47 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hunter v. Huntergreen2 sentences2025This interpretation . . . fails to take into proper account the parents’ fundamental due process liberty interest in childrearing. [Id. at 26–27 . . . .] In [Hunter, 484 Mich at 263 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed Heltzel’s central holding: “In Heltzel, our Court of Appeals recognized Troxel’s mandate: In order to protect a fit natural parent’s fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c).” Further, in Hunter, [ 484 Mich at 260 ], quoting Heltzel, [ 248 Mich Ap 2025This interpretation . . . fails to take into proper account the parents’ fundamental due process liberty interest in childrearing. [Id. at 26–27 . . . .] In [Hunter, 484 Mich at 263 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed Heltzel’s central holding: “In Heltzel, our Court of Appeals recognized Troxel’s mandate: In order to protect a fit natural parent’s fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c).” Further, in Hunter, [ 484 Mich at 260 ], quoting Heltzel, [ 248 Mich Ap | 8 | 16 |
Heltzel v. Heltzelgreen2 sentences2025This interpretation . . . fails to take into proper account the parents’ fundamental due process liberty interest in childrearing. [Id. at 26–27 . . . .] In [Hunter, 484 Mich at 263 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed Heltzel’s central holding: “In Heltzel, our Court of Appeals recognized Troxel’s mandate: In order to protect a fit natural parent’s fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c).” Further, in Hunter, [ 484 Mich at 260 ], quoting Heltzel, [ 248 Mich Ap 2025This interpretation . . . fails to take into proper account the parents’ fundamental due process liberty interest in childrearing. [Id. at 26–27 . . . .] In [Hunter, 484 Mich at 263 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed Heltzel’s central holding: “In Heltzel, our Court of Appeals recognized Troxel’s mandate: In order to protect a fit natural parent’s fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c).” Further, in Hunter, [ 484 Mich at 260 ], quoting Heltzel, [ 248 Mich Ap | 2 | 7 |
Paige v. Bing Construction Co.green2 sentences2019It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being.”); McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139 ; 298 NW2d 687 (1980); Goodwin, 325 Mich App at 144 . -3- Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige, 61 Mich App at 481 , a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister, 100 Mich App at 133 , a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun 2011My belief is that the Court should grant leave to reconsider the scope and validity of the doctrine of parental immunity for a most appropriate reason: the doctrine is being 5 See Paige v Bing Construction Co, 61 Mich App 480, 485 (1975). 6 See Hush, 77 Mich App at 646 . 7 Post, statement of MARILYN KELLY, J. (dissenting). 4 applied differently in different courts throughout the state, and the Court should clarify its status. | 2 | 4 |
Howard v. Howardgreen2 sentences2025Howard, 310 Mich App at 495 (“[T]he presumption in favor of an established custodial environment set forth in MCL 722.27(1)(c) yields to the parental presumption set forth in MCL 722.25(1).”). 2025See Hunter, 484 Mich at 279 ; Varran v Granneman, 312 Mich App 591, 613 ; 880 NW2d 242 (2015) (“The Supreme Court in Hunter merely concluded that MCL 722.25(1) provides sufficient deference to a fit parent’s fundamental rights to the care, custody, and management of their child because it requires, in order to rebut the parental presumption, clear and convincing evidence that custody by the parent is not in the child’s best interests.”); Howard, 310 Mich App at 493 (holding that the trial court did not err by finding that the third party presented clear and convincing evidence to maintain cust | 2 | 2 |
Frowner v. Smithgreen2 sentences2025This interpretation . . . fails to take into proper account the parents’ fundamental due process liberty interest in childrearing. [Id. at 26–27 . . . .] In [Hunter, 484 Mich at 263 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed Heltzel’s central holding: “In Heltzel, our Court of Appeals recognized Troxel’s mandate: In order to protect a fit natural parent’s fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c).” Further, in Hunter, [ 484 Mich at 260 ], quoting Heltzel, [ 248 Mich Ap 2025In Hunter, 484 Mich at 263 , our Supreme Court reaffirmed Heltzel’s central holding: “In order to protect a fit natural parent’s fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c).” In other words, the parental “presumption requires that any opposing presumption, shielding the child from a custodial change absent a showing of proper cause or changed circumstances, must yield.” Frowner, 296 Mich App at 384 . | 1 | 3 |
Rummelt v. Andersonred2 sentences2009Compare Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491 ; 493 NW2d 434 (1992), and Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130 ; 406 NW2d 246 (1987) (cases in where presumptions were applicable, holding that the natural parent has the burden and that he or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child are served by placement with the parent), with Deel v Deel, 113 Mich App 556 ; 317 NW2d 685 (1982), Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603 ; 280 NW2d 610 (1979), Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258 ; 273 NW2d 490 (1978), and Bahr v Bahr, 60 Mich App 354 ; 230 NW2d 430 (1975) (holding 2009Compare Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491 ; 493 NW2d 434 (1992), and Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130 ; 406 NW2d 246 (1987) (cases in where presumptions were applicable, holding that the natural parent has the burden and that he or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child are served by placement with the parent), with Deel v Deel, 113 Mich App 556 ; 317 NW2d 685 (1982), Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603 ; 280 NW2d 610 (1979), Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258 ; 273 NW2d 490 (1978), and Bahr v Bahr, 60 Mich App 354 ; 230 NW2d 430 (1975) (holding | 1 | 3 |
