parental presumption in Maryland

2009The Koshko Court noted that “[t]he Herrick court also quoted approvingly from Wolinski the proposition that petitioning grandparents bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to satisfy the Fairbanks factors regarding rebuttal of the parental presumption.” Koshko, 398 Md. at 419 , 921 A.2d 171 (citing Herrick at 238, 838 A.2d 1263 ).

2009The Koshko Court noted that “[t]he Herrick court also quoted approvingly from Wolinski the proposition that petitioning grandparents bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to satisfy the Fairbanks factors regarding rebuttal of the parental presumption.” Koshko, 398 Md. at 419 , 921 A.2d 171 (citing Herrick at 238, 838 A.2d 1263 ).

2018Law § 5-323(d) is the goal of the legislation, the parental presumption must still be overcome by finding that "terminating parental rights is in the child's best interests." Jayden G., 433 Md. at 96 , 70 A.3d at 303 .

2018Law § 5-323(d) is the goal of the legislation, the parental presumption must still be overcome by finding that "terminating parental rights is in the child's best interests." Jayden G., 433 Md. at 96 , 70 A.3d at 303 .

2009The Koshko Court noted that “[t]he Herrick court also quoted approvingly from Wolinski the proposition that petitioning grandparents bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to satisfy the Fairbanks factors regarding rebuttal of the parental presumption.” Koshko, 398 Md. at 419 , 921 A.2d 171 (citing Herrick at 238, 838 A.2d 1263 ).

2007The Herrick court also quoted approvingly from Wolinski the proposition that petitioning grandparents bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to satisfy the Fairbanks factors regarding rebuttal of the parental presumption. 154 Md.App. at 238 , 838 A.2d at 1272 .

2007Fit parents, who are presumed to act in their children's best interests, McDermott, 385 Md. at 422 , 869 A.2d at 811 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 , 99 S.Ct. at 2504 ), nonetheless may be hailed into court to defend their decisions absent any showing that they are unfit and without any requirement that the grandparents challenging the parental decision plead any exceptional circumstances that may tend to override the parental presumption.

2007Fit parents, who are presumed to act in their children's best interests, McDermott, 385 Md. at 422 , 869 A.2d at 811 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 , 99 S.Ct. at 2504 ), nonetheless may be hailed into court to defend their decisions absent any showing that they are unfit and without any requirement that the grandparents challenging the parental decision plead any exceptional circumstances that may tend to override the parental presumption.

2001Continuing its description of the common law rule, the opinion in Bowers stated: "On the other hand, where corporal punishment was inflicted with `a malicious desire to cause pain' or where it amounted to `cruel and outrageous' treatment of the child, the chastisement was deemed unreasonable, thus defeating the parental privilege and subjecting the parent to penal sanctions in those circumstances where criminal liability would have existed absent the parent-child relationship." Id.

2001Continuing its description of the common law rule, the opinion in Bowers stated: “On the other hand, where corporal punishment was inflicted with ‘a malicious desire to cause pain’ or where it amounted to ‘cruel and outrageous’ treatment of the child, the chastisement was deemed unreasonable, thus defeating the parental privilege and subjecting the parent to penal sanctions in those circumstances where criminal liability would have existed absent the parent-child relationship.” Id.

2022See, e.g., Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (sexual abuse); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 , 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (same); McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1996) (intentional or malicious acts); Doe by & through Connolly v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. 1992) (willful and malicious acts); Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 204, 209 (Nebraska’s “‘modified version’ of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other jurisdictions” does not extend to claims based upon “brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment.” (citing Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959)). 17 The juris

2022See, e.g., Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (sexual abuse); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 , 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (same); McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1996) (intentional or malicious acts); Doe by & through Connolly v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. 1992) (willful and malicious acts); Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 204, 209 (Nebraska’s “‘modified version’ of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other jurisdictions” does not extend to claims based upon “brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment.” (citing Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959)). 17 The juris

2022Some states have abolished the doctrine in toto, and others have replaced it with either a “reasonable parent” 15 The issue in Nolasco was whether Nebraska’s version of the parental immunity doctrine should be abrogated in its entirety or modified to permit motor vehicle negligence actions. 949 N.W.2d at 211 .

