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30 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bogle v. Conwaygreen2 sentences1983The situation is not like that presented in Bogle v. Conway, 199 Kan. 707 , 433 P.2d 407 (1967), upon which MFA relies for its position, where there was great potential for conflict of interest between insurer and insured, that is, for a policy defense to be built up by the carrier at the expense of the insured, and there was a particular need for full awareness on the part of those insured in order to consent to dual representation by carrier’s counsel. 1983The situation is not like that presented in Bogle v. Conway, 199 Kan. 707 , 433 P.2d 407 (1967), upon which MFA relies for its position, where there was great potential for conflict of interest between insurer and insured, that is, for a policy defense to be built up by the carrier at the expense of the insured, and there was a particular need for full awareness on the part of those insured in order to consent to dual representation by carrier’s counsel. | 1 | 2 |
Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n of America v. Underwriters at Lloyd'sgreen1 sentence2018See 199 Kan. at 714 , 433 P.2d 407 ; see also Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n v. Underwriters , 761 F.Supp. 1485 , 1492 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Raymond Pendleton v. Pan American Fire and Casualty Companygreen1 sentence1998In sum, Bogle addresses whether an insurer will be estopped to assert a policy defense; it does not purport to discuss the proof required to establish a claim that an insurer breached the implied warranty to use reasonable care and act in good faith in defending a suit against its insured. *627 These factors also distinguish a second case relied on by Sours, Pendleton v. Pan American Fire and Casualty Company, 317 F.2d 96, 99 (10th Cir. 1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hilton
green
2 sentences2020State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 845, 849 , 286 P.3d 871 (2012). 2020State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 845, 849 , 286 P.3d 871 (2012). | 8 | 2014–2020 |
State v. Roat
green
2 sentences2025State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 581 , 590, 466 P.3d 439 (2020). 2025State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 581 , 590, 466 P.3d 439 (2020). | 3 | 2022–2025 |
State v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences2020In assessing whether an issue has become moot, we consider whether "'it is clearly and convincingly shown the actual controversy has ended, the only judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose, and it would not impact any of the parties' rights.'" 295 Kan. at 840-41 . 2020Mootness is a doctrine of court policy, not a question of jurisdiction; this court's review of mootness is unlimited. 295 Kan. at 841 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bruns v. Kansas State Board of Technical Professions
green
1 sentence2017The Bruns court referred to the following factors to determine whether a policy is a rule or regulation under the Filing Act: (1) the agency did not exercise any discretion in applying the written policy; (2) the rule had general application to those having to do business with the agency; and (3) the agency treats its internal policy as having the effect of law. 255 Kan. at 733-34 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Boone v. Lowry
green
2 sentences2003App. 2d 293, 299-300 , 657 P.2d 64 [, rev. denied 232 Kan. 875 ] (1983), stated: ‘We know of no reason why, in Lowry’s absence, if it could have been of any avail, MFA could not have made a unilateral reservation of rights, so far as Lowry was concerned, and defendant in his absence.’ “The Court concludes as a matter of law that there was no reasonable basis for Mid-Continent to not participate in the mediation or defense of die underlying action on the basis that it would risk estoppel from relying upon die breach of the duty of cooperation. 2003As the defendant itself states on page 8 of its brief: *270 ‘The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the insured’s failure to appear at trial did not constitute non-cooperation based upon the facts and circumstances of the case and did not rule upon the trial court’s finding of estoppel.’ “In Watson the Kansas Supreme Court explicatively states on page 870 of Volume 227: “We see no purpose in adding unnecessarily to the length of this opinion by discussing the presence or absence of estoppel since the appeal must be affirmed anyway for failure to establish the policy defense.’ “Ju | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Marshel Investments, Inc. v. Cohen
green
1 sentence2001App. 2d 20, 22 , 975 P.2d 1226 (1999); Marshel Investments, Inc. v. Cohen, 6 Kan. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Weinlood v. Fisher & Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001App. 2d 20, 22 , 975 P.2d 1226 (1999); Marshel Investments, Inc. v. Cohen, 6 Kan. 2001This court has recognized the difference between a claim against an insurer based on a policy and a claim for negligent procurement of a policy. *631 See Weinlood v. Fisher & Assocs., Inc., 26 Kan. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hays v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2000In Hays , our Supreme Court concluded that an insurance agent can incur personal liability for a loss suffered by the agent’s principal under a policy claim resulting from the agent’s failure to forward an application for insurance to the insurance company. 225 Kan. 205 , Syl. ¶ 3. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Parde v. Parde
green
1 sentence2000Accordingly, Parde concluded that “a principled approach to this issue should be consistent with the basic policy rule that the marital estate should include only property created by the marital partnership.” 258 Neb. at 108 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Bruns v. Kansas State Board of Technical Professions
green
1 sentence1997This court held the policy was a rule or regulation, as defined by statute which had to be filed and published to have any force and effect. 19 Kan. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Furek v. University of Delaware
green
