14 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carpenter Ex Rel. Carpenter v. Bishopgreen2 sentences2002He first stated that the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895G, rejects the parental-immunity doctrine and then said that “[t]he doctrine of parental immunity still governs in Arkansas negligence law, but it takes little prophetic ability to realize that the doctrine’s life expectancy is short.” Id. at 426-27, 720 S.W.2d at 300 (Smith, J., concurring). 2001Second, in Carpenter v. Bishop, 290 Ark. 424 , 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986), we were precluded from reaching the ultimate issue of whether a viable fetus, born dead, was a “person” because the underlying suit was barred by the parental-immunity doctrine. | 1 | 5 |
Fields v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences2021Co., 350 Ark. 75, 88 , 87 S.W.3d 224, 229 (2002) (recognizing most states have either abolished the parental-immunity doctrine, never adopted it, or created exceptions); Brian A. Wamble, Parental Immunity: Tennessee Joins the National Trend Toward Modification, 25 U. Mem. 2021Co., 350 Ark. 75, 88 , 87 S.W.3d 224, 229 (2002) (recognizing most states have either abolished the parental-immunity doctrine, never adopted it, or created exceptions); Brian A. Wamble, Parental Immunity: Tennessee Joins the National Trend Toward Modification, 25 U. Mem. | 1 | 2 |
Winn v. Gilroygreen2 sentences2009Under this approach, “[T]he proper inquiry concerns the tor-tious or privileged nature of a parent’s act that causes injury to the child, not a special parental immunity from a child’s action for personal torts as distinct from other kinds of claims.” Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718 , 681 P.2d 776, 784 (1984). 2009Under this approach, “[T]he proper inquiry concerns the tor-tious or privileged nature of a parent’s act that causes injury to the child, not a special parental immunity from a child’s action for personal torts as distinct from other kinds of claims.” Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718 , 681 P.2d 776, 784 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Brown, Admr. v. Cole, Admr.green2 sentences2002The Court explained that the reason for adopting the parental-immunity doctrine was to prevent strife among family members, who were “bound by the same blood and natural ties of affection.” Id. at 420 , 129 S.W.2d at 247 . 2002The Court explained that the reason for adopting the parental-immunity doctrine was to prevent strife among family members, who were “bound by the same blood and natural ties of affection.” Id. at 420 , 129 S.W.2d at 247 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hewlett v. Georgered2 sentences2002Reversed and remanded. 1 The doctrine of parental immunity originated with the 1891 Mississippi Supreme court decision of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891) {overruled by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992)). 1980Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rambo v. Rambo
green
2 sentences2009Parental immunity was created judicially in Arkansas in Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832 , 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938), and proscribes an unemancipated minor from maintaining an action for an involuntary tort against his parent. 2009Parental immunity was created judicially in Arkansas in Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832 , 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938), and proscribes an unemancipated minor from maintaining an action for an involuntary tort against his parent. | 6 | 1986–2009 |
Attwood v. Estate of Attwood
green
2 sentences2021Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230 , 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982). “[A] willful tort is beyond the scope of the parental immunity doctrine.” Id. at 238 , 633 S.W.2d at 370 . 2021Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230 , 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982). “[A] willful tort is beyond the scope of the parental immunity doctrine.” Id. at 238 , 633 S.W.2d at 370 . | 5 | 1996–2021 |
Spears Ex Rel. Spears v. Spears
green
2 sentences2005However, this court did announce its intention, in Spears v. Spears, 339 Ark. 162 , 3 S.W.3d 691 (1999), to reexamine the parental-immunity doctrine at the next appropriate opportunity. 2005However, this court did announce its intention, in Spears v. Spears, 339 Ark. 162 , 3 S.W.3d 691 (1999), to reexamine the parental-immunity doctrine at the next appropriate opportunity. | 3 | 2000–2005 |
Robinson v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2002We said: “[t]he parental-immunity doctrine is the law in this jurisdiction,” and held that “the doctrine is applicable . . . where, although appellee had attained her legal age when this action was commenced, she was an unemancipated minor at the time of the alleged tort.” Id. at 227 , 914 S.W.2d at 294 . 2 In examining the current status of the parental-immunity doctrine in our sister states, we find that nine states, including Arkansas, continue to apply parental immunity to cases where automobile liability insurance coverage represents the source of funds for recovery. 2002We said: “[t]he parental-immunity doctrine is the law in this jurisdiction,” and held that “the doctrine is applicable . . . where, although appellee had attained her legal age when this action was commenced, she was an unemancipated minor at the time of the alleged tort.” Id. at 227 , 914 S.W.2d at 294 . 2 In examining the current status of the parental-immunity doctrine in our sister states, we find that nine states, including Arkansas, continue to apply parental immunity to cases where automobile liability insurance coverage represents the source of funds for recovery. | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Meadows v. State
