policy claim in Texas

2021We continue to recognize “the possibility that in denying [a] claim, the insurer may commit some act, so extreme, that would cause injury independent of the policy claim.” [Republic Ins. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995)].

2020Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995) (a policy claim is independent of a bad faith claim).

2018See Boyd , 177 S.W.3d at 920-22 (concluding that insured's common-law conversion claim, common-law bad-faith claim, and statutory claims were all "negated" because policy did not cover underlying losses and insured did "not allege that he suffered any damages unrelated to and independent of the policy claim"); Castañeda , 988 S.W.2d at 199 (holding that insured could not recover damages for loss of credit reputation because any such loss "stemmed from the denial of benefits" that were not owed under the policy).

2018See Castañeda, 988 S.W.2d at 203, 208 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). 16 Although we did not explain the reason for the general rule in Stoker, we alluded to it by acknowledging “the possibility that in denying the claim, the insurer may commit some act, so extreme, that would cause injury independent of the policy claim.” Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341 (emphasis added).

2025Co. v. Boyd, 177 S.W.3d 919 , 920‒22 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (concluding that insured’s 6 common-law conversion claim, common-law bad-faith claim, and statutory claims were all “negated” because policy did not cover underlying losses and insured did “not allege that he suffered any damages unrelated to and independent of the policy claim”); see also Mid–Continent Cas.

2023Although the Texas Supreme Court has “left open the possibility that an insurer’s denial of a claim it was not obliged to pay might nevertheless be in bad faith if its conduct was extreme and produced damages unrelated to and independent of the policy claim,” id., there is no evidence in this case to support that exception to the general rule that extracontractual claims do not survive a determination of no coverage.

2025Co. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 709 F.3d 515 , 521–22 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[N]o Texas court has yet held that recovery is available for an insurer’s extreme act, causing injury independent of the policy claim.”).

2024Co. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 709 F.3d 515, 521-22 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The Stoker language [concerning possible independent injuries] has frequently been discussed, but in seventeen years since the decision appeared, no Texas court has yet held that recovery is available for an insurer’s extreme act, causing injury independent of the policy claim . . . )).

2013This doctrine “holds the master liable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment” and is “essentially a policy doctrine .... ” Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex.1964). “[EJxcept for acts personally directed by the principal, the liability of the master is founded upon the contractual arrangement with the servant, either expressed or implied which vests in him the right to control the details of the work.” Id.; see also Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex.1984) (employer and employee were jointly and severally liable for

2013This doctrine “holds the master liable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment” and is “essentially a policy doctrine . . . .” Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex. 1964). “[E]xcept for acts personally directed by the principal, the liability of the master is founded upon the contractual arrangement with the servant, either expressed or implied which vests in him the right to control the details of the work.” Id.; see also Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. 1984) (employer and employee were jointly and severally liable

2015This doctrine "holds the master liable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment" and is "essentially a policy doctrine...." Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 589 (.Tex.I964).

2013This doctrine “holds the master liable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment” and is “essentially a policy doctrine .... ” Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex.1964). “[EJxcept for acts personally directed by the principal, the liability of the master is founded upon the contractual arrangement with the servant, either expressed or implied which vests in him the right to control the details of the work.” Id.; see also Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex.1984) (employer and employee were jointly and severally liable for

2011Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341 ; see Crocker v. American National General Insurance Company, 211 S.W.3d 928, 936 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.)(discussing this aspect of Stoker).

2011Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341 ; see Crocker v. American National General Insurance Company, 211 S.W.3d 928, 936 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2007, no pet.)(discussing this aspect of Stoker).

2019Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 319 .

2010Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 6 (1971); see also Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318-319 . 18 .

2026“The focus on the evidence and its relation to the elements of bad faith is necessary to maintain the distinction between a contract claim on the policy and a claim of bad faith delay or denial of that claim, which arises from the tort duty we imposed on insurers in Arnold and Aranda.” Id. at 600 (citing generally Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1998) overruled on other grounds by Texas Mut.

2018In Stoker , after we announced the general rule that "there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered," we explained that we were not excluding "the possibility that in denying the claim, the insurer may commit some act, so extreme, that would cause injury independent of the policy claim." 903 S.W.2d at 341 (citing Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 214 ).

2025Although there is “the possibility that in denying a claim, the insurer may commit some act, so extreme, that would cause injury independent of the policy claim,” In re State Farm, 629 S.W.3d at 847, a successful independent-injury claim is rare—so rare that the Menchaca Court remarked, “we in fact have yet to encounter one.” 545 S.W.3d at 500 .

2022To establish “injury independent of the policy claim,” however, Ayanbadejo must show his “damages are truly independent of [his] right to receive policy benefits.” Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 500 .

2024An attendance policy is one “adopted to ensure the orderly work and safety of employees.” See Lairson v. Texas Emp’t Comm’n, 742 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ).

2011An attendance policy is a policy “adopted to ensure the orderly work and safety of employees.” See Lairson v. Texas Emp’t Comm’n, 742 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).

