knowing waiver in Pennsylvania

2019See Commonwealth v. Starr, [] 541 Pa. 564 , 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 ([Pa.] 1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta).

2019See Commonwealth v. Starr, [] 541 Pa. 564 , 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 ([Pa.] 1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta).

2019See also Commonwealth v. McDonough, [] 571 Pa. 232 , 812 A.2d 504, 508 ([Pa.] 2002) (concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.)[.] -4- The right to waive counsel’s assistance and continue pro se is not automatic[,] however.

2018See Commonwealth v. Starr, [] 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 ([Pa.] 1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta)[; see also] Commonwealth v. McDonough, [] 812 A.2d 504, 508 ([Pa.] 2002) (concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.).

2015Because the crime of EWOC is a specific intent crime, Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 357 Pa.Super. 38 , 515 A.2d 311, 313 (1986), and the intent required is the knowing violation of a duty of care, id., the Superior Court has long interpreted the intent element to require that: (1) the accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child; (2) the accused is aware that the child is in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare; and (3) the accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to pr

2015Because the crime of EWOC is a specific intent crime, Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 357 Pa.Super. 38 , 515 A.2d 311, 313 (1986), and the intent required is the knowing violation of a duty of care, id., the Superior Court has long interpreted the intent element to require that: (1) the accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child; (2) the accused is aware that the child is in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare; and (3) the accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to pr

2020In Commonwealth v. Martir, 712 A.2d 327 , the court stated, "[tjhe mens rea required for [ endangering the welfare of a child] is a knowing violation of the accused's duty of care to the minor-victim.

2008See also Pahel, supra at 964 . ¶ 9 “The mens rea required for [Section 4304] is a knowing violation of the accused’s duty of care to the minor-victim.” Commonwealth v. Martir, 712 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa.Super.1998).

2026“To be convicted under [Section 4304], the Commonwealth must prove a knowing violation of a duty of care.” Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett, 251 A.3d 811, 815 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“To be convicted under [Section 4304], the Commonwealth must prove a knowing violation of a duty of care.” Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett, 251 A.3d 811, 815 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024Foster, 764 A.2d Foster, 764 A.2d 1076, 1082 (Pa. 1076, 1082 Super. 2000) (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations (citations omitted omitted and and emphasis added). emphasis added).

2023Commonwealth v. Foster, 764 A.2d 1076 , 1082 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations omitted and emphasis added).

2018Corn. v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. Super. 1986); Com. v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2018Com. v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. Super. 1986); Corn. v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029 6 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2017More specifically, he acknowledges that “[i]ndecent [a]ssault requires an intent to arouse sexual desires, while [EWOC] requires [a] knowing violation of a duty of care.” Id. at 29 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (defining indecent assault and requiring the offense be committed “for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant”) and - 18 - J-S10007-17 Commonwealth v. Cottam, 616 A.2d 988, 1005 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that the mens rea for the crime of EWOC “is a knowing violation of a duty of care”)).

2017Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311 , 616 A.2d 988 (1992); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(a)(1).

1992In Brewster v. Department of Transportation, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986), this court stated, “acceptance of an ARD program constitutes a conscious choice of an alternative to prosecution and a knowing waiver of the right to prove innocence or risk conviction by defending oneself at trial.” 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct., at 279, n. 2, 503 A.2d 497 -98, n. 2.

1992In Brewster v. Department of Transportation, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986), this court stated, “acceptance of an ARD program constitutes a conscious choice of an alternative to prosecution and a knowing waiver of the right to prove innocence or risk conviction by defending oneself at trial.” 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct., at 279, n. 2, 503 A.2d 497 -98, n. 2.

1977The Commonwealth contends that because appellant’s “waiver” of her Miranda rights was freely revocable, see 384 U.S. at 473-74 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 723 , she did not truly waive these rights until she uttered an inculpatory statement. 8 According to the Commonwealth, therefore, the point of time to which a suppression court should look to determine whether a suspect was aware of the subject matter of the interrogation — the prerequisite under Richman to the finding of a knowing waiver — is not when the Miranda waiver card is signed, but the later time when a confessional utterance i

1977The Commonwealth contends that because appellant’s “waiver” of her Miranda rights was freely revocable, see 384 U.S. at 473-74 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 723 , she did not truly waive these rights until she uttered an inculpatory statement. 8 According to the Commonwealth, therefore, the point of time to which a suppression court should look to determine whether a suspect was aware of the subject matter of the interrogation — the prerequisite under Richman to the finding of a knowing waiver — is not when the Miranda waiver card is signed, but the later time when a confessional utterance i

1978See Commonwealth v. Smith, supra, 472 Pa. at 496 , 372 A.2d at 799 ("We have insisted that the Commonwealth bear the burden of proving a knowing waiver.").

1978See Commonwealth v. Smith, supra, 472 Pa. at 496 , 372 A.2d at 799 ("We have insisted that the Commonwealth bear the burden of proving a knowing waiver.").

2025Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir.2009)). [J-22-2024] - 17 absolutely meaningless.

2025Plaintiffs’ position that the PLCAA only covers actions where the harm was solely caused by a third- party bad actor would render the product liability exception’s limitation of proximate cause 11 Exception (iii) “has come to be known as the ‘predicate exception’ because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a ‘predicate statute.’” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir.2009) (citing, inter alia, City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A.

2024See Commonwealth v. Howard, 257 A.3d 1217 , 1227 (Pa. 2021) (plurality) (noting that the mens rea requirement of EWOC requires a knowing violation of a duty of care and the knowing creation of a dangerous situation);7 Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 727-28 (Pa. Super. 2003) (noting that the offense of REAP requires the creation of danger accompanied by the defendant’s actual present ability to inflict harm). ____________________________________________ (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduc

2022The Petrie Court held that, in the instance where the insurance policy provided UIM coverage for more than one vehicle, the waiver of stacking form must “explicitly provide for inter-policy” stacking waiver, and it was incumbent upon the insurance company to supplement the Section 1738(d) waiver form or “otherwise fulfill its obligation to secure a knowing waiver of inter-policy stacking.” Petrie, 242 A.3d at 921 .

2022The Petrie Court held that, in the instance where the insurance policy provided UIM coverage for more than one vehicle, the waiver of stacking form must “explicitly provide for inter-policy” stacking waiver, and it was incumbent upon the insurance company to supplement the Section 1738(d) waiver form or “otherwise fulfill its obligation to secure a knowing waiver of inter-policy stacking.” Petrie, 242 A.3d at 921.

2022Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1296 (C.D.

2021See, e.g., Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that post-indictment statements that complied with Miranda but were not preceded by any indication to the defendant that an indictment was pending against him precluded a knowing waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights because it failed to communicate information necessary for an indicted defendant to “appreciate the gravity of his legal position” and “the urgency of his need for a lawyer’s assistance”); United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding waiver to be involuntary where the defendant was “dis

2021See, e.g., Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that post-indictment statements that complied with Miranda but were not preceded by any indication to the defendant that an indictment was pending against him precluded a knowing waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights because it failed to communicate information necessary for an indicted defendant to “appreciate the gravity of his legal position” and “the urgency of his need for a lawyer’s assistance”); United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding waiver to be involuntary where the defendant was “dis