knowing waiver in Illinois

2013As the knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial is “fundamental,” it implicates the second prong of plain-error review, where “remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.” In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358, 363 (2001).

2013As the knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial is “fundamental,” it implicates the second prong of plain- error review, where “remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.” In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358, 363 (2001).

2023“The determination of whether a jury waiver is valid cannot rest on any precise formula, but rather depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. ¶ 11 Section 115-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires that a defendant who wishes to waive his right to a jury trial do so in writing. 725 ILCS 5/115-1 (West 2018). “[T]he existence of a written waiver supports a finding of a knowing waiver when accompanied by defense counsel’s request for a bench trial made in open court and in the defendant’s presence.” People v. Turner, 375 Ill.

2022Additionally, “the existence of a written waiver supports a finding of a knowing waiver when accompanied by defense counsel’s request for a bench trial made in open court and in the defendant’s presence.” Turner, 375 Ill.

2000Ordinarily, this failure would foreclose our consideration of this error under principles of waiver; however, as the knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, we may consider this issue under the doctrine of plain error. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Taylor, 291 Ill.

2000Ordinarily, this failure would foreclose our consideration of this error under principles of waiver; however, as the knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, we may consider this issue under the doctrine of plain error. 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a); People v. Taylor, 291 Ill.App.3d 18, 20 , 225 Ill.Dec. 474 , 683 N.E.2d 977 (1997).

2026People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 333 (1985).

2002R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d at 363 , citing People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 333 (1985); People v. Taylor, 291 Ill.

2008Steiger, 208 Ill.

2008Steiger, 208 Ill.

2007Dec. 125 , 687 N.E.2d at 52-53 (finding defendant's four prior convictions supported a presumption of familiarity with jury waivers, thus supporting a finding of *185 a valid waiver); People v. Johnson, 347 Ill.App.3d at 445 , 283 Ill.Dec. 88 , 807 N.E.2d 693 (finding defendant's prior traffic and battery convictions demonstrated familiarity with the criminal justice system and supported a finding of a knowing waiver).

2007Dec. 125 , 687 N.E.2d at 52-53 (finding defendant's four prior convictions supported a presumption of familiarity with jury waivers, thus supporting a finding of *185 a valid waiver); People v. Johnson, 347 Ill.App.3d at 445 , 283 Ill.Dec. 88 , 807 N.E.2d 693 (finding defendant's prior traffic and battery convictions demonstrated familiarity with the criminal justice system and supported a finding of a knowing waiver).

2021See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 22-23 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that he lacked the capacity to make a knowing waiver of counsel where the trial court had ample opportunity to observe and assess the defendant’s ability to make a knowing waiver of counsel, the defendant demonstrated a rational understanding of the charges and possible penalties, the defendant coherently participated in all phases of the pretrial and trial proceedings and responded lucidly to the judge, and the defendant filed numerous motions, examined witnesses, and actively presented a defense); Allen, 401 Ill.

2020See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 22-23 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that he lacked the capacity to make a knowing waiver of counsel where the trial court had ample opportunity to observe and assess the defendant’s ability to make a knowing waiver of counsel, the defendant demonstrated a rational understanding of the charges and possible penalties, the defendant coherently participated in all phases of the pretrial and trial proceedings and responded lucidly to the judge, and the defendant filed numerous motions, examined witnesses, and actively presented a defense); Allen, 401 Ill.

2021See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 22-23 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that he lacked the capacity to make a knowing waiver of counsel where the trial court had ample opportunity to observe and assess the defendant’s ability to make a knowing waiver of counsel, the defendant demonstrated a rational understanding of the charges and possible penalties, the defendant coherently participated in all phases of the pretrial and trial proceedings and responded lucidly to the judge, and the defendant filed numerous motions, examined witnesses, and actively presented a defense); Allen, 401 Ill.

2020See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 22-23 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that he lacked the capacity to make a knowing waiver of counsel where the trial court had ample opportunity to observe and assess the defendant’s ability to make a knowing waiver of counsel, the defendant demonstrated a rational understanding of the charges and possible penalties, the defendant coherently participated in all phases of the pretrial and trial proceedings and responded lucidly to the judge, and the defendant filed numerous motions, examined witnesses, and actively presented a defense); Allen, 401 Ill.

2019See also, e.g. , People v. Hinton , 402 Ill.

2019See also, e.g., People v. Hinton, 402 Ill.

2015See Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315, 319 (2010).

2015See Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315, 319 (2010).

2015In re Estate of Pawlinski, 407 Ill.

2015In re Estate of Pawlinski, 407 Ill.

2015Swaw v. Ortell, 137 Ill.

2015Swaw v. Ortell, 137 Ill.

2019App. 3d 1153, 1159-60 (2009) (finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the “knowing” requirement under section 2Z of the Consumer Fraud Act relating to roof repair work because the plaintiffs failed to present either evidence of the defendants’ state of mind in failing to provide the plaintiffs with a required consumer rights pamphlet or evidence supporting a knowing violation, even though the plaintiffs testified that defendants did not provide them with the required pamphlet); Wendorf v. Landers, 755 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978 (N.D.

2018App. 3d 1153 , 1159-60, 327 Ill.Dec. 648 , 902 N.E.2d 769 (2009) (finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the "knowing" requirement under section 2Z of the Consumer Fraud Act relating to roof repair work because the plaintiffs failed to present either evidence of the defendants' state of mind in failing to provide the plaintiffs with a required consumer rights pamphlet or evidence supporting a knowing violation, even though the plaintiffs testified that defendants did not provide them with the required pamphlet); Wendorf v. Landers , 755 F.Supp.2d 972 , 978 (N.D.

2021“The fact that the penalty assessment may result in a ‘windfall’ to the recipient is irrelevant because the penalty is not solely related to the hardship suffered by the recipient.” Grams v. Autozone, Inc., 319 Ill.

2019"The fact that the penalty assessment may result in a 'windfall' to the recipient is irrelevant because the penalty is not solely related to the hardship suffered by the recipient." Grams v. Autozone, Inc. , 319 Ill.

2021App. 3d 1004, 1007, 1017-18 (2004), this court found that the employer committed a knowing violation where it withheld payments from its employee’s wages but failed to pay them over and “offered no compelling excuse for consistently failing to comply with the statute.” ¶ 25 In In re Marriage of Solomon, 2015 IL App (1st) 133048, ¶¶ 32-33, 35 , the First District found that the employer’s failure to withhold was an “unintentional and honest” mistake and not a knowing violation where it had mistakenly entered the withholdings as bimonthly, instead of biweekly, resulting in a failure to withhold

2019Solomon , 2015 IL App (1st) 133048 , ¶ 32, 390 Ill.Dec. 628 , 29 N.E.3d 560 .

2021App. 3d at 852 (although there existed deficiencies in the defendant’s self-representation, they were the result of the defendant not being an attorney; because the defendant was able to perform all of the basic tasks necessary to present his defense—making an opening statement and closing argument, cross-examining witnesses, entering exhibits, objecting to witness testimony, and submitting jury instructions—and was able to articulately and lucidly participate in discussions with the trial court and prosecution, the court would not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s assessment that

2020App. 3d at 852 (although there existed deficiencies in the defendant’s self-representation, they were the result of the defendant not being an attorney; because the defendant was able to perform all of the basic tasks necessary to present his defense—making an opening statement and closing argument, cross-examining witnesses, entering exhibits, objecting to witness testimony, and submitting jury instructions—and was able to articulately and lucidly participate in discussions with the trial court and prosecution, the court would not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s assessment that