policy claim in Michigan

2018In Harris, the Court stated that the plaintiff could not take advantage of the uncoordinated medical benefit provision in the policy because his claim did not flow from the subject policy but instead arose “solely by statute.” Id. at 472 .

2018In Harris, the Court stated that the plaintiff could not take advantage of the uncoordinated medical benefit provision in the policy because his claim did not flow from the subject policy but instead arose “solely by statute.” Id. at 472 .

2021Bazzi, 502 Mich at 401 .

2020Bazzi, 502 Mich at 400-401 , was a mandatory-benefits case, and it thus addressed the separate question of whether a no-fault insurer could raise the common-law defense of fraud in the procurement of the policy to a claim for coverage mandated by the no-fault act or whether the Legislature abrogated that defense when it enacted the no-fault act.

2004Freeman, supra at 700 , 443 N.W.2d 734 , correctly identified the first question under policy language before the Court as whether "the insured acted either intentionally or criminally." I agree with the lead opinion that the policy requirement that McCarn acted intentionally or criminally is met.

2004Freeman, supra at 700 , correctly identified the first question under policy language before the Court as whether “the insured acted either intentionally or criminally.” I agree with the lead opinion that the policy requirement that McCarn acted intentionally or criminally is met.

1999When a conflict of interest— even a mere possibility thereof—arises, the law suggests (if it does not require) that the insurer act promptly and openly, on peril of estoppel, preferably upon a record made in the pending case (if pending as here) with the court fully apprised of all necessary details; also that the insurer act thus on time for arms' length actions which may protect the respective rights of both parties to the contract of insurance. [ Id. at 38 , 135 N.W.2d 353 .] We disagree that this statement requires the insurance company, which is not a party to the suit, to notify a plaint

1986When a conflict of interest—even a mere possibility thereof—arises, the law suggests (if it does not require) that the insurer act promptly and openly, on peril of estoppel, preferably upon a record made in the pending case (if pending as here) with the court fully apprised of all necessary details; also that the insurer act thus on time for arms’ length actions which may protect the respective rights of both parties to the contract of insurance. [Meirthew, supra, p 38 .

2020The federal appeals court concluded, “[i]f the teaming policy causes racial discrimination and is not justified by business necessity, then it violates Title VII as ‘disparate impact’ employment discrimination— and whether it causes racial discrimination and whether it nonetheless is justified by business necessity are issues common to the entire class and therefore appropriate for class-wide determination.” Id. -7- Also instructive is Ellis v Costco Wholesale Corp, 285 FRD 492 (ND Cal, 2012), which follows the reasoning of McReynolds in distinguishing the claims of the plaintiffs alleging dis

2019Id.

2019Id. at 378-379 .

2018See, e.g., Agee v. Brown , 73 So.3d 882 , 886 (Fla. App., 2011) ("The best way to protect the public from unethical attorneys in the drafting of wills ... is entirely within the province of the Florida *337 Legislature."); Sandford v. Metcalfe , 110 Conn. App. 162 , 169-170, 954 A.2d 188 (2008) ("[I]t is ill-advised, as a matter of public policy, for an attorney to draft a will in which she is to receive a bequest"; "[t]here is, however, no statute barring an attorney who drafted a testamentary instrument from inheriting by the instrument she drafted"; and "[i]f the law is to be changed to mak

2018See, e.g., Agee v. Brown , 73 So.3d 882 , 886 (Fla. App., 2011) ("The best way to protect the public from unethical attorneys in the drafting of wills ... is entirely within the province of the Florida *337 Legislature."); Sandford v. Metcalfe , 110 Conn. App. 162 , 169-170, 954 A.2d 188 (2008) ("[I]t is ill-advised, as a matter of public policy, for an attorney to draft a will in which she is to receive a bequest"; "[t]here is, however, no statute barring an attorney who drafted a testamentary instrument from inheriting by the instrument she drafted"; and "[i]f the law is to be changed to mak

2018This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours-of identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternatives-is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's. [ Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56 , 67, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] If the current policy framework is insufficient to protect a decedent when MRPC 1.8(c) has been breached, and any further inquiry into the

2018This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours-of identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternatives-is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's. [ Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56 , 67, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] If the current policy framework is insufficient to protect a decedent when MRPC 1.8(c) has been breached, and any further inquiry into the

2005Relying on Herweyer v Clark Hwy Services, Inc, 455 Mich 14 ; 564 NW2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and “should receive close judicial scrutiny.” 262 Mich App at 687 . 471 Mich 904 (2004).

2005Relying on Herweyer v Clark Hwy Services, Inc, 455 Mich 14 ; 564 NW2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and “should receive close judicial scrutiny.” 262 Mich App at 687 . 471 Mich 904 (2004).

2005In Williams, the panel considered identical policy language and concluded that the one-year limitation was “not so unreasonable as to be unenforceable” because the policy required that a claim be filed within a year, rather than a lawsuit. 262 Mich App 679 ; 687 NW2d 304 (2004).

2005In Williams, the panel considered identical policy language and concluded that the one-year limitation was “not so unreasonable as to be unenforceable” because the policy required that a claim be filed within a year, rather than a lawsuit. 262 Mich App 679 ; 687 NW2d 304 (2004).

2005Services, Inc., 455 Mich. 14 , 564 N.W.2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and "should receive close judicial scrutiny." 262 Mich.App. at 687 , 687 N.W.2d 304 . [4] 471 Mich. 904 , 688 N.W.2d 93 (2004). [5] Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320 , 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). [6] Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374 , 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). [7] Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins.