2022See, e.g., Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (sexual abuse); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 , 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (same); McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1996) (intentional or malicious acts); Doe by & through Connolly v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. 1992) (willful and malicious acts); Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 204, 209 (Nebraska’s “‘modified version’ of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other jurisdictions” does not extend to claims based upon “brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment.” (citing Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959)). 17 The juris

2022See, e.g., Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (sexual abuse); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 , 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (same); McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1996) (intentional or malicious acts); Doe by & through Connolly v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. 1992) (willful and malicious acts); Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 204, 209 (Nebraska’s “‘modified version’ of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other jurisdictions” does not extend to claims based upon “brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment.” (citing Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959)). 17 The juris

2022See, e.g., Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (sexual abuse); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 , 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (same); McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1996) (intentional or malicious acts); Doe by & through Connolly v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. 1992) (willful and malicious acts); Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 204, 209 (Nebraska’s “‘modified version’ of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other jurisdictions” does not extend to claims based upon “brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment.” (citing Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959)). 17 The juris

2022See, e.g., Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (sexual abuse); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 , 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (same); McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1996) (intentional or malicious acts); Doe by & through Connolly v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. 1992) (willful and malicious acts); Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 204, 209 (Nebraska’s “‘modified version’ of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other jurisdictions” does not extend to claims based upon “brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment.” (citing Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959)). 17 The juris

2022See, e.g., Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (sexual abuse); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 , 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (same); McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App. 1996) (intentional or malicious acts); Doe by & through Connolly v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. 1992) (willful and malicious acts); Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 204, 209 (Nebraska’s “‘modified version’ of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other jurisdictions” does not extend to claims based upon “brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment.” (citing Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb. 1959)). 17 The juris

2016The issue there was whether a wrongful death action brought by the deceased mother’s children, against the tort-feasor (the children’s father) was barred under the doctrine of parental immunity. 347 Md. at 74, 81-82 , 698 A.2d at 1098, 1102 .

2016The issue there was whether a wrongful death action brought by the deceased mother’s children, against the tort-feasor (the children’s father) was barred under the doctrine of parental immunity. 347 Md. at 74, 81-82 , 698 A.2d at 1098, 1102 .

2016In that case, we addressed in relevant part, whether the parental immunity doctrine barred the parents’ claim against the estate of one of their deceased daughters. 362 Md. 626, 629, 644 , 766 A.2d 598, 599, 607-08 (2001).

2016In that case, we addressed in relevant part, whether the parental immunity doctrine barred the parents’ claim against the estate of one of their deceased daughters. 362 Md. 626, 629, 644 , 766 A.2d 598, 599, 607-08 (2001).

2010See also Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 645-46 , 814 A.2d 543, 547 (2003) (affirming custody in a twelve year old child's maternal grandparents over the objections of her biological father when the trial judge interviewed the child in chambers, learning that she viewed her grandparents as her "second mom and dad," and that she was not close to her father). [10] Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), fo

2010See also Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 645-46 , 814 A.2d 543, 547 (2003) (affirming custody in a twelve year old child's maternal grandparents over the objections of her biological father when the trial judge interviewed the child in chambers, learning that she viewed her grandparents as her "second mom and dad," and that she was not close to her father). [10] Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), fo

2010Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), for the proposition that Mr. D. is not entitled to the parental presumption, because he "has failed to assume parental responsibilities.” In Sider , we considered whether the circuit court erred by denying the paternity petition of a third party, the putative father, when the child’s mother and her former husband had already filed a complaint for divorce.

2010Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), for the proposition that Mr. D. is not entitled to the parental presumption, because he "has failed to assume parental responsibilities.” In Sider , we considered whether the circuit court erred by denying the paternity petition of a third party, the putative father, when the child’s mother and her former husband had already filed a complaint for divorce.

2010Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), for the proposition that Mr. D. is not entitled to the parental presumption, because he "has failed to assume parental responsibilities.” In Sider , we considered whether the circuit court erred by denying the paternity petition of a third party, the putative father, when the child’s mother and her former husband had already filed a complaint for divorce.

2010Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), for the proposition that Mr. D. is not entitled to the parental presumption, because he "has failed to assume parental responsibilities.” In Sider , we considered whether the circuit court erred by denying the paternity petition of a third party, the putative father, when the child’s mother and her former husband had already filed a complaint for divorce.

2010Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), for the proposition that Mr. D. is not entitled to the parental presumption, because he "has failed to assume parental responsibilities.” In Sider , we considered whether the circuit court erred by denying the paternity petition of a third party, the putative father, when the child’s mother and her former husband had already filed a complaint for divorce.

2010Respondent argues, citing Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997), for the proposition that Mr. D. is not entitled to the parental presumption, because he "has failed to assume parental responsibilities.” In Sider , we considered whether the circuit court erred by denying the paternity petition of a third party, the putative father, when the child’s mother and her former husband had already filed a complaint for divorce.

2007In re Blessen H., 392 Md. 684, 693 , 898 A.2d 980, 985-86 (2006); In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 565-68 , 819 A.2d 1030, 1038-40 (2003).

2007In re Blessen H., 392 Md. 684, 693 , 898 A.2d 980, 985-86 (2006); In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 565-68 , 819 A.2d 1030, 1038-40 (2003).