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47 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1936–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States Fire Insurance v. Dickersongreen2 sentences2022Co. v. Dickerson, 90 So. 613 (1921)). 2022See Trif, 322 So. 3d at 673 (recognizing that “[a] century ago, the Florida Supreme Court read into a policy the requirement that a post-loss misrepresentation be intentional to void the policy.” (citing Dickerson, 90 So. at 618 )). 3 Security First relies on Mezadieu v. Safepoint Insurance Co., 315 So. 3d 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). | 1 | 2 |
Rosenthal v. Scottgreen2 sentences1977We have resisted these assaults against the finality of decisions of the Courts of Appeal in all of those cases where such decisions were entitled to be accorded finality." Karlin v. City of Miami Beach, 113 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1959). [6] For example, a divided court (4-3) in Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960), held that conflict with dictum in a forty year old case served to give jurisdiction, although there was no discussion as to how the dictum had become precedential or why the "conflict" fit within the policy framework that had just been formulated. [7] See Rosent 1977See Rosenthal v. Scott, 131 So.2d 480 (Fla.1961), deciding by a divided court (5-2) to request an opinion on a per curiam reversal. . | 1 | 2 |
Ring v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2020See also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible. | 1 | 1 |
Hurst v. Floridagreen1 sentence2020See also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible. | 1 | 1 |
McKinney v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2020See also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible. | 1 | 1 |
Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, etc. v. Crystal Marie Harringtongreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Harrington, 154 So. 3d at 1112 (describing a "long line of well- established precedent" under which a vehicle cannot be treated as "both insured and uninsured under the same policy"); Smith v. Valley Forge Ins. 2016See, e.g., Harrington, 154 So.3d at 1112 (describing a “long line of well-established precedent” under which a vehicle cannot be treated as “both insured and uninsured under the same policy”); Smith v. Valley Forge Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Continental Assur. Co. v. Carrollgreen1 sentence2015See Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Carroll, 485 So.2d 406 (Fla.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Howell v. Stategreen2 sentences2013As to the portion of the claim involving the guilt phase, this Court concluded “the low probability of success, combined with the tremendous potential for alienating the jury by blaming the trooper for his own death, fully justifies trial counsel’s strategic decision to forego presentation of the alleged policy violation during the guilt phase as being well within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 703-04 (footnote omitted). 2013This Court made a similar holding as to whether counsel was ineffective in failing to use the alleged policy violation in support of a nonstatutory mitigator, concluding that “counsel made a reasonable strategic decision that introducing the evidence of the policy violation would have alienated the jury without contributing substantially to mitigation.” Id. at 704 . | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. Reshagreen2 sentences2010See 648 So.2d at 1190 . 2010See 648 So.2d at 1190 . | 1 | 1 |
Whitehurst v. Campgreen1 sentence2008See Whitehurst v. Camp, 699 So.2d 679 , 684 n. 2 (Fla. 1997). [5] Bankruptcy trustees are sometimes said to have by law "no conscience and no memory" so that they are free to reject contracts and avoid liens incurred by the insolvent debtor. | 1 | 1 |
Merck v. Stategreen1 sentence2004Concerning nonstatutory mitigation, we have stated that "[e]vidence is mitigating if, in fairness or in the totality of the defendant's life or character, it may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability for the crime committed." Merck v. State, 763 So.2d 295, 298 (Fla.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Sturiano v. Brooksgreen1 sentence2004Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Tempelis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green1 sentence2002In denying coverage, Aetna relied upon the policy clause that provided: "We do not provide coverage for any insured who has: a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance; b. made false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct; related to this insurance." Id. at 219. | 1 | 1 |
Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mortgreen1 sentence2001As the Florida Supreme Court pointed out in Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla.1989), "The clear intent of the underlying policy of the rule was to terminate all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for further intervention of the judicial process." The plaintiff now argues that the form of the offer of judgment was not proper; however, such claim is not cognizable because it was not raised in the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Cassisi v. Maytag Co.green1 sentence2000Indeed, Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So.2d 1140, 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in adopting the Greco inference, recognized: Considering the complexities of products litigation, and again the policy factors of Section 402A, such a solution is the better reasoned one since it is the manufacturer—rather than the plaintiff—which presumably is in the better position to produce the technical evidence required for determining the existence of a product's defect. | 1 | 1 |
| Tenney v. City of Miami Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State, Dept. of Ins. v. Ins. Services Officegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leon Kroungold and Thaddeus S. Bochey v. Stanton L. Triestergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dziokonski v. Babineaugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barker v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Avins v. Rutgersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gerner v. Moog Industries, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| McDonald v. Dept. of Banking and Financegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Acme Specialty Corporation v. City of Miamigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schooley v. Juddgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Karlin v. City of Miami Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota
green
2 sentences1977We have resisted these assaults against the finality of decisions of the Courts of Appeal in all of those cases where such decisions were entitled to be accorded finality." Karlin v. City of Miami Beach, 113 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1959). [6] For example, a divided court (4-3) in Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960), held that conflict with dictum in a forty year old case served to give jurisdiction, although there was no discussion as to how the dictum had become precedential or why the "conflict" fit within the policy framework that had just been formulated. [7] See Rosent 1977For example, a divided court (4-3) in Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960), held that conflict with dictum in a forty year old case served to give jurisdiction, although there was no discussion as to how the dictum had become precedential or why the “conflict” fit within the policy framework that had just been formulated. . | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Hoffman v. BankUnited, N.A.
