Justice Cleckley pointed out in Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535 , 546 n. 13, 474 S.E.2d *810 465, 476 n. 13 (1996), "[s]tare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent." That is, "[a]s a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere ... to the holdings of our prior cases[.]" County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 668 , 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3141 , 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).

2003As Justice Cleckley pointed out in Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535 , 546 n. 13, 474 S.E.2d 465 , 476 n. 13 (1996), “[s]tare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent.” That is, “[ajs a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere ... to the holdings of our prior cases[.]” County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 668 , 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3141 , 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).

2003As Justice Cleckley pointed out in Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535 , 546 n. 13, 474 S.E.2d *810 465, 476 n. 13 (1996), "[s]tare decisis is the policy of the court to stand by precedent." That is, "[a]s a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere ... to the holdings of our prior cases[.]" County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 668 , 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3141 , 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).

1996“Thus, an occurrence policy would cover a claim where the alleged malpractice occurred during the term of the policy even if the claim is not made or the malpractice not discovered until after the policy has lapsed_” PA Osteopathic Medical Ass’n. v. Foster, 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 368 , 372-373, 579 A.2d 989 , 991 (1990).

1996“Thus, an occurrence policy would cover a claim where the alleged malpractice occurred during the term of the policy even if the claim is not made or the malpractice not discovered until after the policy has lapsed_” PA Osteopathic Medical Ass’n. v. Foster, 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 368 , 372-373, 579 A.2d 989 , 991 (1990).

1995Moreover, while the mortgagee is the named payee of the proceeds, “there are no other provisions in his favor.” Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added). 5 Considering the aforementioned principles and the fact that our legislature has prescribed “the New York Standard as an exclusive form of fire insurance policy to be used in this State,” Kirk v. Firemen’s Insurance Co., of Newark, N.J., 107 W.Va. 666, 668 , 150 S.E. 2 (1929), we conclude that the mortgage clause in the Jones’ policy is a standard mortgage clause. 6 See Meadows v. Employers’ Fire Insurance Co., 171 W.Va. 337 , 298 5.E.2d 8

1995Therefore, the Cowger court ultimately held that “an insurer may defend a policy claim on the ground of a misrepresentation which caused the issuance of the policy but with respect to which the fact or facts misrepresented were not necessarily related to the loss sustained.... ” 295 Ark. at 256 , 748 S.W.2d at 336 .

1995Therefore, the Cowger court ultimately held that “an insurer may defend a policy claim on the ground of a misrepresentation which caused the issuance of the policy but with respect to which the fact or facts misrepresented were not necessarily related to the loss sustained.... ” 295 Ark. at 256 , 748 S.W.2d at 336 .

1995Moreover, while the mortgagee is the named payee of the proceeds, “there are no other provisions in his favor.” Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added). 5 Considering the aforementioned principles and the fact that our legislature has prescribed “the New York Standard as an exclusive form of fire insurance policy to be used in this State,” Kirk v. Firemen’s Insurance Co., of Newark, N.J., 107 W.Va. 666, 668 , 150 S.E. 2 (1929), we conclude that the mortgage clause in the Jones’ policy is a standard mortgage clause. 6 See Meadows v. Employers’ Fire Insurance Co., 171 W.Va. 337 , 298 5.E.2d 8

1995Moreover, while the mortgagee is the named payee of the proceeds, “there are no other provisions in his favor.” Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added). 5 Considering the aforementioned principles and the fact that our legislature has prescribed “the New York Standard as an exclusive form of fire insurance policy to be used in this State,” Kirk v. Firemen’s Insurance Co., of Newark, N.J., 107 W.Va. 666, 668 , 150 S.E. 2 (1929), we conclude that the mortgage clause in the Jones’ policy is a standard mortgage clause. 6 See Meadows v. Employers’ Fire Insurance Co., 171 W.Va. 337 , 298 5.E.2d 8

1995Moreover, while the mortgagee is the named payee of the proceeds, “there are no other provisions in his favor.” Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added). 5 Considering the aforementioned principles and the fact that our legislature has prescribed “the New York Standard as an exclusive form of fire insurance policy to be used in this State,” Kirk v. Firemen’s Insurance Co., of Newark, N.J., 107 W.Va. 666, 668 , 150 S.E. 2 (1929), we conclude that the mortgage clause in the Jones’ policy is a standard mortgage clause. 6 See Meadows v. Employers’ Fire Insurance Co., 171 W.Va. 337 , 298 5.E.2d 8

1993Id. at 286 , 75 Ill.Dec. at 889 , 458 N.E.2d at 57 .

1993Id. at 286 , 75 Ill.Dec. at 889 , 458 N.E.2d at 57 .