parental immunity in Illinois

2002We recognize that the parental immunity doctrine is a judicial creation (see Nudd, 7 Ill. 2d at 619 ; accord Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 108 ), but we note that only the legislature has provided parental immunity to individuals who are not parents or foster parents (see 105 ILCS 5/24 — 24, 34 — 84a (West 2000) (“In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, [educators] stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils”); Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (2002) (sections 24 — 24 and 34 — 84a of

2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill.

2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill.

2002In the defendants’ view, “the parental immunity doctrine follows the child.” The parental immunity doctrine, which blocks mere negligence claims, but not willful and wanton misconduct claims (see Gerrity v. Beatty , 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49 (1978), citing Nudd v. Matsoukas , 7 Ill. 2d 608 (1956)), was recognized in Illinois in Foley v. Foley , 61 Ill.

1982Reciting the public policy that undergirds the doctrine of parental immunity, that is, the preservation of “the peace, harmony, tranquility, discipline, cooperation, love and respect essential to good family relationship” ( 100 Ill.

1982The Court feels that in so doing, Defendant was operating the motor vehicle to accomplish a family purpose and is therefore immune from suit by Plaintiff.” Plaintiff appeals raising two issues: (1) “[w]hether the ‘family purpose’ exception to the parental immunity doctrine in Illinois applies in automobile cases based on negligence” and (2) “[w]hether the ‘family purpose’ exception to the parental immunity doctrine in Illinois was met in this case.” In Schenk v. Schenk (1968), 100 Ill.

1997The Cates court referenced its earlier decision in Stallman wherein it had before it the application of the parental immunity doctrine in an automobile negligence action, but reiterated that in Stallman " 'it [was] unnecessary’ for the court 'to reach the issue concerning the status of the parental immunity doctrine.’ ” Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 84-85 , quoting Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 269 .

1997The Stall-man court was careful to point out that its ruling on the underlying tort liability issue made "unnecessary the consideration of the issue of the parental immunity doctrine.” Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 271 .

1979(Kobylanski.) Because the doctrine of parental immunity precludes a child from suing his parents for injuries absent wilful and wanton misconduct (Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ), teachers and other certified educational employees are immune from suits for negligence arising out of matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children.

1979(Kobylanski.) Because the doctrine of parental immunity precludes a child from suing his parents for injuries absent wilful and wanton misconduct (Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451 , 216 N.E.2d 137 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ), teachers and other certified educational employees are immune from suits for negligence arising out of matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children.

1997It explained that the doctrine did not exist in the English common law but arose from Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891), McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (1903), and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905).

1997It explained that the doctrine did not exist in the English common law but arose from Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891), McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (1903), and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905).

2004In the case at bar, the dissent points to our decision in Seef v. Sutkus, 145 Ill. 2d 336 (1991), which recognized a parental claim for loss of society of a stillborn child.

2004In the case at bar, the dissent points to our decision in Seef v. Sutkus , 145 Ill. 2d 336 (1991), which recognized a parental claim for loss of society of a stillborn child.

1997It explained that the doctrine did not exist in the English common law but arose from Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891), McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (1903), and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905).

1997It explained that the doctrine did not exist in the English common law but arose from Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891), McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (1903), and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905).

1997It explained that the doctrine did not exist in the English common law but arose from Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891), McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (1903), and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905).

1997It explained that the doctrine did not exist in the English common law but arose from Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703 , 9 So. 885 (1891), McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388 , 77 S.W. 664 (1903), and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905).

1984App. 3d 104, 107 , 435 N.E.2d 770, 772 .) Thus, the existence of insurance is not a relevant concern in weighing the policy considerations of the parental immunity doctrine.

1984The parental immunity doctrine was applied in the recent case of Hogan v. Hogan (1982), 106 Ill.

1984Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165 , 347 N.E.2d 705 ; Johnson v. Myers (1972), 2 Ill.

1984Although it has repeatedly been said that parental immunity “is a court-formulated rule which is not based on an absence of duty but upon immunity from suit” (Johnson v. Myers (1972), 2 Ill.

1970App. 577 and Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill.

1966App. 577 and Meece v. Holland Furnace Co. 269 Ill.

2004The dissent asks: "How can we justify sanctioning a damage claim in the death of [a] stillborn child [citation], whom the parents will never even know, while barring a damage claim in the nonfatal injury of a newborn child, whom the parents will come to know, live with, and suffer with for her or his entire life?" 209 Ill.2d at 95 , 282 Ill.

2004The dissent asks: "How can we justify sanctioning a damage claim in the death of [a] stillborn child [citation], whom the parents will never even know, while barring a damage claim in the nonfatal injury of a newborn child, whom the parents will come to know, live with, and suffer with for her or his entire life?" 209 Ill.2d at 95 , 282 Ill.

1997The Cates court indicated that guidance can be gained from the opinion of this court in Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill.App.2d 199 , 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968), and even more from Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402 , 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).

1997The Cates court indicated that guidance can be gained from the opinion of this court in Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill.App.2d 199 , 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968), and even more from Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402 , 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).

1993(See Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine In Search of Justification, 50 Fordham L.Rev. 489, 512 n. 151 (1982), quoting Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner (1980), 83 Ill.App.3d 234, 236 , 38 Ill.Dec. 652 , 403 N.E.2d 1256 (appellate court of Illinois appears to have adopted approach similar to Goller and abrogated the immunity except for injuries caused by `"mere negligence within the scope of the parental relationship'") Pedigo v. Rowley (1980), 101 Idaho 201 , 204, 610 P.2d 560, 563 (citing Schenk and stating "Illinois has also limited the application of the doctrine of par

1993(See Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine In Search of Justification, 50 Fordham L.Rev. 489, 512 n. 151 (1982), quoting Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner (1980), 83 Ill.App.3d 234, 236 , 38 Ill.Dec. 652 , 403 N.E.2d 1256 (appellate court of Illinois appears to have adopted approach similar to Goller and abrogated the immunity except for injuries caused by `"mere negligence within the scope of the parental relationship'") Pedigo v. Rowley (1980), 101 Idaho 201 , 204, 610 P.2d 560, 563 (citing Schenk and stating "Illinois has also limited the application of the doctrine of par

1992App. 3d 683 , 504 N.E.2d 920 ] purport to effect a change in the status of the parental immunity doctrine as it existed before the appeal to the Stallman I court, the judgments are vacated.” (Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 271 , 531 N.E.2d at 356 .) Since the supreme court specifically said “we do not decide the issue,” we fail to see how anyone could contend that Stallman adopted the doctrine of parental immunity.

1992App. 3d 683 , 504 N.E.2d 920 ] purport to effect a change in the status of the parental immunity doctrine as it existed before the appeal to the Stallman I court, the judgments are vacated.” (Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 271 , 531 N.E.2d at 356 .) Since the supreme court specifically said “we do not decide the issue,” we fail to see how anyone could contend that Stallman adopted the doctrine of parental immunity.

1988Mayberry v. Pryor (1984), 134 Mich. App. 826, 832-33 , 352 N.W.2d 322, 324-25 .

1988Mayberry v. Pryor (1984), 134 Mich. App. 826, 832-33 , 352 N.W.2d 322, 324-25 .

1988This court noted a similar paradox in Cockrum v. Baumgartner (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 193, 202 , which denied a parental claim for damages in a “wrongful birth” action.

1988This court noted a similar paradox in Cockrum v. Baumgartner (1983), 95 Ill.2d 193, 202 , which denied a parental claim for damages in a "wrongful birth" action.