Troxel v. Granvillegreen2 sentences2009This interpretation. . . fails to take into proper account the parents' fundamental due process liberty interest in childrearing."). [20] Id. at 27 , 638 N.W.2d 123 . [21] Mason, 267 Mich.App. at 198 , 704 N.W.2d 104 . [22] Id. at 206 , 704 N.W.2d 104 . [23] Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 . [24] Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [25] Id. [26] Id. [27] Id. at 70 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [28] Id. at 69 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [29] Bowie v. Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 43 , 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992) (rejecting the argument that the CCA created a substantive right of a third party to seek custody of 2002See Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000). [Zulkowski v Zulkowski, 463 Mich 933 (2000) (emphasis in original).] 17 The existence of an established custodial environment should be considered, subsection 7(1)(c), but should not itself eliminate the third person’s burden to overcome the parental presumption by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 2 |
Wayne-Oakland Bank v. Adam's Ribgreen2 sentences2019See Wayne Oakland Bank v Adam’s Rib, 48 Mich App 144, 146-147 ; 210 NW2d 121 (1973), where this Court held that parental immunity could not shield a partnership from liability for the negligence of a partner. 4 The existence of liability insurance does not alter our conclusion. 2019See Wayne Oakland Bank v Adam’s Rib, 48 Mich App 144, 146-147 ; 210 NW2d 121 (1973), where this Court held that parental immunity could not shield a partnership from liability for the negligence of a partner. 4 The existence of liability insurance does not alter our conclusion. | 1 | 1 |
Doering Ex Rel. Barrett v. Copper Mountain, Inc.green1 sentence2010See, e.g., Doering v Copper Mountain, Inc, 259 F3d 1202, 1216 (CA 10, 2001) (“When the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the parental immunity doctrine, it indicated that courts adhering to the doctrine did so for public policy reasons, not because parents owe no duty of due care to their children.”), citing Trevarton v Trevarton, 151 Colo 418, 421-422; 378 P2d 640 (1963); Larson v Buschkamp, 105 Ill App 3d 965, 969; 435 NE2d 221 (1982) (stating that the doctrine of parental immunity is a procedural rather than substantive bar to actions between a parent and child); Emery v Emery, 45 Cal 2d 421, | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Smithgreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., Doering v Copper Mountain, Inc, 259 F3d 1202, 1216 (CA 10, 2001) (“When the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the parental immunity doctrine, it indicated that courts adhering to the doctrine did so for public policy reasons, not because parents owe no duty of due care to their children.”), citing Trevarton v Trevarton, 151 Colo 418, 421-422; 378 P2d 640 (1963); Larson v Buschkamp, 105 Ill App 3d 965, 969; 435 NE2d 221 (1982) (stating that the doctrine of parental immunity is a procedural rather than substantive bar to actions between a parent and child); Emery v Emery, 45 Cal 2d 421, | 1 | 1 |
| Burkhardt v. Burkhardtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re MNGgreen | 1 | 1 |
In Re MJKgreen1 sentence2009It did not address situations in which the parent no longer has custody." In re MJK, 200 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Colo.App., 2008), citing In re Guardianship of L.V., 136 Cal.App.4th 481 , 493, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 (2006); see also In re MNG, 113 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex.App., 2003). [40] Defendant would have the Court require a demonstration of parental unfitness before allowing the parental presumption to be rebutted where no such demonstration is required by the statute. | 1 | 1 |
| Hohe v. San Diego Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| LaFleche v. Ybarragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gelbman v. Gelbmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goller v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Elias v. Collinsred2 sentences2019See Elias v Collins, 237 Mich 175, 177 ; 211 NW 88 (1926), overruled by Plumley v Klein, 388 Mich 1, 8 ; 199 NW2d 169 (1972). 2019See Elias v Collins, 237 Mich 175, 177 ; 211 NW 88 (1926), overruled by Plumley v Klein, 388 Mich 1, 8 ; 199 NW2d 169 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Plumley v. Klein
green
2 sentences2022Parental immunity remains (1) “where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child,” and (2) “where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.” Id. 2011I write separately to express my strenuous disagreement with my dissenting colleague’s belief that this Court ought to reconsider what remains of the parental immunity doctrine1 because I vigorously oppose the proposition that “the near-universal 1 Plumley v Klein, 388 Mich 1 (1972). | 7 | 1975–2022 |
Hush v. Devilbiss Co.
