parental privilege in Massachusetts

2024"As with other affirmative defenses," if the parental privilege defense is properly raised before the fact finder, "the Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving at least one prong of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 13 .

2019Clearly, the use of "physical force," based on the facts described in Custody of Vaughn, supra, would find no sanction under the parental privilege recognized in Dorvil, 472 Mass. at 10 .

2006The doctrine of parental immunity was abrogated with respect to motor vehicle torts in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 365-66 (1975) (noting that there may be exercises of parental discretion and authority which should be immune from judicial scrutiny).

2002The language of the court is instructive in that it stated in its decision “further definition of the scope of the new rule of interspousal tort liability will await development in future cases.” In Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350 , 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975), the doctrine of parental immunity was abrogated to the extent of a parent’s automobile liability insurance coverage.

1988See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921-922 (1971) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486 (1969) (parent-child negligence suits will be allowed regardless of the presence or absence of insurance); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436 (1966); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 330 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376, 378-379 (1971) (citing opinions in twelve States which had abolished the doctrine); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 134, 137 (1980) (aboli

1988See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 921-922 (1971) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486 (1969) (parent-child negligence suits will be allowed regardless of the presence or absence of insurance); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436 (1966); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St.3d 326, 330 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376, 378-379 (1971) (citing opinions in twelve States which had abolished the doctrine); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 134, 137 (1980) (abolish

1988See Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404-405 (1974); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121-122 (1977).

1975See Rigdon v. Ridgon, supra; Silesky v. Kelman, supra; Goller v. White, supra. 9 In Goller , the father drove a tractor. 10 Hewlett, Roller and McKelvey , the early trilogy of cases which first propounded the parental immunity rule, would likely now fall within the exceptions to the rule in most jurisdictions.

2019For cases involving parental conduct that was determined to be criminal notwithstanding an assertion of the parental privilege to discipline a child, see Commonwealth v. Rosa, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 464 (2018); Commonwealth v. 12 may be relevant to determining parental unfitness." Adoption of Leland, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 585 (2006).

2019For cases involving parental conduct that was determined to be criminal notwithstanding an assertion of the parental privilege to discipline a child, see Commonwealth v. Rosa, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 464 (2018); Commonwealth v. 12 may be relevant to determining parental unfitness." Adoption of Leland, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 585 (2006).

2019For cases involving parental conduct that was determined to be criminal notwithstanding an assertion of the parental privilege to discipline a child, see Commonwealth v. Rosa, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 464 (2018); Commonwealth v. 12 may be relevant to determining parental unfitness." Adoption of Leland, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 585 (2006).

2019For cases involving parental conduct that was determined to be criminal notwithstanding an assertion of the parental privilege to discipline a child, see Commonwealth v. Rosa, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 464 (2018); Commonwealth v. 12 may be relevant to determining parental unfitness." Adoption of Leland, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 585 (2006).

2018See, e.g., Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 , 18-26, 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (defendant could not be criminally prosecuted for wearing T-shirt saying "Fuck the Draft").

2018See, e.g., Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 , 18-26, 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (defendant could not be criminally prosecuted for wearing T-shirt saying "Fuck the Draft").

2016See Commonwealth v. Packer, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 585 , 593 n.11 (2015).

2015In accordance with the crime’s common-law character, we have turned to the common law to articulate defenses to a charge of assault and battery, such as the justification of self-defense, see Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508, 511 (1975), or defense of another, see Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 646-647 (1976). *7 This court has not expressly recognized a parental privilege defense to use force in disciplining a child, nor have we articulated the scope of any such privilege.

2015See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 924 (2006) (observing that court has “not addressed the issue [of the parental privilege defense] one way or the other,” and determining that defendant’s request for jury instruction on that defense “[would] be best addressed on remand”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554 , 568 n.11 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s contention that trial judge erred in failing to give instruction regarding parental privilege defense; “[o]n any view of the evidence, [the] frequent beating of . . . very young children . . . would

2015In accordance with the crime’s common-law character, we have turned to the common law to articulate defenses to a charge of assault and battery, such as the justification of self-defense, see Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508, 511 (1975), or defense of another, see Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 646-647 (1976). *7 This court has not expressly recognized a parental privilege defense to use force in disciplining a child, nor have we articulated the scope of any such privilege.

