knowing waiver in Texas

2008See Village of Hoffman Estates , 455 U.S. at 494 , 102 S. Ct. at 1191.

2008See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 , 102 S.Ct. at 1191.

2006See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 690 S.W.2d 239, 240-42 (Tex.1985) (interpreting prior version of DTPA).

1986We said in Jim Walter Homes v. Valencia, 690 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.1985), the maximum amount of damages recoverable in a suit in which actual damages resulting from a knowing violation of the DTPA exceed $1000 is three times the first $1000 of actual damages plus three times the actual damages in excess of $1000.

2000Voluntary consent is not equivalent to a knowing waiver. "[W]e cannot accept the position . . . that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a 'voluntary' consent." Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 232-33 . "[W]hile the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent." Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 249 ; see also Ohio v. Robinette , 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (Fourth Amendment does not require officer to in

2000Voluntary consent is not equivalent to a knowing waiver. “[W]e cannot accept the position ... that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a ‘voluntary’ consent.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232-33 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 . “[W]hile the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-10 , 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2

1994Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.1984).

1993Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.1984); Kold-Serve Corp. v. Ward, 736 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987), error dism’d, 748 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.1988) (upon proof of knowing violation by defendant, plaintiff who establishes such damages is entitled to recover for mental anguish); see also HOW Ins.

2022See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (holding that “juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence” and his “capacity to understand the warnings” were relevant considerations in determining whether he knowingly waived them).

2022See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (holding that “juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence” and his “capacity to understand the warnings” were relevant considerations in determining whether he knowingly waived them).

2016App. 2009). 3 Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 233-35 (Tex. Crim.

2015See id. at 234–35 (rejecting the minority view “imposing on the trial court a duty to ensure a knowing waiver of the right to testify.”).

2014CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (stating “A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a producing cause of economic damages” and listing false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice, breach of warranty, unconscionable action or course of action, or act or practice in violation of insurance code (emphasis added)); see also Main Place Custom Homes, 192 S.W.3d at 605 (declining to consider sufficiency of evidence issue on all alleged violations of the DTPA because evidence was sufficient to support one violation and then considering evidence to support a knowing violation).

2014See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.50(a) (stating “A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a producing cause of economic damages” and listing false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice, breach of warranty, unconscionable action or course of action, or act or practice in violation of insurance code (emphasis added)); see also Main Place Custom Homes, 192 S.W.3d at 605 (declining to consider sufficiency of evidence issue on all alleged violations of the DTPA because evidence was sufficient to support one violation and then considering evidence to support a kn

2005See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.50(b)(1); see also Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.45(9) (describing a knowing violation as one in which the defendant has “actual awareness” of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of its actions); Gomez v. Diaz, 57 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).

2005Code Ann. ' 17.45(9) (describing a knowing violation as one in which the defendant has A actual awareness @ of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of its actions); Gomez v. Diaz , 57 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).

2004See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 , 118 S.Ct. 1939 , 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir.1991).

2004See Bryan v. United States , 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc. , 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991).

2004See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 , 118 S.Ct. 1939 , 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir.1991).

2004See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 , 118 S.Ct. 1939 , 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir.1991).

1995Code Ann. § 14.32(f). "[T]he trial court was required to inform [McGuire] of his rights and, in the absence of a knowing waiver of such rights or compliance with the statute, was without authority to hold him in contempt." See Ex parte Gunther , 758 S.W.2d 226, 226 (Tex. 1988).

1990Based on the provisions of section 14.32(f), the court stated “that the trial court was required to inform Gunther of his rights” and that “in the absence of a knowing waiver or compliance with the statute, [the trial court] was without authority to hold him in contempt.” Gunther, 758 S.W.2d at 226 (emphasis added).

1988We stated: "The Faretta opinion simply cannot reasonably be read to require that a trial judge spread upon the record all such information and data about an accused that might conceivably impugn his decision to represent himself...." 630 S.W.2d at 954, n. 5 ; see also Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 586, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Opinion concurring).

