policy defense in Missouri

1972Co., supra. In the case of Greer v. Zurich Insurance Co., Mo.Sup., 441 S.W.2d 15 at l.c. 30, the court said: “ * * * In general, policies should be given a reasonable construction in accordance with their terms and should be interpreted to provide coverage when reasonably possible to do so rather than to defeat it.” Ambiguous provisions in an insurance policy cannot avail as a policy defense.

1970This same policy provision which was pleaded in defendant’s Answer was discussed in Greer v. Zurich Insurance Company, Mo., 441 S.W.2d 15 and the court stated at 1.c. 31: “ * * * Whether this is termed a condition precedent or subsequent, or a forfeiture is immaterial» It, in effect, provides for an avoidance or forfeiture not of the policy but of a claim under the policy because the insurance contract has proscribed recourse to the legal remedy.

2008Id.

2003Rosa, 73 S.W.3d at 866 .

2004In Farmers Mutual, the insured sent written notice of cancellation to the insurance company, but his failure to comply with the policy requirement of returning the policy together with the written notice caused him to remain liable to the company for future assessments. 279 S.W.2d at 526-27 .

1992In Farmers Mutual, the insured sent written notice of cancellation to the insurance company, but his failure to comply with the policy requirement of returning the policy together with the written notice caused him to remain liable to the company for future assessments. 279 S.W.2d at 526-27 .

1919Co., 19 Mo. 506 , that though one is a violator of the law in assaulting another, yet if after such assault he seeks to withdraw from the difficulty and avoid further trouble, but is followed and killed by his adversary, his death does not fall within the meaning of the policy clause similar to this one.

1919Co., 19 Mo. 506 , that though one is a violator of the law in assaulting another, yet if after such assault he seeks to withdraw from the difficulty and avoid further trouble, but is followed and killed by hisi adversary, his death does not fall within the meaning of the policy clause similar to this one.

2021Id. at 218-19 .

2020See Allen v. Bryers, 512 S.W.3d 17, 36 (Mo. banc 2016); HIAR Holding, 411 S.W.3d at 272 .

2020In HIAR Holding, the Missouri Supreme Court found the defense of failure to cooperate was inapplicable under the particular (and stipulated) facts of that case. 411 S.W.3d at 272 . 36 (C) The trial court did not err in giving Instruction Nos. 16 and 22 Northrop’s sixth point relates to the instructions submitting London’s and OneBeacon’s “late notice of claim” affirmative defenses.

2014Id. at 875 .

2014Id. (rejecting a claim that the letter of dismissal had to use the language of the rule and finding it sufficient so long as the letter adequately sets forth the conduct with which the employee is charged); see also Dunlap, 103 S.W.3d at 790 (“While a suspension or dismissal letter need not cite the specific policy or rule the employee violated, if the specific policy or rule is not cited, the letter must explain the policy or rule and indicate how the employee’s conduct was in violation thereof’).

2012Id.

2012Viewing the policy language between the policy in Blair and the policy at bar as similar, the trial court boiled down Blair to one key sentence: “The policy here requires nonpayment, notice, and the passage of 10 days — in that order — before cancellation takes effect.” 118 S.W.3d at 607 .

2007Id. at 1247 .

2007Crewse, 706 S.W.2d at 43-44 ; Silman Custom Painting, Inc., 990 F.2d at 1067.

2007Crewse, 706 S.W.2d at 42-43 .

2005To trigger the policy exception, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated that the reasons for the employee’s discharge must implicate “a constitutional provision, a statute, or a regulation based upon statute.” Id.

2004Id. at 550 .

2002In our view, the proper approach is that suggested by State v. Cusumano, supra. We hold that a suspension letter need not cite the specific policy or rule the employee violated.

2002As a result of its analysis, the court stated a preference for the application of estoppel when evaluating an insurer’s election of a policy defense. “[A]n examination of the cases shows estoppel, with some element of unfairness, lack of notice, or other detriment to the insured, rather than voluntary waiver without such element, is the preferred theory when the insurer elects a policy defense.” Id. at 388 (quoting Macalco Inc. v. Gulf Ins.

1996MIGA places its reliance on King Louie Bowling Corporation of Missouri v. Missouri Insurance Guaranty Association, 735 S.W.2d 35 (Mo.App.1987).

1995Id. 831-33 . *946 The jury here clearly intended to, and gave interest.

1995Dickhans, 705 S.W.2d 104 , concerns a policy requirement to file the proof of loss within sixty days after such proof is requested. 5 .

1992Statutory provisions that waive sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. 796 S.W.2d at 623 .