green
2 sentences2018Parental immunity serves a number of purposes, including "preservation of domestic tranquility and family unity, protection of family resources, and recognition of the need to avoid judicial intervention into the core of parenthood and parental discipline ...." Hush v. Devilbiss Co. , 77 Mich. App. 639 , 645, 259 N.W.2d 170 (1977). 2018Parental immunity serves a number of purposes, including "preservation of domestic tranquility and family unity, protection of family resources, and recognition of the need to avoid judicial intervention into the core of parenthood and parental discipline ...." Hush v. Devilbiss Co. , 77 Mich. App. 639 , 645, 259 N.W.2d 170 (1977). | 6 | 1982–2021 |
In Re Anjoski
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 59 . 2015“Rather, the statute’s sole limitation is that the award be in the child’s best interests, after weighing the parental presumption, applicable burdens of proof, and the statutory best interests factors.” Id. at 63 . | 3 | 2009–2022 |
Glover v. McRipley
green
2 sentences2009Compare Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491 ; 493 NW2d 434 (1992), and Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130 ; 406 NW2d 246 (1987) (cases in where presumptions were applicable, holding that the natural parent has the burden and that he or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child are served by placement with the parent), with Deel v Deel, 113 Mich App 556 ; 317 NW2d 685 (1982), Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603 ; 280 NW2d 610 (1979), Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258 ; 273 NW2d 490 (1978), and Bahr v Bahr, 60 Mich App 354 ; 230 NW2d 430 (1975) (holding 2009Compare Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491 ; 493 NW2d 434 (1992), and Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130 ; 406 NW2d 246 (1987) (cases in where presumptions were applicable, holding that the natural parent has the burden and that he or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child are served by placement with the parent), with Deel v Deel, 113 Mich App 556 ; 317 NW2d 685 (1982), Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603 ; 280 NW2d 610 (1979), Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258 ; 273 NW2d 490 (1978), and Bahr v Bahr, 60 Mich App 354 ; 230 NW2d 430 (1975) (holding | 3 | 2000–2009 |
Varran v. Granneman
green
2 sentences2025See Hunter, 484 Mich at 279 ; Varran v Granneman, 312 Mich App 591, 613 ; 880 NW2d 242 (2015) (“The Supreme Court in Hunter merely concluded that MCL 722.25(1) provides sufficient deference to a fit parent’s fundamental rights to the care, custody, and management of their child because it requires, in order to rebut the parental presumption, clear and convincing evidence that custody by the parent is not in the child’s best interests.”); Howard, 310 Mich App at 493 (holding that the trial court did not err by finding that the third party presented clear and convincing evidence to maintain cust 2023This case involves a postjudgment dispute between two parents “who have the same fundamental rights to the care and custody of the same child.” Varran v Granneman, 312 Mich App 591, 606 ; 880 NW2d 242 (2015). | 2 | 2023–2025 |
Haddrill v. Damon
green
2 sentences2019It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being.”); McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139 ; 298 NW2d 687 (1980); Goodwin, 325 Mich App at 144 . -3- Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige, 61 Mich App at 481 , a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister, 100 Mich App at 133 , a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun 2019It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being.”); McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139 ; 298 NW2d 687 (1980); Goodwin, 325 Mich App at 144 . -3- Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige, 61 Mich App at 481 , a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister, 100 Mich App at 133 , a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun | 2 | 1987–2019 |
McCALLISTER v. SUN VALLEY POOLS, INC
green
2 sentences2019It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being.”); McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139 ; 298 NW2d 687 (1980); Goodwin, 325 Mich App at 144 . -3- Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige, 61 Mich App at 481 , a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister, 100 Mich App at 133 , a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun 2019It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being.”); McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139 ; 298 NW2d 687 (1980); Goodwin, 325 Mich App at 144 . -3- Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige, 61 Mich App at 481 , a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister, 100 Mich App at 133 , a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun | 2 | 1982–2019 |
In re Sanders
green
