parental immunity in Iowa

2022See, e.g., In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d at 324 (“The most serious obstacle to [terminating the guardianship] is the psychological trauma the transfer of custody may cause [the child].

2022See, e.g., In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d at 324 (“The most serious obstacle to [terminating the guardianship] is the psychological trauma the transfer of custody may cause [the child].

2019See M.D., 797 N.W.2d at 127 .

2016M.D., 797 N.W.2d at 127 ; see also Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 782 (noting that, for the parental presumption to be rebutted, there must be evidence that placement with the natural parent “is likely to have a seriously disrupting and disturbing effect upon the child’s development”).

1987Moreover, in Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 1974), we held that a child’s contributory negligence, not the sole proximate cause of his injury, is not a defense to a parental claim under rule 8 for the expense and actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting from injury to or death of the child.

1982In Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974), the court held the contributory negligence defense is inapplicable to a parental claim for medical expense and loss of services, companionship and society under Iowa R.Civ.P. 8.

2016See Stewart, 369 N.W.2d at 823 (noting the father “did not relinquish his presumptive right to custody when he agreed that the [guardians] should be appointed as guardians for” the child).

2016See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 781 (noting the current guardian “bears the burden of proof of rebutting the presumption favoring the natural parent by establishing that [the child’s] best interest requires that she continue in [the guardian’s] care”); see also Stewart, 369 N.W.2d at 824 (noting the district court properly placed the burden of proof on the guardians to rebut the parental presumption by showing it is in the child’s best interests the guardianship continue); Carrere v. Prunty, 133 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Iowa 1965) (“[Statutes] giving preference to parents in custody cases do not provide for

2016See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 781–82; see also Roach, 778 N.W.2d at 214–15 (holding that, given the guardians demonstrated the mother was not involved in the child’s life except for some weekend visits, in addition to the mother’s other issues, the guardianship should not be terminated).

2016See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 781 (noting the current guardian “bears the burden of proof of rebutting the presumption favoring the natural parent by establishing that [the child’s] best interest requires that she continue in [the guardian’s] care”); see also Stewart, 369 N.W.2d at 824 (noting the district court properly placed the burden of proof on the guardians to rebut the parental presumption by showing it is in the child’s best interests the guardianship continue); Carrere v. Prunty, 133 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Iowa 1965) (“[Statutes] giving preference to parents in custody cases do not provide for

2016See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 781 (noting the current guardian “bears the burden of proof of rebutting the presumption favoring the natural parent by establishing that [the child’s] best interest requires that she continue in [the guardian’s] care”); see also Stewart, 369 N.W.2d at 824 (noting the district court properly placed the burden of proof on the guardians to rebut the parental presumption by showing it is in the child’s best interests the guardianship continue); Carrere v. Prunty, 133 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Iowa 1965) (“[Statutes] giving preference to parents in custody cases do not provide for

2016See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 781 (noting the current guardian “bears the burden of proof of rebutting the presumption favoring the natural parent by establishing that [the child’s] best interest requires that she continue in [the guardian’s] care”); see also Stewart, 369 N.W.2d at 824 (noting the district court properly placed the burden of proof on the guardians to rebut the parental presumption by showing it is in the child’s best interests the guardianship continue); Carrere v. Prunty, 133 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Iowa 1965) (“[Statutes] giving preference to parents in custody cases do not provide for

2016Subsequently, it is the guardians’ burden to rebut the presumption by showing it is in the child’s best interests that the guardianship be continued.2 See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 781 . 2 Contrary to Swallow’s argument, we find no support in our case law that a “present risk” to the child must be proven before the parental presumption can be rebutted.

2002See Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000) (noting State pled, as an affirmative defense, the discretionary function exemption to the State's waiver of sovereign immunity); Kulish v. Ellsworth, 566 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1997) (defendants amended their answer to assert the affirmative defense of governmental immunity for acts or omissions related to an emergency response under Iowa Code section 670.4(11)); Turner, 304 N.W.2d at 786 ("[D]efendant asserted the doctrine of parental immunity as an affirmative defense.").

