parental immunity in Minnesota

2002The court went on to identify ways in which the parental presumption could be overcome: The natural parent is entitled, as a matter of law, to custody of a minor child unless “there has been established on the [parent’s] part neglect, abandonment, incapacity, moral delinquency, instability of character or inability to fur nish the child with needed care, * * * or unless it has been established that such custody otherwise would not be in the best interest of the child.” Wallin, 290 Minn. at 266 , 187 N.W.2d at 680 .

2002The court went on to identify ways in which the parental presumption could be overcome: The natural parent is entitled, as a matter of law, to custody of a minor child unless “there has been established on the [parent’s] part neglect, abandonment, incapacity, moral delinquency, instability of character or inability to fur nish the child with needed care, * * * or unless it has been established that such custody otherwise would not be in the best interest of the child.” Wallin, 290 Minn. at 266 , 187 N.W.2d at 680 .

2007Id.

2005This principle was reaffirmed in N.AK, 649 N.W.2d at 175 , where the supreme court stated that “the cases make clear that ultimately the welfare of the child is the umbrella under which every aspect of custody decisions— including the parental presumption — falls.” The court recognized that the parental presumption can be overcome by “extraordinary circumstances of a grave and weighty nature.” Id.

2005This principle was reaffirmed in N.AK, 649 N.W.2d at 175 , where the supreme court stated that “the cases make clear that ultimately the welfare of the child is the umbrella under which every aspect of custody decisions— including the parental presumption — falls.” The court recognized that the parental presumption can be overcome by “extraordinary circumstances of a grave and weighty nature.” Id.

1983Subsequently, the parental immunity exceptions retained in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968), were also abolished.

1983Subsequently, the parental immunity exceptions retained in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431 , 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968), were also abolished.

1968Mr. Justice Otis, in authoring the Balts decision, considered generally the arguments for and against the doctrine of parental immunity, the weight of authority, parent-child litigation unrelated to torts, and recent trends with respect to immunity, citing specifically the 1965 decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551 , 215 A.2d 695 , which held that an unemancipated minor was not immune from liability to his mother for injuries she suffered in an automobile accident arising out of the son's negligence.

1968Mr. Justice Otis, in authoring the Balts decision, considered generally the arguments for and against the doctrine of parental immunity, the weight of authority, parent-child litigation unrelated to torts, and recent trends with respect to immunity, citing specifically the 1965 decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551 , 215 A.2d 695 , which held that an unemancipated minor was not immune from liability to his mother for injuries she suffered in an automobile accident arising out of the son's negligence.

1968The history of its beginning in 1871 with the decision of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 , 13 L.R.A. 682 , is fully covered in Balts v. Balts, supra, under its history of parent-child tort immunity.

1968The history of its beginning in 1871 with the decision of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 , 13 L.

1968Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra; Dean v. Smith, supra.” New Hampshire became the second jurisdiction to abolish the doctrine of parental immunity in regard to ordinary negligence actions.

1968Signs v. Signs, supra; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642 , 251 P.2d 149 . 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, § 8.11, p. 650, advocates allowing the maintenance of an action in tort against a *636 parent or a child in every case "in which it is reasonably clear that the domestic peace has already been disturbed beyond repair or where by reason of the circumstances it is not imperiled, and where the reasonableness of family discipline is not involved." The authors also point out that one situation in which family harmony is not thereby disturbed arises where there is liability insurance coverage.

1968Signs v. Signs, supra; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642 , 251 P.2d 149 . 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, § 8.11, p. 650, advocates allowing the maintenance of an action in tort against a *636 parent or a child in every case "in which it is reasonably clear that the domestic peace has already been disturbed beyond repair or where by reason of the circumstances it is not imperiled, and where the reasonableness of family discipline is not involved." The authors also point out that one situation in which family harmony is not thereby disturbed arises where there is liability insurance coverage.