2 sentences2016Instead, the proceedings are child protective proceedings under the juvenile code, which, unlike the presumption found in MCL 722.25(1), fully contemplates a trial court’s assessment of parental fitness during the adjudicative phase, MCL 712A.2(b); Sanders, 495 Mich at 405 , and expressly authorizes the court to order medical care for a child within its jurisdiction, after a finding of parental unfitness, during the dispositional phase, MCL 712A.18(1)(f). 2016Instead, the proceedings are child protective proceedings under the Juvenile Code, which, unlike the presumption found in MCL 722.25(1), fully contemplate a trial court’s assessment of parental fitness during the adjudicative phrase, MCL 712A.2(b); In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 405 , and which expressly authorize the court to order medical care for a child within its jurisdiction, after a finding of parental unfitness, during the dispositional phrase, MCL 712A.18(1)(f). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Mason v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2009The Court also noted that the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) applies "in all custody disputes between parents and an agency or a third person." Id. (emphasis in original). 2009The Court also noted that the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) applies “in all custody disputes between parents and an agency or a third person.” Id. (emphasis in original). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Estate of Ezekiel D Goodwin v. Northwest Michigan Fair Association
green
2 sentences2019In Goodwin v Northwest Mich Fair Ass’n, 325 Mich App 129, 143-144 ; 923 NW2d 894 (2018), our Court recently set out the current standards governing the application of the parental- immunity doctrine: Although parents undoubtedly have a duty to supervise their children, the law generally does not allow children to recover damages from their parents for a breach of this duty. 2019In Goodwin v Northwest Mich Fair Ass’n, 325 Mich App 129, 143-144 ; 923 NW2d 894 (2018), our Court recently set out the current standards governing the application of the parental- immunity doctrine: Although parents undoubtedly have a duty to supervise their children, the law generally does not allow children to recover damages from their parents for a breach of this duty. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wright v. Wright
green
2 sentences2019It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being.”); McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139 ; 298 NW2d 687 (1980); Goodwin, 325 Mich App at 144 . -3- Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige, 61 Mich App at 481 , a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister, 100 Mich App at 133 , a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun 2019It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being.”); McCallister v Sun Valley Pools, Inc, 100 Mich App 131, 139 ; 298 NW2d 687 (1980); Goodwin, 325 Mich App at 144 . -3- Consequently, this Court has applied the parental-immunity doctrine where a child died from injuries sustained after falling into a man-made hole on a construction site, Paige, 61 Mich App at 481 , a 15-year-old boy injured himself diving into his family’s swimming pool, McCallister, 100 Mich App at 133 , a seven-year-old girl shot herself with a loaded gun | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Heid v. Aaasulewski
green
2 sentences2012The purpose of the proper-cause or change-of-circumstances requirement is “to ‘erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.’ ” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003), quoting Held v AAASulewski (After Remand), 209 Mich App 587, 593-594 ; 532 NW2d 205 (1995). 2012The purpose of the proper-cause or change-of-circumstances requirement is “to ‘erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.’ ” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003), quoting Held v AAASulewski (After Remand), 209 Mich App 587, 593-594 ; 532 NW2d 205 (1995). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer
green
2 sentences2012The purpose of the proper-cause or change-of-circumstances requirement is “to ‘erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.’ ” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003), quoting Held v AAASulewski (After Remand), 209 Mich App 587, 593-594 ; 532 NW2d 205 (1995). 2012The purpose of the proper-cause or change-of-circumstances requirement is “to ‘erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.’ ” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003), quoting Held v AAASulewski (After Remand), 209 Mich App 587, 593-594 ; 532 NW2d 205 (1995). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Trevarton v. Trevarton
green
1 sentence2010See, e.g., Doering v Copper Mountain, Inc, 259 F3d 1202, 1216 (CA 10, 2001) (“When the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the parental immunity doctrine, it indicated that courts adhering to the doctrine did so for public policy reasons, not because parents owe no duty of due care to their children.”), citing Trevarton v Trevarton, 151 Colo 418, 421-422; 378 P2d 640 (1963); Larson v Buschkamp, 105 Ill App 3d 965, 969; 435 NE2d 221 (1982) (stating that the doctrine of parental immunity is a procedural rather than substantive bar to actions between a parent and child); Emery v Emery, 45 Cal 2d 421, | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Emery v. Emery
green