2015See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 924 (2006) (observing that court has “not addressed the issue [of the parental privilege defense] one way or the other,” and determining that defendant’s request for jury instruction on that defense “[would] be best addressed on remand”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554 , 568 n.11 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s contention that trial judge erred in failing to give instruction regarding parental privilege defense; “[o]n any view of the evidence, [the] frequent beating of . . . very young children . . . would

2015See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 924 (2006) (observing that court has “not addressed the issue [of the parental privilege defense] one way or the other,” and determining that defendant’s request for jury instruction on that defense “[would] be best addressed on remand”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554 , 568 n.11 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s contention that trial judge erred in failing to give instruction regarding parental privilege defense; “[o]n any view of the evidence, [the] frequent beating of . . . very young children . . . would

2015See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 924 (2006) (observing that court has “not addressed the issue [of the parental privilege defense] one way or the other,” and determining that defendant’s request for jury instruction on that defense “[would] be best addressed on remand”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554 , 568 n.11 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s contention that trial judge erred in failing to give instruction regarding parental privilege defense; “[o]n any view of the evidence, [the] frequent beating of . . . very young children . . . would

2015Cf. Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-688 (1976); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008).

2015In Commonwealth v. Rubeck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 396-397 (2005), the defendant was convicted of assault and battery for her conduct towards her two year old son in the waiting room of a medical center.

2015The United States Supreme Court has long held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925).

2015Cf. Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-688 (1976); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008).

2015Cf. Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-688 (1976); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008).

2006In support of his motion to dismiss, Grandmaison argues that the Supreme Judicial Court has not recognized a cause of action for negligent parental supervision resulting in injury to the child. 3 Fiesta and Essex argue that in Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 401 Mass. 762 (1988), the Supreme Judicial Court abolished the doctrine of parental immunity for negligent injury to a minor child thereby authorizing third-party claims against a parent for negligent supervision.

2006Thereafter, in Stamboulis , 401 Mass, at 764-65, the Court held that the parent-child immunity doctrine is not an absolute bar to an action by a child against a parent whose negligence caused injury to the child. 4 The Court expressed no view as to whether it would permit the child to recover for negligent parental supervision because that issue was not presented to the lower court and the summary judgment record was not sufficiently developed to permit “an appropriate analysis of this issue.” Stamboulis, 401 Mass. at 763, n.3 .

2005“The use of physical force [in chastisement] by a parent is privileged only when it is used for the ‘training or education of the child or for the preservation of discipline.’ (Restatement, Torts 2d, § 151 [(1965)].) When the child does not have the capacity to understand or appreciate the correction, the value of the training, education or discipline is lost upon him and, therefore, the parental privilege of the use of physical force is negated.” (Footnote omitted.) Matter of Rodney C., 91 Misc. 2d 677, 680-681 (N.Y.

1988See Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404-405 (1974); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121-122 (1977).

1988See Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404-405 (1974); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121-122 (1977).

1988See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921-922 (1971) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486 (1969) (parent-child negligence suits will be allowed regardless of the presence or absence of insurance); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436 (1966); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 330 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376, 378-379 (1971) (citing opinions in twelve States which had abolished the doctrine); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 134, 137 (1980) (aboli

1988See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 921-922 (1971) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486 (1969) (parent-child negligence suits will be allowed regardless of the presence or absence of insurance); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436 (1966); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St.3d 326, 330 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376, 378-379 (1971) (citing opinions in twelve States which had abolished the doctrine); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 134, 137 (1980) (abolish

1988See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921-922 (1971) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486 (1969) (parent-child negligence suits will be allowed regardless of the presence or absence of insurance); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436 (1966); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 330 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376, 378-379 (1971) (citing opinions in twelve States which had abolished the doctrine); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 134, 137 (1980) (aboli

1988See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 921-922 (1971) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Petersen v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486 (1969) (parent-child negligence suits will be allowed regardless of the presence or absence of insurance); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436 (1966); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St.3d 326, 330 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376, 378-379 (1971) (citing opinions in twelve States which had abolished the doctrine); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 134, 137 (1980) (abolish