parental presumption in Alabama

2025Thus, we conclude that the 'relinquishment' exception to the parental presumption provided no basis for the standard applied by the trial court in this case." 12 CL-2025-0032 Id. at 307 (footnote omitted).

2025Therefore, we conclude that the 'prior[-] decree' exception to the parental presumption provided no basis for the standard applied by the trial court in this case." Id. at 308 .

2026The supreme court then explained that the parental presumption ' "does not apply after [1] a voluntary forfeiture of custody or [2] a prior decree removing custody from the natural parent 9 SC-2025-0655 and awarding it to a nonparent. " ' 645 So. 3d at 306 (quoting Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984)).

2025The supreme court then explained that the parental presumption " 'does not apply after [1] a voluntary forfeiture of custody or [2] a prior decree removing custody from the natural parent and awarding it to a nonparent.' " 645 So. 3d at 306 (quoting Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984)).

2012However, she further argues that the parental presumption set forth in Ex parte Terry, 494 So.2d 628 (Ala.1986), should have been applied.

2008Although the father argues that the juvenile court failed to accord him the parental presumption described by Ex parte Terry, supra, that is clearly not the case.

2011In Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264 (Ala.1989), we held that the parental immunity doctrine does not bar suits by minor children against their parents based on sexual abuse claims.

2003In Hurst we held that the exception to the parental-immunity doctrine giving the injured child a right to redress was in response to "wrongful, intentional, heinous acts," 539 So.2d at 266 , committed by the parent.

2002Similarly, Ex parte Berryhill, 410 So.2d 416 (Ala.1982), the facts of which are quite similar to the present case, stands for the proposition that when a father is not awarded custody of a child, he is still given the benefit of the parental presumption against third parties, provided he is not found unfit.

2002Similarly, Ex parte Berryhill, 410 So.2d 416 (Ala.1982), the facts of which are quite similar to the present case, stands for the proposition that when a father is not awarded custody of a child, he is still given the benefit of the parental presumption against third parties, provided he is not found unfit.

2005See, e.g., D.K.G. v. J.H., 627 So.2d 937 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); N.M. v. State, 625 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); M.M. v. C.M., 600 So.2d 316, 318 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Wallace v. Pollard, 532 So.2d 632 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Jones v. Webb, 524 So.2d 374, 374-75 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Minchew v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 504 So.2d 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Martin v. State ex rel.

2005See, e.g., D.K.G. v. J.H., 627 So.2d 937 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); N.M. v. State, 625 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); M.M. v. C.M., 600 So.2d 316, 318 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Wallace v. Pollard, 532 So.2d 632 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Jones v. Webb, 524 So.2d 374, 374-75 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Minchew v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 504 So.2d 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Martin v. State ex rel.

2002In Ex parte R.C.L., supra, that court held that the parental presumption is not defeated by pendente lite orders, as it is by temporary custody orders.

2002In Ex parte R.C.L., supra, that court held that the parental presumption is not defeated by pendente lite orders, as it is by temporary custody orders.

2026A trial court should not be precluded from considering the circumstances existing before paternity is judicially established in deciding whether a putative father should be entitled to the parental presumption." Id. at ___.

2008Id.; see also R.K. v. R.J, 843 So.2d 774, 784 (Ala.Civ.App.2002).

2005See, e.g., D.K.G. v. J.H., 627 So.2d 937 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); N.M. v. State, 625 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); M.M. v. C.M., 600 So.2d 316, 318 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Wallace v. Pollard, 532 So.2d 632 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Jones v. Webb, 524 So.2d 374, 374-75 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Minchew v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 504 So.2d 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Martin v. State ex rel.

2005See, e.g., D.K.G. v. J.H., 627 So.2d 937 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); N.M. v. State, 625 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); M.M. v. C.M., 600 So.2d 316, 318 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Wallace v. Pollard, 532 So.2d 632 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Jones v. Webb, 524 So.2d 374, 374-75 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Minchew v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 504 So.2d 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Martin v. State ex rel.

2005See, e.g., D.K.G. v. J.H., 627 So.2d 937 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); N.M. v. State, 625 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); M.M. v. C.M., 600 So.2d 316, 318 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Wallace v. Pollard, 532 So.2d 632 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Jones v. Webb, 524 So.2d 374, 374-75 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Minchew v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 504 So.2d 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Martin v. State ex rel.

2005See, e.g., D.K.G. v. J.H., 627 So.2d 937 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); N.M. v. State, 625 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); M.M. v. C.M., 600 So.2d 316, 318 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Wallace v. Pollard, 532 So.2d 632 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Jones v. Webb, 524 So.2d 374, 374-75 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Minchew v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 504 So.2d 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Martin v. State ex rel.