1 sentence2010See, e.g., Doering v Copper Mountain, Inc, 259 F3d 1202, 1216 (CA 10, 2001) (“When the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the parental immunity doctrine, it indicated that courts adhering to the doctrine did so for public policy reasons, not because parents owe no duty of due care to their children.”), citing Trevarton v Trevarton, 151 Colo 418, 421-422; 378 P2d 640 (1963); Larson v Buschkamp, 105 Ill App 3d 965, 969; 435 NE2d 221 (1982) (stating that the doctrine of parental immunity is a procedural rather than substantive bar to actions between a parent and child); Emery v Emery, 45 Cal 2d 421, | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Larson v. Buschkamp
green
1 sentence2010See, e.g., Doering v Copper Mountain, Inc, 259 F3d 1202, 1216 (CA 10, 2001) (“When the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the parental immunity doctrine, it indicated that courts adhering to the doctrine did so for public policy reasons, not because parents owe no duty of due care to their children.”), citing Trevarton v Trevarton, 151 Colo 418, 421-422; 378 P2d 640 (1963); Larson v Buschkamp, 105 Ill App 3d 965, 969; 435 NE2d 221 (1982) (stating that the doctrine of parental immunity is a procedural rather than substantive bar to actions between a parent and child); Emery v Emery, 45 Cal 2d 421, | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Santosky v. Kramer green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Stevens v. Stevens green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Bowie v. Arder green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Liebert v. Derse neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Riemersma v. Riemersma green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Fletcher v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences2009Nevertheless, my observations concerning the textual dominance of 7(1)(c) are largely inapposite to my overall conclusion; I am persuaded that, if a fit parent's custody interests are opposed to those of a third party with an established custodial environment, the parent should benefit from a parental presumption as a matter of constitutional right. [13] The majority states that my approach is contrary to Fletcher v. Fletcher, 447 Mich. 871, 889 , 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994), which required the trial court on remand to consider "up-to-date information" and "any other changes in circumstances" when a 2009Nevertheless, my observations concerning the textual dominance of 7(1)(c) are largely inapposite to my overall conclusion; I am persuaded that, if a fit parent's custody interests are opposed to those of a third party with an established custodial environment, the parent should benefit from a parental presumption as a matter of constitutional right. [13] The majority states that my approach is contrary to Fletcher v. Fletcher, 447 Mich. 871, 889 , 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994), which required the trial court on remand to consider "up-to-date information" and "any other changes in circumstances" when a | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Guardianship of Lv green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Siwik v. Siwik
green
2 sentences2009Compare Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491 ; 493 NW2d 434 (1992), and Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130 ; 406 NW2d 246 (1987) (cases in where presumptions were applicable, holding that the natural parent has the burden and that he or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child are served by placement with the parent), with Deel v Deel, 113 Mich App 556 ; 317 NW2d 685 (1982), Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603 ; 280 NW2d 610 (1979), Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258 ; 273 NW2d 490 (1978), and Bahr v Bahr, 60 Mich App 354 ; 230 NW2d 430 (1975) (holding 2009Compare Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491 ; 493 NW2d 434 (1992), and Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130 ; 406 NW2d 246 (1987) (cases in where presumptions were applicable, holding that the natural parent has the burden and that he or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child are served by placement with the parent), with Deel v Deel, 113 Mich App 556 ; 317 NW2d 685 (1982), Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603 ; 280 NW2d 610 (1979), Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258 ; 273 NW2d 490 (1978), and Bahr v Bahr, 60 Mich App 354 ; 230 NW2d 430 (1975) (holding | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Bahr v. Bahr green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Deel v. Deel green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Herbstman v. Shiftan green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Sharon v. City of Newton green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Phillips v. Deihm green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Thelen v. Thelen green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Foldi v. Jeffries green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Baldwin v. Baldwin neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Grodin v. Grodin green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. State neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Henderson v. Henderson green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Cowgill, Adm'r v. Boock, Adm'r green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Roller v. Roller green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.