parental presumption in District of Columbia

2014As for the standard of proof required to rebut this parental presumption, the two-judge majority concluded that the trial judge in that case had “properly proceeded” in applying the parental presumption, observing that the judge had “found by clear and convincing evidence that S.G.‟s best interests for the immediate future lay in remaining” where she had always lived with her siblings and grandmother rather than with her father in another city. 13 In re S.G., 581 A.2d at 786-87 .

2013In In re S.G. itself, the two-judge majority concluded that the trial judge in that case had “properly proceeded” in applying the parental presumption, observing that the judge had “found by clear and convincing evidence that S.G.’s best interests for the immediate future” lay in remaining where she had always lived with her siblings and grandmother rather than with her father in another city. 2 In re S.G., 581 A.2d at 786-87 .

2015Code § 16-309 (b) (2012 Repl.) (criteria for granting adoption petition include the fitness of the adoption petitioner and the best interests of the prospective adoptee). 38 Cf. In re J.F., 615 A.2d 594, 598 (D.C. 1992) (explaining that where the trial judge in a child neglect proceeding did not “acknowledge, much less address, the presumption in favor of a fit parent” in its custody determination, “[t]he judge’s statement that she did not need to decide the rights of the adult parties, since the best interests of the child was the issue, fail[ed] to recognize the constitutionally protected in

2014See In re J.F., 615 A.2d at 598 ; In re S.G., 581 A.2d at 786 (Rogers, C.J., and Ferren, J., concurring).

2021Based on the facts found by the magistrate judge and the cases discussed above, we conclude as a matter of law that appellant failed to grasp his opportunity interest. 6 For this reason as well, he was not entitled to the 6 In In re D.S., 88 A.3d 678, 692 (D.C. 2014), we remanded because neither the magistrate judge nor the associate judge had fully considered the parental presumption when deciding to commit the children to the care of the Child and Family Services Agency.

2016In so holding we build on recent acknowledgments by this court that a showing of unfitness is an essential part of the termination inquiry,5 and we overrule prior pronouncements that proof of unfitness is not constitutionally required to permanently sever an existing parent-child relationship—that all that is needed is a showing that termination is in the best interests of the child. 6 Supreme Court precedent compels this change in our law.7 ____________________ 5 See ante, at 41 (discussing In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275 (D.C. 2015), and In re G.A.P., 133 A.3d 994 (D.C. 2016)); see also In re J.

2015Those determinations must be set forth with clarity.47 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a remand is necessary and appropriate in this case, in order for the trial court to rectify the absence of explicit determinations regarding appellant’s fitness vel non and whether the presumption 46 In re J.C.F., 73 A.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. 2013). 47 Cf. In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 , 420 (D.C. 2009) (remanding for further proceedings where trial court did not accord natural parent the presumption in favor of a fit parent). 31 in favor of a fit parent has been rebutted.

2014See, e.g., In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 , 418-419 (D.C. 2009) (noting that the trial court did not “find that [the father] was unfit so as to negate by itself the presumption”); id. at 417 (noting that “application of the statute must take into account the presumption that the child‟s best interest will be served by placing the child with (continued…) 22 This court again grappled with a placement decision appealed by a fit noncustodial father in In re L.J.T., 608 A.2d 1213 (D.C. 1992).

2015This is not enough to show that the court is applying the law correctly and respecting the presumption in favor of maintaining the parental rights of a fit natural parent.38 Similarly, “proper recognition of the parental presumption requires more than a verbal allowance that the presumption 37 Rashawn H., 937 A.2d at 192 (emphasis in the original); see also In re C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502 , 511 (D.C. 2012) (“The court therefore begins by recognizing the presumption that the child’s best interest will be served by placing the child with his natural parent, provided the parent has not been proven unfi

2014At the outset, proper recognition of the parental presumption requires more (…continued) C.L.O., 41 A.3d at 510; Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. 1989) (en banc). 31 than a verbal allowance that the presumption exists.

2021Thus, there was no “need for a threshold determination,” In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d at 1288 , that the parental presumption had been rebutted.

2016We have said that the trial court must “correctly and explicitly incorporate the parental presumption into its analysis[,]” and make either an explicit finding of parental fitness or “equivalent findings.” Id. at 1289-90 .

2013But, the parental presumption also accords with the principle that a parent’s constitutionally-protected right “is not absolute and must yield to the child’s best interest and well-being, which is the overriding concern.” In re C.M., supra, 916 A.2d at 179 (citing Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ).

2013But, the parental presumption also accords with the principle that a parent’s constitutionally-protected right “is not absolute and must yield to the child’s best interest and well-being, which is the overriding concern.” In re C.M., supra, 916 A.2d at 179 (citing Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ).

2014The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional protections afforded to parents to “establish a home and bring up children,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), to “direct the upbringing and education of children,” Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925), and to direct the “care, custody, and management of their child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

2014The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional protections afforded to parents to “establish a home and bring up children,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), to “direct the upbringing and education of children,” Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925), and to direct the “care, custody, and management of their child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

2014The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional protections afforded to parents to “establish a home and bring up children,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), to “direct the upbringing and education of children,” Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925), and to direct the “care, custody, and management of their child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

2014The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional protections afforded to parents to “establish a home and bring up children,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), to “direct the upbringing and education of children,” Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925), and to direct the “care, custody, and management of their child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).