1968This court said in its consideration of the Gaudreau decision ( 273 Minn. 433 , 142 N.W.2d 75 ): "* * * In refusing to grant immunity, the New Hampshire court found no statute or prior decision standing in its way and observed that if intrafamily litigation in other relationships had not proved disruptive of family unity, there was no reason to believe an action of this kind would be `any more deleterious.' In concluding, the court noted that this was an area of law in which the authorities are a `conglomerate of paradoxical and irreconcilable judicial decisions,' but having found no clear cas

1968This court said in its consideration of the Gaudreau decision ( 273 Minn. 433 , 142 N.W.2d 75 ): "* * * In refusing to grant immunity, the New Hampshire court found no statute or prior decision standing in its way and observed that if intrafamily litigation in other relationships had not proved disruptive of family unity, there was no reason to believe an action of this kind would be `any more deleterious.' In concluding, the court noted that this was an area of law in which the authorities are a `conglomerate of paradoxical and irreconcilable judicial decisions,' but having found no clear cas

1968The question facing this court is the exact converse of the issue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis.2d 372 , 141 N.W.2d 208 .

1968The question facing this court is the exact converse of the issue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis.2d 372 , 141 N.W.2d 208 .

1968As to reliance upon interspousal immunity, see decisions in Cramer v. Cramer (Alaska) 379 P.2d 95 , and Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 , [1] these cases disposing of any claim basis for the parental-immunity rule.

1968As to reliance upon interspousal immunity, see decisions in Cramer v. Cramer (Alaska) 379 P. (2d) 95 , and Briere v. Briere, 107 N. H. 432, 224 A. (2d) 588, 1 these cases disposing of any claim basis for the parental-immunity rule.

1968The policy ground which is the foundation for both immunities having been rejected, and this court having so clearly, in Aulik, [Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602 , 32 N.W.2d 613 ] treated the child's immunity as a corollary of the parent's immunity, we conclude that the abrogation of the child's immunity necessarily flowed from Goller . " The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Goller case abolished the parental-immunity rule in personal injury actions except in two situations: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where t

1968The policy ground which is the foundation for both immunities having been rejected, and this court having so clearly, in Aulik, [Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602 , 32 N.W.2d 613 ] treated the child's immunity as a corollary of the parent's immunity, we conclude that the abrogation of the child's immunity necessarily flowed from Goller . " The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Goller case abolished the parental-immunity rule in personal injury actions except in two situations: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where t

1968As to reliance upon interspousal immunity, see decisions in Cramer v. Cramer (Alaska) 379 P.2d 95 , and Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 , [1] these cases disposing of any claim basis for the parental-immunity rule.

1968As to reliance upon interspousal immunity, see decisions in Cramer v. Cramer (Alaska) 379 P.2d 95 , and Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432 , 224 A.2d 588 , [1] these cases disposing of any claim basis for the parental-immunity rule.

1966More recently, where a child was the sole beneficiary in an action for the wrongful death of her mother against the estate of her father, we noted in Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 324 , 107 N.W.2d 531 , 534: "* * * In view of the substantial and growing modern authority repudiating the doctrine of intra-family immunity even in direct suits, we can find no justification for overruling the Albrecht case." Nevertheless, in so holding we continued explicitly to recognize the doctrine of parental immunity previously adopted and on which we had elaborated in London Guarantee *73 & Accident Co. L

1966More recently, where a child was the sole beneficiary in an action for the wrongful death of her mother against the estate of her father, we noted in Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 324 , 107 N.W.2d 531 , 534: "* * * In view of the substantial and growing modern authority repudiating the doctrine of intra-family immunity even in direct suits, we can find no justification for overruling the Albrecht case." Nevertheless, in so holding we continued explicitly to recognize the doctrine of parental immunity previously adopted and on which we had elaborated in London Guarantee *73 & Accident Co. L

1966More recently, where a child was the sole beneficiary in an action for the wrongful death of her mother against the estate of her father, we noted in Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 324 , 107 N.W.2d 531 , 534: "* * * In view of the substantial and growing modern authority repudiating the doctrine of intra-family immunity even in direct suits, we can find no justification for overruling the Albrecht case." Nevertheless, in so holding we continued explicitly to recognize the doctrine of parental immunity previously adopted and on which we had elaborated in London Guarantee *73 & Accident Co. L

1966More recently, where a child was the sole beneficiary in an action for the wrongful death of her mother against the estate of her father, we noted in Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 324 , 107 N.W.2d 531 , 534: "* * * In view of the substantial and growing modern authority repudiating the doctrine of intra-family immunity even in direct suits, we can find no justification for overruling the Albrecht case." Nevertheless, in so holding we continued explicitly to recognize the doctrine of parental immunity previously adopted and on which we had elaborated in London Guarantee *73 & Accident Co. L