2 sentences1993The court was critical of the policy analysis in Bradshaw and subsequent cases following Bradshaw , noting these cases provided “no empirical support for the proposition that supervision is inversely related to the maturation of college students.” 594 A.2d at 518 . 1993The court was critical of the policy analysis in Bradshaw and subsequent cases following Bradshaw , noting these cases provided "no empirical support for the proposition that supervision is inversely related to the maturation of college students." 594 A.2d at 518 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Horinek
green
2 sentences1990A policy or clause is ambiguous if the words conveying meaning or intent are subject to two or more meanings. 233 Kan. at 180 . 1990A policy or clause is ambiguous if the words conveying meaning or intent are subject to two or more meanings. 233 Kan. at 180 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Watson v. Jones
green
2 sentences1983Watson v. Jones, 227 Kan. 862 , 610 P.2d 619 (1980). 1983Watson v. Jones, 227 Kan. 862 , 610 P.2d 619 (1980). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ray v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1980Ray v. Johnson, 81 Ill. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee
green
1 sentence1938(Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 .) It may be that if the United States saw fit to avail itself of machinery furnished by the state it would not escape the tax on that ground alone. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Continental Casualty Co. v. Bruden
green
1 sentence1937The term ‘accidental means’ as used in such a policy requirement must be interpreted according to the usage of the average man.” (Syl.) In the case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Bruden, 178 Ark. 683 , heat prostration was discussed where the insured was overcome and died after working on a hot engine in the cellar, and it was held to be an injury sustained through external, violent and purely accidental means. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
State Insurance v. Gray
neutral
1 sentence1932Co., 132 Kan. 539 , 296 Pac. 710 ; Insurance Co. v. Weeks, 45 Kan. 751 , 26 Pac. 410 ; Insurance Co. v. Gray, 44 Kan. 731 , 25 Pac. 197 .) Appellant argues that to require defendant to pay the loss of plaintiff’s household goods under the policy would be a violation of our statute (R. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Phenix Insurance Co. of Brooklyn v. Weeks
neutral
1 sentence1932Co., 132 Kan. 539 , 296 Pac. 710 ; Insurance Co. v. Weeks, 45 Kan. 751 , 26 Pac. 410 ; Insurance Co. v. Gray, 44 Kan. 731 , 25 Pac. 197 .) Appellant argues that to require defendant to pay the loss of plaintiff’s household goods under the policy would be a violation of our statute (R. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Holyfield v. Farmers Alliance Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1932Co., 132 Kan. 539 , 296 Pac. 710 ; Insurance Co. v. Weeks, 45 Kan. 751 , 26 Pac. 410 ; Insurance Co. v. Gray, 44 Kan. 731 , 25 Pac. 197 .) Appellant argues that to require defendant to pay the loss of plaintiff’s household goods under the policy would be a violation of our statute (R. 1932Co., 132 Kan. 539 , 296 Pac. 710 ; Insurance Co. v. Weeks, 45 Kan. 751 , 26 Pac. 410 ; Insurance Co. v. Gray, 44 Kan. 731 , 25 Pac. 197 .) Appellant argues that to require defendant to pay the loss of plaintiff’s household goods under the policy would be a violation of our statute (R. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Powell v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York
green
1 sentence1932The insurer has by such pleas complied with the “incontestable” clause, and it will avail the beneficiary nothing to dismiss his suit.’ ( 313 Ill. 161 , 144 N. E. loc. cit. 828, 36 A. L. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Insurance Co. of North America v. Baer
green
2 sentences1917In Insurance Co. v. Baer, 94 Kan. 777 , 147 Pac. 840 , this court said: “An insurance agent who issues a policy of insurance in violation of the instructions of his company is liable to the company for the amount of insurance paid and expenses incurred by the company on account of a loss under the policy.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) If an insurance agent is liable for issuing a policy in violation of his instructions, he must be liable for his failure to cancel one when instructed so to do. 1917In Insurance Co. v. Baer, 94 Kan. 777 , 147 Pac. 840 , this court said: “An insurance agent who issues a policy of insurance in violation of the instructions of his company is liable to the company for the amount of insurance paid and expenses incurred by the company on account of a loss under the policy.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) If an insurance agent is liable for issuing a policy in violation of his instructions, he must be liable for his failure to cancel one when instructed so to do. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Queen City Fire Insurance v. First National Bank
neutral
1 sentence1917“It is the duty of the principal’s agent when ordered peremptorily to cancel a risk, to exercise reasonable diligence to execute the order, and his neglect to do so renders him liable to the company for a resulting loss.” (2 Joyce on The Law of Insurance, 2d ed., § 666.) (See, also, Insurance Co. v. First National Bank, 18 N. D. 603 ; Franklin Ins. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Phenix Insurance v. Munger
green
1 sentence1898In Insurance Co. v. Munger, 49 Kan. 178 , 30 Pac. 120 , in the second paragraph of the syllabus, it is said : “An agent of an insurance company who is given full power to receive proposals of insurance against loss and damage by fire within a given territory in this state, and is authorized to fix rates of premium, to receive moneys, and to countersign, issue and renew policies of insurance, is a general agent of such company, and may, after loss, bind the company by a parol waiver of the conditions as to furnishing complete proofs of loss within thirty days after such loss shall have occurred | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Phenix Insurance v. Bowdre
neutral
1 sentence1898Co. v. Bowdrie, 67 Miss. 620 , 7 South. 597 , and Franklin F. Ins. | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.