2005Relying on Herweyer v Clark Hwy Services, Inc, 455 Mich 14 ; 564 NW2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and “should receive close judicial scrutiny.” 262 Mich App at 687 . 471 Mich 904 (2004).

2005Services, Inc., 455 Mich. 14 , 564 N.W.2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and "should receive close judicial scrutiny." 262 Mich.App. at 687 , 687 N.W.2d 304 . [4] 471 Mich. 904 , 688 N.W.2d 93 (2004). [5] Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320 , 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). [6] Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374 , 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). [7] Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins.

2005Services, Inc., 455 Mich. 14 , 564 N.W.2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and "should receive close judicial scrutiny." 262 Mich.App. at 687 , 687 N.W.2d 304 . [4] 471 Mich. 904 , 688 N.W.2d 93 (2004). [5] Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320 , 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). [6] Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374 , 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). [7] Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins.

2005Services, Inc., 455 Mich. 14 , 564 N.W.2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and "should receive close judicial scrutiny." 262 Mich.App. at 687 , 687 N.W.2d 304 . [4] 471 Mich. 904 , 688 N.W.2d 93 (2004). [5] Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320 , 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). [6] Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374 , 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). [7] Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins.

2005Services, Inc., 455 Mich. 14 , 564 N.W.2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and "should receive close judicial scrutiny." 262 Mich.App. at 687 , 687 N.W.2d 304 . [4] 471 Mich. 904 , 688 N.W.2d 93 (2004). [5] Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320 , 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). [6] Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374 , 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). [7] Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins.

2005Services, Inc., 455 Mich. 14 , 564 N.W.2d 857 (1997), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the insurance policy was adhesive and "should receive close judicial scrutiny." 262 Mich.App. at 687 , 687 N.W.2d 304 . [4] 471 Mich. 904 , 688 N.W.2d 93 (2004). [5] Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320 , 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). [6] Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374 , 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). [7] Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins.

2001The circuit court ruled that “the insurance policy can only be void if there’s a material misrepresentation in the application for no-fault insurance.” The court granted summary disposition in favor of Ms. Cohen, and ordered that her uninsured motorist claim be submitted to arbitration. 5 The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, 6 and later issued a judgment in which it affirmed the circuit court order that sent Ms. Cohen’s uninsured motorist claim to arbitration. 7 238 Mich App 602 ; 606 NW2d 664 (1999). 8 Acia has applied to this Court for leave to appeal. n This case involves issues co

2001The circuit court ruled that “the insurance policy can only be void if there’s a material misrepresentation in the application for no-fault insurance.” The court granted summary disposition in favor of Ms. Cohen, and ordered that her uninsured motorist claim be submitted to arbitration. 5 The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, 6 and later issued a judgment in which it affirmed the circuit court order that sent Ms. Cohen’s uninsured motorist claim to arbitration. 7 238 Mich App 602 ; 606 NW2d 664 (1999). 8 Acia has applied to this Court for leave to appeal. n This case involves issues co

2000See Commercial Standard Ins Co of Fort Worth, Texas v Hitson, 73 NM 328 , 332; 388 P2d 56 (1963) (Interpreting a standard mortgage clause, the court stated “[a]s we view this language, it clearly states that where the payment has been made to the mortgagee, but the insurance coverage had been voided for some reason, there was present a right in the insurance companies to recover back from the ‘mortgagor or owner’ ”); MFA Mut Ins Co v Huddleston, 459 SW2d 104, 106 (Mo App, 1970) (“[Wjhere the policy is ‘void’ as to the insured . . . , the Company [insurer] may acquire the mortgage security upon

2000The federal district court disagreed: Relying primarily on Hawkeye-Security Ins Co v Vector Construction Co, 185 Mich App 369 ; 460 NW2d 329 (1990), Plaintiff argues that there was no accident in this case and thus no occurrence to trigger its obligations under the insurance policy.

2000The federal district court disagreed: Relying primarily on Hawkeye-Security Ins Co v Vector Construction Co, 185 Mich App 369 ; 460 NW2d 329 (1990), Plaintiff argues that there was no accident in this case and thus no occurrence to trigger its obligations under the insurance policy.

1999When a conflict of interest— even a mere possibility thereof—arises, the law suggests (if it does not require) that the insurer act promptly and openly, on peril of estoppel, preferably upon a record made in the pending case (if pending as here) with the court fully apprised of all necessary details; also that the insurer act thus on time for arms' length actions which may protect the respective rights of both parties to the contract of insurance. [ Id. at 38 , 135 N.W.2d 353 .] We disagree that this statement requires the insurance company, which is not a party to the suit, to notify a plaint

1997People v Schultz, 435 Mich 517, 531-532 ; 460 NW2d 505 (1990).

1997People v Schultz, 435 Mich 517, 531-532 ; 460 NW2d 505 (1990).

1993Because we are constitutionally obligated to afford full effect to the Kentucky decision, we need not consider this argument. " '[A] civilized State is accustomed and considers itself bound to observe the principle of comity.’ ” Rubin v Gallagher, supra at 128, quoting Pritchard v Norton, 106 US 124, 129 ; 1 S Ct 102 ; 27 L Ed 104 (1882).

1993Because we are constitutionally obligated to afford full effect to the Kentucky decision, we need not consider this argument. " '[A] civilized State is accustomed and considers itself bound to observe the principle of comity.’ ” Rubin v Gallagher, supra at 128, quoting Pritchard v Norton, 106 US 124, 129 ; 1 S Ct 102 ; 27 L Ed 104 (1882).