policy clause in New York

2017People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474 [1992]; Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 Brook L Rev 459, 460, 467 [1974-1975]), and given the key role the Parker rule plays in our state’s evidence jurisprudence on expert witness testimony, any change in this regard must be made by the Court of Appeals. .

2017People v Scott , 79 NY2d 474 [1992]; Hopkins, The Role of An Intermediate Appellate Court , 41 Brooklyn L Rev 459, 460, 467 [1974—75]), and given the key role the Parker rule plays in our state's evidence jurisprudence on expert witness testimony, any change in this regard must be made by the Court of Appeals.

2012We held that “the tender letter insurer Travelers wrote on behalf of [the] plaintiff and others to insurance carrier Hartford — asking that their mutual insureds be provided with a defense and indemnity, as additional insured under the policy issued to Erath — fulfills the policy’s notice of claim requirements so as to trigger the insurer’s obligation to issue a timely disclaimer” ( 64 AD3d at 269 ).

2012We held that “the tender letter insurer Travelers wrote on behalf of [the] plaintiff and others to insurance carrier Hartford — asking that their mutual insureds be provided with a defense and indemnity, as additional insured under the policy issued to Erath — fulfills the policy’s notice of claim requirements so as to trigger the insurer’s obligation to issue a timely disclaimer” ( 64 AD3d at 269 ).

1984Co., 26 AD2d 816 ).

1977Co., 26 AD2d 816 ).

1983The mothers, if not the fathers, involved in Howard (supra) and Becker were equally, though more painfully because over a much longer period, the cause of death of their infants, and the speculativeness of damage was only one among many of the policy factors considered in Tobin in the search for a “rational practical boundary for liability” ( 24 NY2d, at p 618 ).

1983The policy factors generally to be considered in determining the existence of a duty are foreseeability of the injury, proliferation of claims, fraudulent claims, the inconsistency of the zone of danger rule, unlimited liability, unduly burdensome liability, and the difficulty of circumscribing the area of liability (Tobin v Grossman, 24 NY2d 609, 615 ).

1935Emergency Fleet Corp. ( 240 N. Y. 474 ), Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, in affirming a judgment for a seaman plaintiff injured while painting the side of a ship and while standing on a float alongside of the ship, which it was shown was an unsafe place to work, stated: “We think that evidence of negligence, though slight, is not lacking altogether.” If the defendant’s contention that the injury came under one cf the excepted risks of the policy was a defense, it should have been pleaded and proven.

1935Emergency Fleet Corp. ( 240 N. Y. 474 ), Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, in affirming a judgment for a seaman plaintiff injured while painting the side of a ship and while standing on a float alongside of the ship, which it was shown was an unsafe place to work, stated: “We think that evidence of negligence, though slight, is not lacking altogether.” If the defendant’s contention that the injury came under one cf the excepted risks of the policy was a defense, it should have been pleaded and proven.

1926In Woolley v. Stewart ( 222 N. Y. 347 ), referring to oral agreements affecting real estate, after saying that “ the breach of a void agreement is not a fraud or a wrong in law,” the court says that a party “ may, however, withdraw himself from the policy and defense of the statute, or waive its protection, by inducing or permitting without remonstrance another party to the agreement to do acts, pursuant to and in reliance upon the agreement, to such an extent and so substantial in quality as to irremediably alter his situation and make the interposition of the statute against performance a fr

1920The rule which is applicable and which indicates the reason for the decisions above referred to is stated in Woolley v. Stewart, 222 N. Y. 347, 351 ; “ He (owner) may, however, withdraw himself from the policy and defense of the statute, or waive its protection, by inducing or permitting without remonstrance another party to the agreement to do acts, pursuant to and in reliance upon the agreement, to such an extent and so substantial in quality as to irremediably alter his situation and make the inter position of the statute against performance a fraud.

1919(Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589 .) He may, however, withdraw himself from the policy and defense of the statute, or waive its protection, by inducing or permitting without remonstrance another party to the agreement to do acts, pursuant to and in reliance upon the agreement, to such an extent and so substantial in quality as to irremediably alter his situation and make the interposition of the statute against performance a fraud.

1918(Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589 .) He may, however, withdraw himself from the policy and defense of the statute, or waive its protection, by inducing or permitting without remonstrance another party to the agreement to do acts, pursuant to and in reliance upon the agreement, to such an extent and so substantial in quality as to irremediably alter his situation and make the interposition of the statute against performance a fraud.

1894In support of his proposition, the respondent’s counsel relies upon Pechner v. Insurance Co., 65 N. Y. 195 , and Titus v. Insurance Co., 81 N. Y. 410 ; cases which are to the effect, as claimed, that an agent may orally waive the forfeiture, notwithstanding that the policy requires the waiver to be in writing.

1890It is well settled that if, after knowledge of any alleged forfeiture, the company “recognizes the continued validity of the policy, or does acts based thereon, or requires the insured, by virtue thereof, to do some act or incur some trouble or expense, the forfeiture is, as matter of law, waived.” Titus v. Insurance Co., 81 N. Y. 410 .

2025Huck v City of Newburgh , 275 AD2d 343 ).

2021Litigation may be compounded unduly by protracted and multifarious appeals and collateral proceedings frustrating the speedy determination of disputes" ( Matter of State of New York v King , 36 NY2d 59, 63 ; see Matter of People v Juarez , 31 NY3d 1186, 1187 ; Matter of Santangello v People , 38 NY2d 536, 538 ).

2021Litigation may be compounded unduly by protracted and multifarious appeals and collateral proceedings frustrating the speedy determination of disputes" ( Matter of State of New York v King , 36 NY2d 59, 63 ; see Matter of People v Juarez , 31 NY3d 1186, 1187 ; Matter of Santangello v People , 38 NY2d 536, 538 ).

2015Lipton, Inc., 34 NY2d at 361 ).

2015Lipton, Inc., 34 NY2d at 361 ).

2012Commn., 147 F Supp 2d at 256-257 ).

2012In April 2010, relying on Matter of Transitional Servs. of N.Y. for Long Is., Inc. v New York State Off. of Mental Health (supra), Supreme Court partially dismissed the petition but, pending further submissions of the parties, reserved decision on the issue of whether respondents had improperly implemented the recoupment policy as a guideline — instead of a formal rule or regulation — in violation of the Mental Health Law and SAPA.

2008Indeed, it is evident from the provisions affording the right of first refusal and imposing certain restrictions on transfers of the interests of the tenants-in-common that the entire agreement was designed to foster development of the premises and to ensure that it remained in the hands of the co-investors or their relations. “[Although preemptive rights offend the basic policy of the rule against remote vesting, the offense is properly offset by their utility in modern legal transactions and that usefulness justifies excepting them from the operation of the rule” (Bruken, 67 NY2d at 164-165

2005The court there (at 291-292) refers to the Court of Appeals decision in Green v Montgomery ( 95 NY2d 693 [2001]) and the basic policy of waiver in personal injury cases.