2007Moreover, the plurality declined to consider the lower court's reliance on the "harm" standard . . . but cited with approval various statutes that would be inconsistent with such a standard.' " In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont , 337 Or. 86 , 101 , 91 P.3d 721 , 730 (2004) (emphasis added), cert. denied , 543 U.S. 1050 , 125 S.Ct. 867 , 160 L.Ed.2d 770 (2005).

2007Moreover, the plurality declined to consider the lower court's reliance on the "harm" standard . . . but cited with approval various statutes that would be inconsistent with such a standard.' " In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont , 337 Or. 86 , 101 , 91 P.3d 721 , 730 (2004) (emphasis added), cert. denied , 543 U.S. 1050 , 125 S.Ct. 867 , 160 L.Ed.2d 770 (2005).

2002As the McLendon Court explained, this heightened burden of proof on the natural parent is based upon a “ ‘rule of repose, allowing the child, whose welfare is paramount, the valuable benefit of stability and the right to put down into its environment those roots necessary for the child’s healthy growth into adolescence and adulthood.’ ” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (Ala.Civ.App.1976)). 4 In the present case, the grandparents contend first that the juvenile court erred in giving the father the benefit of the parental presumption described in Terry.

2002As the McLendon Court explained, this heightened burden of proof on the natural parent is based upon a "`rule of repose, allowing the child, whose welfare is paramount, the valuable benefit of stability and the right to put down into its environment those roots necessary for the child's healthy growth into adolescence and adulthood.'" 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (Ala.Civ.App.1976)). [4] In the present case, the grandparents contend first that the juvenile court erred in giving the father the benefit of the parental presumption described in Terry .

2013In Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801 (Ala.1992), this Court held that both foster parents and Department of Human Resources workers may assert the parental-immunity doctrine as a defense to simple negligence claims brought by foster children.

2011In Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801, 803 (Ala.1992), a case in which six foster children died as a result of a fire in the foster home, this Court addressed “whether the parental immunity doctrine bars civil actions by foster children against their foster parents.” This Court stated: “The parental immunity doctrine prohibits all civil suits brought by uneman-cipated minor children against their parents for the torts of their parents....

2026See W.B.Z. v. D.J., 645 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ.

2025On appeal, this court reversed the judgment, holding that the Mobile Juvenile Court had erred in failing to apply the parental presumption in favor of W.B.Z. 17 CL-2025-0032 See W.B.Z. v. D.J., 645 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ.

2011Justice Lyons stated: "I would prefer to address the prospect for exceptions [to the parental-immunity doctrine] by formulating a standard sufficient to protect the child when a parent causes injury under circumstances where no reasonable person could expect immunity from the consequences of his or her action, such as where the conduct has been made a felony by the Legislature or is a misdemeanor with respect to conduct directed toward children below an age limit that is irrelevant to the duties imposed by the parent-child relationship." 872 So.2d at 147 (Lyons, J., concurring in the result in

2003However, the per curiam opinion today rejects Hill , stating that "`[b]ecause the doctrine was judicially created, it is not exclusively a legislative issue and it may be judicially qualified,'" 872 So.2d at 142: "`"While the preferred method for modification of a rule of law is by legislative action, it is clearly within the power of the judiciary, and, at times appropriate for the judiciary, to change an established rule of law.... "`"... [W]here a judicial creation has become outmoded or unjust in application it is more often appropriate for the judicial body to act to modify the law."'" 87

2005Ronnie, Mildred, and Maria rely heavily on Hinson v. Holt , 776 So.2d 804 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998).

2003Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264, 266 (Ala.1989)." Hinson v. Holt, 776 So.2d 804, 811 (Ala. Civ.App.1998). *140 On July 3, 2002, the trial court granted the Coles' motion to dismiss the complaint.

2003(Emphasis added [in Hurst ].) "We reaffirmed the doctrine in Hill v. Giordano, 447 So.2d 164 (Ala.1984) (Jones, J., dissenting), based on the authority of Owens, supra, and held that `any modification or abolition of the parental immunity doctrine should be left to the prerogative of the legislature.' 447 So.2d at 164 .

2003(Emphasis added [in Hurst ].) "We reaffirmed the doctrine in Hill v. Giordano, 447 So.2d 164 (Ala.1984) (Jones, J., dissenting), based on the authority of Owens, supra, and held that `any modification or abolition of the parental immunity doctrine should be left to the prerogative of the legislature.' 447 So.2d at 164 .