green
2 sentences2001Third, in Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105 , 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987), we determined that a fetus was not a “person” as that term was used in the criminal manslaughter law. 2001Third, in Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105 , 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987), we determined that a fetus was not a “person” as that term was used in the criminal manslaughter law. | 2 | 1995–2001 |
Graham v. Matheny
green
2 sentences2012The Herringtons cite Graham v. Matheny, 2009 Ark. 481 , 346 S.W.3d 273 , as the seminal Arkansas case on the issue of guardianship termination. |sThis case presents us with an issue of first impression with regard to the application of a parent’s fundamental right to the care, control, and custody of his or her child within the framework of terminating a consensual guardianship. 2012The Herringtons cite Graham v. Matheny, 2009 Ark. 481 , 346 S.W.3d 273 , as the seminal Arkansas case on the issue of guardianship termination. |sThis case presents us with an issue of first impression with regard to the application of a parent’s fundamental right to the care, control, and custody of his or her child within the framework of terminating a consensual guardianship. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Glaskox by and Through Denton v. Glaskox
green
1 sentence2002Reversed and remanded. 1 The doctrine of parental immunity originated with the 1891 Mississippi Supreme court decision of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891) {overruled by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Boyd v. State
green
2 sentences2001The majority’s confusion is compounded by its continued citation to Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449 , 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128 , 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); and Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171 , 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993), all of which dealt with parental waiver which now has been repealed. 2001The majority’s confusion is compounded by its continued citation to Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449 , 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128 , 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); and Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171 , 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993), all of which dealt with parental waiver which now has been repealed. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ring v. State
green
2 sentences2001The majority’s confusion is compounded by its continued citation to Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449 , 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128 , 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); and Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171 , 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993), all of which dealt with parental waiver which now has been repealed. 2001The majority’s confusion is compounded by its continued citation to Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449 , 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128 , 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); and Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171 , 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993), all of which dealt with parental waiver which now has been repealed. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Misskelley v. State
green
2 sentences2001The majority’s confusion is compounded by its continued citation to Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449 , 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128 , 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); and Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171 , 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993), all of which dealt with parental waiver which now has been repealed. 2001The majority’s confusion is compounded by its continued citation to Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449 , 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128 , 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); and Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171 , 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993), all of which dealt with parental waiver which now has been repealed. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Thomas Ex Rel. Inmon v. Inmon
green
2 sentences1996Carpenter v. Bishop, 290 Ark. 424 , 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986); Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221 , 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980). 1996Carpenter v. Bishop, 290 Ark. 424 , 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986); Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221 , 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Rigdon Ex Rel. Rigdon v. Rigdon
green
2 sentences1982Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.1970). 1982Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ellis v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences1982This Court in Ellis v. Ferguson, 238 Ark. 776 , 385 S. W.2d 154 (1964) described such conduct as follows: “It is not necessary to prove the defendant deliberately intended to injure the person. 1982This Court in Ellis v. Ferguson, 238 Ark. 776 , 385 S. W.2d 154 (1964) described such conduct as follows: “It is not necessary to prove the defendant deliberately intended to injure the person. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.