knowing waiver in California

2015(See e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424-1425 [condition prohibiting the defendant from coming within 100 yards of the victim or her daughter modified to add knowledge requirement]; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 376-377 (Moses) [probation conditions prohibiting the defendant from (1) owning, using, or possessing sexually explicit material, (2) associating with minors, or (3) frequenting places where minors congregate modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912, 931 [condition prohibiting minor from associating wi

2015(See, e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424-1425 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 75 ] [condition prohibiting the defendant from coming within 100 yards of the victim or her daughter modified to add knowledge requirement]; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 376-377 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 ] (Moses) [probation conditions prohibiting the defendant from (1) owning, using, or possessing sexually explicit material, (2) associating with minors, or (3) frequenting places where minors congregate modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912, 931

2015(See e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424-1425 [condition prohibiting the defendant from coming within 100 yards of the victim or her daughter modified to add knowledge requirement]; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 376-377 (Moses) [probation conditions prohibiting the defendant from (1) owning, using, or possessing sexually explicit material, (2) associating with minors, or (3) frequenting places where minors congregate modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912, 931 [condition prohibiting minor from associating wi

2015(See, e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424-1425 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 75 ] [condition prohibiting the defendant from coming within 100 yards of the victim or her daughter modified to add knowledge requirement]; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 376-377 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 ] (Moses) [probation conditions prohibiting the defendant from (1) owning, using, or possessing sexually explicit material, (2) associating with minors, or (3) frequenting places where minors congregate modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912, 931

2015(See e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424-1425 [condition prohibiting the defendant from coming within 100 yards of the victim or her daughter modified to add knowledge requirement]; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 376-377 (Moses) [probation conditions prohibiting the defendant from (1) owning, using, or possessing sexually explicit material, (2) associating with minors, or (3) frequenting places where minors congregate modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912, 931 [condition prohibiting minor from associating wi

2015(See, e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424-1425 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 75 ] [condition prohibiting the defendant from coming within 100 yards of the victim or her daughter modified to add knowledge requirement]; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 376-377 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 ] (Moses) [probation conditions prohibiting the defendant from (1) owning, using, or possessing sexually explicit material, (2) associating with minors, or (3) frequenting places where minors congregate modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912, 931

2023(See Perez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 398–399 [trial court erred by finding that father’s calls and texts to mother in violation of DVRO did not constitute continuing abuse under the statute]; N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 603 [“A knowing violation of a DVRO cannot be characterized ‘as a de minimis and technical violation.’ ”].) Finally, the trial court erred by inferring a retaliatory motive from the mere timing of Robin’s renewal request—and rejecting her claim of genuine 14 fear on that basis alone.

2023“A knowing violation of a [court order] cannot be characterized ‘as “a de minimis and technical violation.” ’ ” (See N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 603 (internal quotation omitted).) In any case, the court’s ruling was not limited to the violation of the custody order.

2007“The purpose of section 1363.1 is to disclose the requirement to arbitrate and to ensure a knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial.” (Malek, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 , original italics.) To ensure that the requirement to arbitrate is adequately disclosed, the Legislature has directed that the disclosure be “prominently displayed on the enrollment form signed by each subscriber or enrollee.” (§ 1363.1, subd. (b).) Without a proper disclosure, we cannot be certain that a subscriber has knowingly waived the right to jury trial.

2005(Malek, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 72.) The objective of section 1363.1, the court held, was to ensure a knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial. (121 Cal.App.4th at p. 72) According to the court, Blue Cross’s enrollment form did not actually comply with the objective.

2015(See e.g., People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424-1425 [condition prohibiting the defendant from coming within 100 yards of the victim or her daughter modified to add knowledge requirement]; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 376-377 (Moses) [probation conditions prohibiting the defendant from (1) owning, using, or possessing sexually explicit material, (2) associating with minors, or (3) frequenting places where minors congregate modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912, 931 [condition prohibiting minor from associating wi

2014“A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a [constitutional] challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) As we have observed, “[I]n a variety of contexts . . ., California appellate courts have found probation conditions to be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when they do not require the probationer to have knowledge of the prohibited conduct or circumstances.” (People v. Ki

2014“A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a [constitutional] challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) As we have observed, “[I]n a variety of contexts . . ., California appellate courts have found probation conditions to be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when they do not require the probationer to have knowledge of the prohibited conduct or circumstances.” (People v. Ki

2014(E.g., People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 751-752 [possessing stolen property, or possessing firearms or ammunition]; In re Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 245, 247-248 [possessing, wearing or displaying gang-affiliated material].) Accordingly, we modify the probation condition at issue to read: "The minor shall not knowingly use or possess. . . ." DISPOSITION The true finding on count 3 is vacated.

2014“A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a [constitutional] challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) As we have observed, “[I]n a variety of contexts . . ., California appellate courts have found probation conditions to be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when they do not require the probationer to have knowledge of the prohibited conduct or circumstances.” (People v. Ki

2014(E.g., People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 751-752 [possessing stolen property, or possessing firearms or ammunition]; In re Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 245, 247-248 [possessing, wearing or displaying gang-affiliated material].) Accordingly, we modify the probation condition at issue to read: "The minor shall not knowingly use or possess. . . ." DISPOSITION The true finding on count 3 is vacated.