2002See Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000) (noting State pled, as an affirmative defense, the discretionary function exemption to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity); Kulish v. Ellsworth, 566 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1997) (defendants amended their answer to assert the affirmative defense of governmental immunity for acts or omissions related to an emergency response under Iowa Code section 670.4(11)); Turner, 304 N.W.2d at 786 (“[Djefendánt asserted the doctrine of parental immunity as an affirmative defense.”).

2002See Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000) (noting State pled, as an affirmative defense, the discretionary function exemption to the State's waiver of sovereign immunity); Kulish v. Ellsworth, 566 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1997) (defendants amended their answer to assert the affirmative defense of governmental immunity for acts or omissions related to an emergency response under Iowa Code section 670.4(11)); Turner, 304 N.W.2d at 786 ("[D]efendant asserted the doctrine of parental immunity as an affirmative defense.").

2002See Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000) (noting State pled, as an affirmative defense, the discretionary function exemption to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity); Kulish v. Ellsworth, 566 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1997) (defendants amended their answer to assert the affirmative defense of governmental immunity for acts or omissions related to an emergency response under Iowa Code section 670.4(11)); Turner, 304 N.W.2d at 786 (“[Djefendánt asserted the doctrine of parental immunity as an affirmative defense.”).

2002BCL Enters., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467 , 675 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio 1997); see also McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.App.1996) ("Parental immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled to avoid waiver."); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (parental immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded).

2002BCL Enters., Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467 , 675 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio 1997); see also McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.App.1996) (“Parental immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled to avoid-waiver.”); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (parental immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded).

2002BCL Enters., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467 , 675 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio 1997); see also McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.App.1996) ("Parental immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled to avoid waiver."); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (parental immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded).

2002BCL Enters., Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467 , 675 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio 1997); see also McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.App.1996) (“Parental immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled to avoid-waiver.”); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (parental immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded).

2002BCL Enters., Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467 , 675 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio 1997); see also McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.App.1996) (“Parental immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled to avoid-waiver.”); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (parental immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded).

2002BCL Enters., Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467 , 675 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio 1997); see also McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.App.1996) (“Parental immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled to avoid-waiver.”); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (parental immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded).

2002See Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000) (noting State pled, as an affirmative defense, the discretionary function exemption to the State's waiver of sovereign immunity); Kulish v. Ellsworth, 566 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1997) (defendants amended their answer to assert the affirmative defense of governmental immunity for acts or omissions related to an emergency response under Iowa Code section 670.4(11)); Turner, 304 N.W.2d at 786 ("[D]efendant asserted the doctrine of parental immunity as an affirmative defense.").

2002See Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000) (noting State pled, as an affirmative defense, the discretionary function exemption to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity); Kulish v. Ellsworth, 566 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1997) (defendants amended their answer to assert the affirmative defense of governmental immunity for acts or omissions related to an emergency response under Iowa Code section 670.4(11)); Turner, 304 N.W.2d at 786 (“[Djefendánt asserted the doctrine of parental immunity as an affirmative defense.”).

1990Abusive punishment “annuls the parental privilege and subjects the parent to applicable criminal statutes.” State v. Bell, 223 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Iowa 1974).

1968See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421 , 289 P.2d 218 , which reaffirmed the family immunity doctrine in ordinary negligence cases but allowed recovery for malicious and willful tort; Cowgill v. Boock, supra, 189 Or. 282 , 219 P.2d 445 , and Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 77 A.2d 923 , also willful tort cases; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106 , 22 N.E.2d 254 , 123 A.L.R. 1015 , which allowed a minor child to recover from his minor sister for tortious injuries; Foy v. Foy Elec.

1968See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421 , 289 P.2d 218 , which reaffirmed the family immunity doctrine in ordinary negligence cases but allowed recovery for malicious and willful tort; Cowgill v. Boock, supra, 189 Or. 282 , 219 P.2d 445 , and Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 77 A.2d 923 , also willful tort cases; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106 , 22 N.E.2d 254 , 123 A.L.R. 1015 , which allowed a minor child to recover from his minor sister for tortious injuries; Foy v. Foy Elec.