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 1042 . 3 unless and until the trial court, with finality, adjudicates GR’s PIP lawsuit, the trial court may revisit the challenged order. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tower Hill Select Insurance Company v. McKee
green
1 sentence2016In McKee , we held that the policy requirement of a sinkhole repair contract before payment was due did not preclude McKee from filing suit. 151 So.3d at 4 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mora v. Tower Hill Prime Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2016The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding that the insurer did not provide sufficient evidence: “the insurer needs to provide an explanation as to why ‘in good faith’ and ‘pursuant to a policy requirement or other requirement’ it would not have issued the policy or would not have issued it under the same terms.” Id. at 1228 . 2016The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding that the insurer did not provide sufficient evidence: “the insurer needs to provide an.explanation as to why ¾ good faith’ and ‘pursuant to a policy requirement or other requirement’ it would- not have issued the policy -or would not have issued it under the same terms.” - Id. at 1228 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Fabbiano v. Demings
green
1 sentence2014Therefore, in a case in which the third-party complaint puts the third-party defendant on notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence from which the plaintiffs claims arose, and the third-party defendant is already a party to the lawsuit when the plaintiff seeks to name the third-party defendant as a party defendant, the plaintiffs amended complaint naming the third-party defendant as a party defendant should relate back to the timely filed third-party complaint. 7 We reject the approach of the First District that would limit the relation-back doctrine to cases involving “mistake or misn | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Arad v. CADUCEUS SELF INS. FUND. INC.
green
1 sentence2006NOTES [1] The information required is: (a) date, time, and place of the Incident; (b) a detailed description of what happened; (c) the name and address of the injured party; (d) the names and addresses of all witnesses; and (e) the expected nature and amount of damages. [2] "Tail coverage" is a supplemental coverage available to protect the insured in "the future for claims regarding incidents that occurred during the policy period but which were not presented until after the policy period." Arad, 585 So.2d at 1001 . [3] It appears that the trial court was unable to interpret the phrase "durin | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Richmond v. Florida Power & Light Co.
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Payne v. Wille
green
1 sentence2004In Payne v. Witte, 657 So.2d 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), a deputy sheriff who was demoted brought a petition for certiorari after the recommendation of the department’s hearing review board demoted him for a policy violation. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Abolsky v. Abolsky
neutral
1 sentence2004In support of this contention, Howell cites State v. Rushing, 532 So.2d 1338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), in which the court reversed the dismissal of an information charging manslaughter by culpable negligence based on the defendant's act of giving a loaded gun to the suicidal victim. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Howell v. State
green
2 sentences2004Therefore, evidence of the alleged policy violation would not have appreciably changed the circumstances that led the jury to recommend death, the trial judge to impose death, and this Court to conclude, in rejecting the challenge to the law-enforcement aggravator in the direct appeal, that "Howell knew or could have reasonably foreseen that law enforcement personnel would search the vehicle and its contents and thereby detonate the bomb." Howell, 707 So.2d at 682 . 2004Therefore, evidence of the alleged policy violation would not have appreciably changed the circumstances that led the jury to recommend death, the trial judge to impose death, and this Court to conclude, in rejecting the challenge to the law-enforcement aggravator in the direct appeal, that "Howell knew or could have reasonably foreseen that law enforcement personnel would search the vehicle and its contents and thereby detonate the bomb." Howell, 707 So.2d at 682 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Northern Security Insurance v. Hatch
green
1 sentence2002The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, which found the condition was ambiguous because it "could be read as cancelling coverage only for the claim to which the material misrepresentation relates or cancelling the entire policy for a claim with any material misrepresentation." Id. at 395 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Walsh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1997Co., 91 Ill.App.2d 156 , 234 N.E.2d 394 (1968), the court refused to read into the policy a requirement that the insured attempt to identify the other motorist. 1997Co., 91 Ill.App.2d 156 , 234 N.E.2d 394 (1968), the court refused to read into the policy a requirement that the insured attempt to identify the other motorist. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1997The Grissom court held that the term "accident," as defined in the policy, included "an unexpected or unintended injury or damage that results from a known cause." 610 So.2d at 1306 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mangus v. John Doe
green
2 sentences1997In Mangus v. Doe, 203 Va. 518 , 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962), the court was unwilling to read the requirement of due diligence in ascertaining identity into the uninsured motorist statute. 1997In Mangus v. Doe, 203 Va. 518 , 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962), the court was unwilling to read the requirement of due diligence in ascertaining identity into the uninsured motorist statute. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Curtis Publishing Company v. Bader green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Frankel v. City of Miami Beach
green
1 sentence1994On the other hand, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1976), partially overruling on other grounds, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bader, 266 So.2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 271 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1972), and City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1959), provide at least a policy framework within which to consider the issue, and their facts suggest an answer. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| City of Miami v. Keton green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Vamper v. Hill Bros., Inc. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Peninsular Life Insurance Company v. Hanratty green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| George v. Northcraft green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Nicholas v. NATIONWIDE MUT. FIRE INS. neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Meyer v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Lassone v. Whalen green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Law Bros. Contracting Corp. v. O'Shea neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Jarvis v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Jernigan v. Progressive American Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Cazares v. Church of Scientology of Cal. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Reid v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Home Development Co. of St. Petersburg v. Bursani green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Judd v. Schooley green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Daleo v. BERT & BETTE BAYFRONT 66 green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| GORDON INTERNAT'L ADV., INC. v. Charlotte County L. & T. Co. green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. J. H. Blackshear, Inc. green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Fink v. Powsner green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Boulevard National Bank of Miami v. Sher green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.