2016In so holding we build on recent acknowledgments by this court that a showing of unfitness is an essential part of the termination inquiry,5 and we overrule prior pronouncements that proof of unfitness is not constitutionally required to permanently sever an existing parent-child relationship—that all that is needed is a showing that termination is in the best interests of the child. 6 Supreme Court precedent compels this change in our law.7 ____________________ 5 See ante, at 41 (discussing In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275 (D.C. 2015), and In re G.A.P., 133 A.3d 994 (D.C. 2016)); see also In re J.

2016In so holding we build on recent acknowledgments by this court that a showing of unfitness is an essential part of the termination inquiry,5 and we overrule prior pronouncements that proof of unfitness is not constitutionally required to permanently sever an existing parent-child relationship—that all that is needed is a showing that termination is in the best interests of the child. 6 Supreme Court precedent compels this change in our law.7 ____________________ 5 See ante, at 41 (discussing In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275 (D.C. 2015), and In re G.A.P., 133 A.3d 994 (D.C. 2016)); see also In re J.

2015In Maryland, as in the District of Columbia, the best interest of the child standard remains “the overriding statutory criterion in TPR cases,” and that standard is applied with the strong but rebuttable “implicit substantive presumption that the interest of the child is best served by maintaining the parental relationship.” Id. at 189-90 ; see also In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d 276, 286 (Md. 2013) (“[T]he focus of the inquiry [in contested adoption and TPR cases] into the child’s best interest—even with the parental presumption in place—must be on the child, not the parent.”).

2015In Maryland, as in the District of Columbia, the best interest of the child standard remains "the overriding statutory criterion in TPR cases,” and that standard is applied with the strong but rebuttable "implicit substantive presumption that the interest of the child is best served by maintaining the parental relationship.” Id. at 189-90; see also In re Jayden G., 433 Md. 50 , 70 A.3d 276, 286 (2013) (”[T]he focus of the inquiry [in contested adoption and TPR cases] into the child’s best interest—even with the parental presumption in place—must be on the child, not the parent.”).

2014In conducting this review of the trial court’s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2014In conducting this review of the trial court‟s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2014In conducting this review of the trial court’s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2014In conducting this review of the trial court‟s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2014Our task is to determine whether the trial court, in rejecting the father‟s request for custody of his six children and committing them to the care of CFSA, adequately considered the parental presumption recognized in our decisions and in the District of Columbia Code.21 21 While we recognize that our review is of the associate judge‟s order affirming the magistrate judge, rather than the ruling of the magistrate judge, “we do not believe our powers of appellate review are so limited that, in reviewing the trial court's final order we may not look to the findings and conclusions of the fact fi

2014Our task is to determine whether the trial court, in rejecting the father‟s request for custody of his six children and committing them to the care of CFSA, adequately considered the parental presumption recognized in our decisions and in the District of Columbia Code.21 21 While we recognize that our review is of the associate judge‟s order affirming the magistrate judge, rather than the ruling of the magistrate judge, “we do not believe our powers of appellate review are so limited that, in reviewing the trial court's final order we may not look to the findings and conclusions of the fact fi

2016In so holding we build on recent acknowledgments by this court that a showing of unfitness is an essential part of the termination inquiry,5 and we overrule prior pronouncements that proof of unfitness is not constitutionally required to permanently sever an existing parent-child relationship—that all that is needed is a showing that termination is in the best interests of the child. 6 Supreme Court precedent compels this change in our law.7 ____________________ 5 See ante, at 41 (discussing In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275 (D.C. 2015), and In re G.A.P., 133 A.3d 994 (D.C. 2016)); see also In re J.

2016In so holding we build on recent acknowledgments by this court that a showing of unfitness is an essential part of the termination inquiry,5 and we overrule prior pronouncements that proof of unfitness is not constitutionally required to permanently sever an existing parent-child relationship—that all that is needed is a showing that termination is in the best interests of the child. 6 Supreme Court precedent compels this change in our law.7 ____________________ 5 See ante, at 41 (discussing In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275 (D.C. 2015), and In re G.A.P., 133 A.3d 994 (D.C. 2016)); see also In re J.

1987The judge then examined at length the case law from many jurisdictions and decided to adopt the parental immunity doctrine, concluding that the “overwhelming weight of authority” favored such immunity because it served “to protect parental discipline, domestic felicity, and family tranquility and concord.” Id. at 417 .

1987Next, in Dennis v. Walker, the District Court followed “the overwhelming weight of authority in this country” to hold that the doctrine of parental immunity should apply in the District of Columbia. 284 F.Supp. at 417 .

2022See S.M. v. R.M., 92 A.3d 1128, 1129-30, 1137 (D.C. 2014).