2020Co., 205 S.W.2d 43 , 44–45 (Tex. 1947). “[A] denial by [the insurer] of liability under the policy is a waiver of proof of loss enabling the insured to maintain a suit on the policy without furnishing such proof.” Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins.

2020Co., 876 S.W.2d 132 , 144 n.18 (Tex. 1994) (citing Sanders, 205 S.W.2d at 45 ).

2013First, the supreme court has stated on several occasions that it “did not exclude the possibility that an insurer’s denial of a claim it was not obliged to pay might nevertheless be in bad faith if its conduct was extreme and produced damages unrelated to and independent of the policy claim.” Boyd, 177 S.W.3d 922 ; Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804 .

2004Macias asserts that Fodge “held that, if the denial of benefits were extreme and produced damages unrelated to and independent of the policy claim, then jurisdiction would be present.” See id. at 804 (emphasis added).

2006See Shaver , 361 S.W.2d at 869 .

2006See Shaver, 361 S.W.2d at 869 .

2025The goal of a plea to the jurisdiction “is to defeat a cause of action for which the state has not waived sovereign immunity (usually before the state has incurred the full costs of litigation).” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). 50 The legal question is “did any of the Defendants adopt a policy in violation of Section 370.003 of the Texas Local Government Code?” The only “policy” the State identifies in its pleading is the Enforcement Ordinance, and the only “act” alleged is the codifying and publishing of the ordinance passed by the citizens.8 (MR 00

2019See, e.g., City of Hous. v. Nicolai, 539 S.W.3d 378 , 385–89 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that municipality was immune from negligent implementation of policy claim after officer failed to fasten detainee’s seatbelt in violation of procedure requiring such individuals to be belted); see also Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (“When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine whether the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.”).

2015Co. v. Burt Ford Enters., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex.App.Tyler .1986, no writ) (noting that the supreme court has held that “where an insurer refuses to tender a defense to its insured and denies coverage on a claim made against its insured, and the insured thereafter negotiates a settlement of the claim, the insurer is entitled to raise a policy defense of exclusion of coverage set forth in the policy”). .

2015Co. v. Burt Ford Enters., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, no writ) (noting that the supreme court has held that “where an insurer refuses to tender a defense to its insured and denies coverage on a claim made against its insured, and the insured thereafter negotiates a settlement of the claim, the insurer is entitled to raise a policy defense of exclusion of coverage set forth in the policy”). 16 unlawful activity but excludes an admission of liability for the activity, it does not establish that the underlying allegations are true or false.” U.S. Nat’l Ass’n, 68 F. Supp. 3d a

2013“The theories of vicarious and joint and several liability are judicially created vehicles for enforcing remedies for wrongs committed.” Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex. 1983).

2013“The theories of vicarious and joint and several liability are judicially created vehicles for enforcing remedies for wrongs committed.” Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex. 1983).

2009Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 718 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). 24 .A formal judicial admission is binding on the party admitting it, and he may not introduce contradictory evidence.

2008Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson , 21 S.W.3d 707, 718 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). 22.

2007A conflicting line of authority holds that the insured’s claim for defense costs is “a first-party claim” and that the prompt-payment statute does indeed apply when an insurer wrongfully refuses to pay for the insured’s defense. 21 These cases principally stem from the suggestion in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex.1996), that the prompt-payment statute might hypothetically apply to an insured’s claim for a defense under a liability policy.

2007A conflicting line of authority holds that the insured's claim for defense costs is "a first-party claim" and that the prompt-payment statute does indeed apply when an insurer wrongfully refuses to pay for the insured's defense. [21] These cases principally *253 stem from the suggestion in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex.1996), that the prompt-payment statute might hypothetically apply to an insured's claim for a defense under a liability policy.

2004See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391 (op. on reh’g) (appellate court reviews trial court’s rule 403 decision under abuse of discretion standard meaning that “an appellate court should not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement”); United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2nd Cir.1983) (given “the superiority of his nether position,” a trial judge is given broad discretion to weigh these competing interests because he is in a superior position to evaluate all of the circumstances connected with them) (internal quotes omitted); 6 Herasimchuk at 784 n. 116

2004See Montgomery , 810 S.W.2d at 391 (op. on reh'g) (appellate court reviews trial court's rule 403 decision under abuse of discretion standard meaning that "an appellate court should not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement"); United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2nd Cir.1983) (given "the superiority of his nether position," a trial judge is given broad discretion to weigh these competing interests because he is in a superior position to evaluate all of the circumstances connected with them) (internal quotes omitted); [6] Herasimchuk at 784 n.

2003Duff v. Yelin, 721 S.W.2d 365, 370-71 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986) aff’d, 751 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.1988).

2003Duff v. Yelin , 721 S.W.2d 365, 370-71 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1986) aff’d, 751 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1988).

2009Id. at 175.

2009Id. at 175 .