parental immunity in South Carolina

1985Almost two years later, in Walton v. Stewart, 277 S. C. 436, 289 S. E. (2d) 403 (1982), the Supreme Court held that its abrogation of the doctrine of parental immunity applied prospectively only and that the doctrine barred the maintenance of a suit based on an event occurring before the effective date of abolition.

1984Nearly two years later, in Walton v. Stewart, 277 S. C. 436, 289 S. E. (2d) 403 (1982), the Supreme Court held that its abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine applied prospectively only and that the doctrine therefore barred the maintenance of an action based on an event occurring before the Court abolished the doctrine.

1982Parker v. Parker, supra. After the occurrence of the facts giving rise to this litigation, we abolished the parental immunity doctrine, Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980); however, the abrogation of this doctrine applies prospectively only, Hyder v. Jones, 271 S. C. 85, 245 S. E. (2d) 123 , supra; Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Association, 268 S. C. 479, 234 S. E. (2d) 873 .

1980As the parental immunity doctrine is court-created, we are required to examine its holdings. [4] Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Assoc. , 268 S.C. 479 , 234 S.E. (2d) 873 (1977).

1982Parker v. Parker, supra. After the occurrence of the facts giving rise to this litigation, we abolished the parental immunity doctrine, Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980); however, the abrogation of this doctrine applies prospectively only, Hyder v. Jones, 271 S. C. 85, 245 S. E. (2d) 123 , supra; Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Association, 268 S. C. 479, 234 S. E. (2d) 873 .

1980This case has been consistently followed since that time, as recently as Hyder v. Jones , 271 S.C. 85 , 245 S.E. (2d) 123 (1978).

1984Co., 211 S. C. 232, 44 S. E. (2d) 537 (1947) (held general rule that doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in South Carolina is subject to statutory exception in suits against railroads by their employees); Sturcken v. Richland Oil Company, 248 S. C. 355, 150 S. E. (2d) 341 (1966) (held jury charge on doctrine of contributory negligence was improper where charge referred to “grades” of negligence). 17 See e.g., King v. Williams, 276 S. C. 478, 279 S. E. (2d) 618 (1981) (abolished “locality rule” in medical malpractice cases); Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980

1984Co., 211 S. C. 232, 44 S. E. (2d) 537 (1947) (held general rule that doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in South Carolina is subject to statutory exception in suits against railroads by their employees); Sturcken v. Richland Oil Company, 248 S. C. 355, 150 S. E. (2d) 341 (1966) (held jury charge on doctrine of contributory negligence was improper where charge referred to “grades” of negligence). 17 See e.g., King v. Williams, 276 S. C. 478, 279 S. E. (2d) 618 (1981) (abolished “locality rule” in medical malpractice cases); Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980

1984Co., 211 S. C. 232, 44 S. E. (2d) 537 (1947) (held general rule that doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in South Carolina is subject to statutory exception in suits against railroads by their employees); Sturcken v. Richland Oil Company, 248 S. C. 355, 150 S. E. (2d) 341 (1966) (held jury charge on doctrine of contributory negligence was improper where charge referred to “grades” of negligence). 17 See e.g., King v. Williams, 276 S. C. 478, 279 S. E. (2d) 618 (1981) (abolished “locality rule” in medical malpractice cases); Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980

1984Co., 211 S. C. 232, 44 S. E. (2d) 537 (1947) (held general rule that doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in South Carolina is subject to statutory exception in suits against railroads by their employees); Sturcken v. Richland Oil Company, 248 S. C. 355, 150 S. E. (2d) 341 (1966) (held jury charge on doctrine of contributory negligence was improper where charge referred to “grades” of negligence). 17 See e.g., King v. Williams, 276 S. C. 478, 279 S. E. (2d) 618 (1981) (abolished “locality rule” in medical malpractice cases); Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980