2015Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice § 4.04[1] (Matthew Bender 2014); see also In re D.S., 88 A.3d 678 , 689 n.15 (D.C. 2014). 31 See, e.g., In re J.G., 831 A.2d 992 , 1000 (D.C. 2003) (reiterating that “in no case may a contest between parent and nonparent resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipses omitted). 32 In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 713-14. 24 natural parent would be seriously detrimental to the child’s wellbeing,33 or if terminating e

2015See In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 714 (concluding that "insofar as the child’s relationships with persons other than the natural parent are important in determining whether termination is required and if so, what its effects might be, statutory consideration of such relationships is constitutional”); see also In re C.T., 724 A.2d 590 , 598 n. 9 (D.C.1999) (”[I]n determining whether the drastic measure of terminating parental rights is required in the child’s best interest, the court must consider the adoptive prospects of the child along with other relevant factors.”); In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d at

2015In Maryland, as in the District of Columbia, the best interest of the child standard remains "the overriding statutory criterion in TPR cases,” and that standard is applied with the strong but rebuttable "implicit substantive presumption that the interest of the child is best served by maintaining the parental relationship.” Id. at 189-90; see also In re Jayden G., 433 Md. 50 , 70 A.3d 276, 286 (2013) (”[T]he focus of the inquiry [in contested adoption and TPR cases] into the child’s best interest—even with the parental presumption in place—must be on the child, not the parent.”).

2015In Maryland, as in the District of Columbia, the best interest of the child standard remains "the overriding statutory criterion in TPR cases,” and that standard is applied with the strong but rebuttable "implicit substantive presumption that the interest of the child is best served by maintaining the parental relationship.” Id. at 189-90; see also In re Jayden G., 433 Md. 50 , 70 A.3d 276, 286 (2013) (”[T]he focus of the inquiry [in contested adoption and TPR cases] into the child’s best interest—even with the parental presumption in place—must be on the child, not the parent.”).

2015Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice § 4.04[1] (Matthew Bender 2014); see also In re D.S., 88 A.3d 678 , 689 n.15 (D.C. 2014). 31 See, e.g., In re J.G., 831 A.2d 992 , 1000 (D.C. 2003) (reiterating that “in no case may a contest between parent and nonparent resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipses omitted). 32 In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 713-14. 24 natural parent would be seriously detrimental to the child’s wellbeing,33 or if terminating e

2015Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice § 4.04[1] (Matthew Bender 2014); see also In re D.S., 88 A.3d 678 , 689 n.15 (D.C. 2014). 31 See, e.g., In re J.G., 831 A.2d 992 , 1000 (D.C. 2003) (reiterating that “in no case may a contest between parent and nonparent resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipses omitted). 32 In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 713-14. 24 natural parent would be seriously detrimental to the child’s wellbeing,33 or if terminating e

2015Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice § 4.04[1] (Matthew Bender 2014); see also In re D.S., 88 A.3d 678 , 689 n.15 (D.C. 2014). 31 See, e.g., In re J.G., 831 A.2d 992 , 1000 (D.C. 2003) (reiterating that “in no case may a contest between parent and nonparent resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets and ellipses omitted). 32 In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 713-14. 24 natural parent would be seriously detrimental to the child’s wellbeing,33 or if terminating e

2015See In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 714 (concluding that "insofar as the child’s relationships with persons other than the natural parent are important in determining whether termination is required and if so, what its effects might be, statutory consideration of such relationships is constitutional”); see also In re C.T., 724 A.2d 590 , 598 n. 9 (D.C.1999) (”[I]n determining whether the drastic measure of terminating parental rights is required in the child’s best interest, the court must consider the adoptive prospects of the child along with other relevant factors.”); In re Jayden G., 70 A.3d at

2015Those determinations must be set forth with clarity.47 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a remand is necessary and appropriate in this case, in order for the trial court to rectify the absence of explicit determinations regarding appellant’s fitness vel non and whether the presumption 46 In re J.C.F., 73 A.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. 2013). 47 Cf. In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 , 420 (D.C. 2009) (remanding for further proceedings where trial court did not accord natural parent the presumption in favor of a fit parent). 31 in favor of a fit parent has been rebutted.

2014His order with regard to the application of the presumption hinged in large part upon his determination that “after sufficient and patient inquiry,” Judge Saddler was “satisfied that [the mother] understood that the [c]ustody [o]rder [would be] permanent, and that [she] would have to return to Court to obtain a change.” He found that the mother “indicated more than once that she understood, and maintained her consent,” and further, that there was “no indication on the record that [she] did not consent to [the aunt] having custody of the minor child.” 10 Morrissey, 668 A.2d at 797 (“[I]f the wo

2014At the outset, proper recognition of the parental presumption requires more (…continued) C.L.O., 41 A.3d at 510; Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. 1989) (en banc). 31 than a verbal allowance that the presumption exists.

2014His order with regard to the application of the presumption hinged in large part upon his determination that “after sufficient and patient inquiry,” Judge Saddler was “satisfied that [the mother] understood that the [c]ustody [o]rder [would be] permanent, and that [she] would have to return to Court to obtain a change.” He found that the mother “indicated more than once that she understood, and maintained her consent,” and further, that there was “no indication on the record that [she] did not consent to [the aunt] having custody of the minor child.” 10 Morrissey, 668 A.2d at 797 (“[I]f the wo