1988We stated: “The Faretta opinion simply cannot reasonably be read to require that a trial judge spread upon the record all. such information and data about an accused that might conceivably impugn his decision to represent himself....” 630 S.W.2d at 954, n. 5 ; see also Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 586, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Opinion concurring).

1988“Thus, it is essential to note that Martin, supra, modified all prior decisions of the Court in cases involving an assertion of the self-representation right, to the extent that their focus was on the traditional ‘waiver of counsel’ inquiry, rather than that circumscribed by Faretta, supra.” Still later Judge Clinton in footnote 1 of Lambrecht v. State, 681 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), wrote: “But see Martin v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) in which the Court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s reasoning that the independent right to self-representation does not arise from the acc

1984But see Martin v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) in which the Court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s reasoning that the independent right to self-representation does not arise from the accused’s power to waive assistance of counsel and observed that prior decisions of this Court which had iterated exacting "requisites" for establishing a knowing waiver of counsel, [e.g., Barbour v. State, 551 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Goodman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) ], had read Faretta incorrectly.

1988"Thus, it is essential to note that Martin, supra, modified all prior decisions of the Court in cases involving an assertion of the self-representation right, to the extent that their focus was on the traditional `waiver of counsel' inquiry, rather than that circumscribed by Faretta, supra." Still later Judge Clinton in footnote 1 of Lambrecht v. State, 681 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), wrote: "But see Martin v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) in which the Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's reasoning that the independent right to self-representation does not arise from the acc

1988“Thus, it is essential to note that Martin, supra, modified all prior decisions of the Court in cases involving an assertion of the self-representation right, to the extent that their focus was on the traditional ‘waiver of counsel’ inquiry, rather than that circumscribed by Faretta, supra.” Still later Judge Clinton in footnote 1 of Lambrecht v. State, 681 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), wrote: “But see Martin v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) in which the Court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s reasoning that the independent right to self-representation does not arise from the acc

2024App. 2022). 16 Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (1993). 17 Id. at 259, 261 (The defendant’s voluntary absenting of himself after trial had begun was considered to be a knowing waiver of his continued presence.).

2024App. 2022). 16 Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (1993). 17 Id. at 259, 261 (The defendant’s voluntary absenting of himself after trial had begun was considered to be a knowing waiver of his continued presence.).

2021See Kaufman County v. Leggett, 396 S.W.3d 24, 30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (affirming denial of plea to jurisdiction where plaintiff alleged [officer’s] conduct “was in violation of department policies for the operation of patrol units”); but see City of Laredo v. Varela, No. 04-10-00619-CV, 2011 WL 1852439 , at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 11, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing denial of plea to jurisdiction even though officer “fail[ed] to comply with the department’s policy”). 11 In its plea to the jurisdiction and in its brief to this Court, the Department heavily emphasi

2020See Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d at 448 ; United Nat’l, 447 S.W.3d at 12 ; Hamilton, 265 S.W.3d at 735–37; Johns, 1998 WL 548887 , at *8; cf. Weiser-Brown, 801 F.3d at 526–27 (finding insufficient evidence of a knowing violation where no evidence showed investigation was outcome oriented or that insurer failed to recognize weaknesses in expert’s report). 3.

2020See Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d at 448 ; United Nat’l, 447 S.W.3d at 12 ; Hamilton, 265 S.W.3d at 735–37; Johns, 1998 WL 548887 , at *8; cf. Weiser-Brown, 801 F.3d at 526–27 (finding insufficient evidence of a knowing violation where no evidence showed investigation was outcome oriented or that insurer failed to recognize weaknesses in expert’s report). 3.

2018That amount is equal to a trebling of actual damages.”); Smith v. Kinslow, 598 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Civ.

2018Auth. v. Rodriguez , 547 S.W.3d 830 , 838 (Tex. 2018) ("[E]very word or phrase is presumed to have been intentionally used with a meaning and a purpose."); see also Beck v. Sheppard , 566 S.W.2d 569 , 572 (Tex. 1978) (noting legislative history supports that "the inclusion of the requirement of a knowing violation [in section 143.102 ] was deliberate."). b.