1984Co., 211 S. C. 232, 44 S. E. (2d) 537 (1947) (held general rule that doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in South Carolina is subject to statutory exception in suits against railroads by their employees); Sturcken v. Richland Oil Company, 248 S. C. 355, 150 S. E. (2d) 341 (1966) (held jury charge on doctrine of contributory negligence was improper where charge referred to “grades” of negligence). 17 See e.g., King v. Williams, 276 S. C. 478, 279 S. E. (2d) 618 (1981) (abolished “locality rule” in medical malpractice cases); Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980

1984Co., 211 S. C. 232, 44 S. E. (2d) 537 (1947) (held general rule that doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in South Carolina is subject to statutory exception in suits against railroads by their employees); Sturcken v. Richland Oil Company, 248 S. C. 355, 150 S. E. (2d) 341 (1966) (held jury charge on doctrine of contributory negligence was improper where charge referred to “grades” of negligence). 17 See e.g., King v. Williams, 276 S. C. 478, 279 S. E. (2d) 618 (1981) (abolished “locality rule” in medical malpractice cases); Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980

1982Broome v. Truluck, 270 S. C. 227, 241 S. E. (2d) 739 (1978); Marley v. Kirby, 271 S. C. 122, 245 S. E. (2d) 604 (1978); Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S. C. 680, 258 S. E. (2d) 883 (1979); and Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980).

1982Broome v. Truluck, 270 S. C. 227, 241 S. E. (2d) 739 (1978); Marley v. Kirby, 271 S. C. 122, 245 S. E. (2d) 604 (1978); Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S. C. 680, 258 S. E. (2d) 883 (1979); and Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980).

1982Parker v. Parker, supra. After the occurrence of the facts giving rise to this litigation, we abolished the parental immunity doctrine, Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980); however, the abrogation of this doctrine applies prospectively only, Hyder v. Jones, 271 S. C. 85, 245 S. E. (2d) 123 , supra; Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Association, 268 S. C. 479, 234 S. E. (2d) 873 .

1982Broome v. Truluck, 270 S. C. 227, 241 S. E. (2d) 739 (1978); Marley v. Kirby, 271 S. C. 122, 245 S. E. (2d) 604 (1978); Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S. C. 680, 258 S. E. (2d) 883 (1979); and Elam v. Elam, 275 S. C. 132, 268 S. E. (2d) 109 (1980).

1980In Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A. (2d) 351, 355 (Pa. 1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: “The speculative theory of family disruption upon which the doctrine of parental immunity is largely based has been criticized and rejected by legal scholars without exception.

1980In Falco v. Pados , 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A. (2d) 351, 355 (Pa. 1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "The speculative theory of family disruption upon which the doctrine of parental immunity is largely based has been criticized and rejected by legal scholars without exception.

1980Thus, the automobile owning son whose car is wrecked by his parent may sue for the property damage incurred but not for the personal injuries he sustains by reason of his being a passenger in his parent operated vehicle. [3] Maxey v. Sauls , 242 S.C. 247 , 130 S.E. (2d) 570 (1963). [4] As this Court observed in Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Assoc. , 268 S.C. 479 , 234 S.E. (2d) 873 (1977) all court created immunities frustrate our common law system of jurisprudence.

1980Thus, the automobile owning son whose car is wrecked by his parent may sue for the property damage incurred but not for the personal injuries he sustains by reason of his being a passenger in his parent operated vehicle. [3] Maxey v. Sauls , 242 S.C. 247 , 130 S.E. (2d) 570 (1963). [4] As this Court observed in Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Assoc. , 268 S.C. 479 , 234 S.E. (2d) 873 (1977) all court created immunities frustrate our common law system of jurisprudence.

1980In Maw , the court held that parental immunity involved a proper classification and followed the rule apparently first enunciated by this court in Kelly v. Kelly , 158 S.C. 517 , 155 S.E. 888 (1930).

1980In Maw , the court held that parental immunity involved a proper classification and followed the rule apparently first enunciated by this court in Kelly v. Kelly , 158 S.C. 517 , 155 S.E. 888 (1930).