2009DISCUSSION I STANDARDS OF REVIEW; ISSUES PRESENTED The orders to show cause issued by the probate court put Appellant on notice that imposition of sanctions was being considered under sections 177.5 and/or 575.2, “each of which requires a knowing violation of a valid order of the court without good cause or substantial justification.” (Winikow v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 719, 726 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 413 ] (Winikow).) 4 Appellant argues the fees and sanctions orders are unsupported *1481 by statutory authority and/or the record, and represent an abuse of discretion because under these

2009DISCUSSION I STANDARDS OF REVIEW; ISSUES PRESENTED The orders to show cause issued by the probate court put Appellant on notice that imposition of sanctions was being considered under sections 177.5 and/or 575.2, “each of which requires a knowing violation of a valid order of the court without good cause or substantial justification.” (Winikow v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 719, 726 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 413 ] (Winikow).) 4 Appellant argues the fees and sanctions orders are unsupported *1481 by statutory authority and/or the record, and represent an abuse of discretion because under these

2015California appellate courts have found probation conditions to be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when they do not require the probationer to have knowledge of the prohibited conduct or circumstances.” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 .) Probation conditions have been modified in a host of cases where they failed to include language requiring the probationer’s knowing violation of the condition.

2015California appellate courts have found probation conditions to be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when they do not require the probationer to have knowledge of the prohibited conduct or circumstances.” (Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 843 .) In a host of cases, appellate courts have modified probation conditions that failed to include language requiring the probationer’s knowing violation of the condition at issue.

2001(Winikow v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 726 ; People v. Tabb, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1306, 1309-1311; Moyal v. Lanphear, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 501 .) B Sufficient Factual Basis for Sanctions Award As noted, for purposes of the imposition of sanctions, both section 177.5 and rule 227 require “a knowing violation of a valid order of the court without good cause or substantial justification.” (Winikow v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 726 .) Thus, Hornung contends that even if the sanctions were imposed to compensate the County for an unnecessary hearing,

2000The Sanctions Ordered The court based its imposition of sanctions on California Rules of Court, rule 227, and Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, each of which requires a knowing violation of a valid order of the court without good cause or substantial justification. 5 (Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 499-500 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 296 ].) “The imposition of sanctions, monetary or otherwise, is within the discretion of the trial court.

2024Code, § 721, subd. (b); In re Marriage of Kamgar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 136, 149 .) “[A] spouse’s ‘bad business judgment’ in making [community property] investments, to the extent it amounts only to ordinary negligence, is not a breach of fiduciary duty; and the managing spouse, in such circumstances, cannot be held responsible to the other spouse for [a decision] that (by hindsight) has gone bad.” (Hogoboom & King, supra, ¶ 8.606.2.) 61 Quin has not demonstrated the evidence compelled a finding that Doug’s actions concerning the sale of the Faxon home were grossly negligent, reckless or even w

2022Code, § 16047 from interspousal fiduciary duties]; see In re Marriage of Kamgar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 136, 149 .) Even so, pursuant to section 721, subdivision (b) “a spouse’s improvident C[ommunity] P[roperty] investments can amount to a breach of fiduciary duty if they rise to the level of ‘grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law’ ([Corp. Code, § 16404, [subd.] (c).” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group (2021) ¶ 8:606, p. 8-222, original italics.) “On the other hand, a spouse’s ‘bad business judgment’ in maki

1981Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 604-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ], makes clear that a criminal defendant in such a situation must be protected by a showing on the record that there has been a knowing waiver of rights.

1981Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 604-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ], makes clear that a criminal defendant in such a situation must be protected by a showing on the record that there has been a knowing waiver of rights.

2023(People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549 .) He also bears the burden of providing “a record on appeal which affirmatively shows that there was an error below, and any uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the defendant.” (Ibid.) Issues as to which the record is silent are resolved in favor of the judgment.5 (Ibid.) 5 Defendant inverts the burden by arguing that the record fails to show he made a knowing waiver.

2022The standard for a knowing waiver is what a defendant actually understood (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 212; Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 545 ; People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747 , 759), i.e., a defendant’s subjective understanding (Kidd v. Lemke (2013 7th Cir.) 734 F.3d 696, 705 ).

1990The Attorney General concedes the lack of on-the-record advice and waiver as to self-incrimination was error under In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], but argues the error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the allegations would have been found untrue had they been tried, Ray argues that under Yurko failure to secure a knowing waiver of each constitutional right is per se reversible error.

1990The Attorney General concedes the lack of on-the-record advice and waiver as to self-incrimination was error under In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], but argues the error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the allegations would have been found untrue had they been tried, Ray argues that under Yurko failure to secure a knowing waiver of each constitutional right is per se reversible error.

2013Defendant also concedes our Supreme Court has held that use of validly executed Tahl forms satisfies the requirement of a knowing waiver of constitutional rights (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 284-285 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175 ) and that the same rule applies to advisements under section 1016.5 (People v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 519, 522 ).

2001The established procedure for admitting a conviction involves obtaining the defendant’s knowing waiver of constitutional rights and an explicit admission, In People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ], however, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a prior conviction will be upheld “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” There is no longer any “specific formula for advising a defendant of his or her rights.” (People v. Murillo (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1304 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2