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17 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ileto v. Glock, Inc.green2 sentences2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012).3 One such exception, for ‘‘an action in which a manufac- turer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute appli- cable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought’’; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012); ‘‘has come to be known as the ‘predicate exception,’ because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a ‘predicate statute.’ ’’ Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 113 2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012). 3 One such exception, for "an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought"; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012) ; "has come to be known as the 'predicate exception,' because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a 'predicate statute.' " Ileto v. Glock, Inc. , 565 F.3d 1126 , 1132 (9 | 1 | 2 |
Mamudovski v. BIC CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec 2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec | 1 | 1 |
Mamudovski v. BIC Corp.green2 sentences2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec 2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paul Levy, Frank Moten, Donald Verna, Nicholas Visceglia. Appeal of Donald Vernagreen2 sentences2011Among the many, serious errors that the majority commits in reaching its extraordinary result are: (1) the majority resolves the case on the basis of a claim that the defendant never has raised and the state never has had the opportunity to address; 1 (2) it finds facts in violation of this court’s strict prohibition against appellate fact finding and then relies on those facts — all of which directly contradict the trial court’s factual findings — in asserting that the state is to blame for the breach of the attorney-client privilege; (3) it ignores the critical and universally recognized dis 2011Among the many, serious errors that the majority commits in reaching its extraordinary result are: (1) the majority resolves the case on the basis of a claim that the defendant never has raised and the state never has had the opportunity to address; 1 (2) it finds facts in violation of this court’s strict prohibition against appellate fact finding and then relies on those facts — all of which directly contradict the trial court’s factual findings — in asserting that the state is to blame for the breach of the attorney-client privilege; (3) it ignores the critical and universally recognized dis | 1 | 1 |
Graves v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Subsequently, the Mississippi Supreme Court clarified that the state is not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of his or her right to refuse consent; instead, the defendant must show "impaired consent or some diminished capacity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graves v. State, 708 So.2d 858, 863 (Miss.1997). 2010Subsequently, the Mississippi Supreme Court clarified that the state is not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of his or her right to refuse consent; instead, the defendant must show “impaired consent or some diminished capacity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858, 863 (Miss. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Penick v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Similarly, in Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss.1983), the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded, contrary to the holding of Schneckloth , that a knowing waiver is necessary before consent may be deemed valid under the Mississippi constitution. 2010Similarly, in Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983), the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded, contrary to the holding of Schneckloth, that a knowing waiver is necessary before consent may be deemed valid under the Mississippi constitution. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Calvin Lyniol Robinsongreen1 sentence2003Some courts have commented that “perfect comprehension of each element of a criminal charge does not appear to be necessary to a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver.” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
McHugh v. McHughgreen1 sentence1996See McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn
green
2 sentences2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012).3 One such exception, for ‘‘an action in which a manufac- turer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute appli- cable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought’’; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012); ‘‘has come to be known as the ‘predicate exception,’ because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a ‘predicate statute.’ ’’ Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 113 2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012). 3 One such exception, for "an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought"; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012) ; "has come to be known as the 'predicate exception,' because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a 'predicate statute.' " Ileto v. Glock, Inc. , 565 F.3d 1126 , 1132 (9 | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Skinner v. Switzer
green
2 sentences2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012).3 One such exception, for ‘‘an action in which a manufac- turer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute appli- cable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought’’; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012); ‘‘has come to be known as the ‘predicate exception,’ because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a ‘predicate statute.’ ’’ Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 113 2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012). 3 One such exception, for "an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought"; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012) ; "has come to be known as the 'predicate exception,' because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a 'predicate statute.' " Ileto v. Glock, Inc. , 565 F.3d 1126 , 1132 (9 | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Andrews v. Fairley
green
2 sentences2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012).3 One such exception, for ‘‘an action in which a manufac- turer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute appli- cable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought’’; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012); ‘‘has come to be known as the ‘predicate exception,’ because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a ‘predicate statute.’ ’’ Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 113 2019See 15 U.S.C. § 7902 (2012). 3 One such exception, for "an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm, ammunition, or component part] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought"; 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5) (A) (iii) (2012) ; "has come to be known as the 'predicate exception,' because a plaintiff not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a 'predicate statute.' " Ileto v. Glock, Inc. , 565 F.3d 1126 , 1132 (9 | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Bailey v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act
green
2 sentences1999In Bailey v. Administrator, 3 Conn. App. 494 , 495 , 490 A.2d 92 (1985), the court found that wilful misconduct included a wilful disregard of an employer's interest which was exhibited by deliberate violation of the employer's procedures or disregarding an expected standard of behavior. 1999In Bailey v. Administrator, 3 Conn. App. 494 , 495 , 490 A.2d 92 (1985), the court found that wilful misconduct included a wilful disregard of an employer's interest which was exhibited by deliberate violation of the employer's procedures or disregarding an expected standard of behavior. | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co.
green
1 sentence2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec | 1 | 2018–2018 |
IKE'S Auto Body, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Millbrook Owners Ass'n v. Hamilton Standard
green
2 sentences2018Insofar as the sanction was premised in part on counsel's violation of the February 26, 2014 court order to file the agreement, the first two prongs necessary for a sanction of nonsuit-a clear and unambiguous court order and a knowing violation of that order; Millbrook , supra, 257 Conn. at 17 -18 , 776 A.2d 1115 ;-are easily satisfied. 2018Insofar as the sanction was premised in part on counsel's violation of the February 26, 2014 court order to file the agreement, the first two prongs necessary for a sanction of nonsuit-a clear and unambiguous court order and a knowing violation of that order; Millbrook , supra, 257 Conn. at 17 -18 , 776 A.2d 1115 ;-are easily satisfied. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co.
green
2 sentences2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec 2018In fact, when the court asked if there was anything that counsel wanted to argue in support of their claims that was not in the pleadings, the defendants' counsel said no . "[A] court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte, and ... pursuant to Practice Book § [17-44], a person seeking summary judgment ... must file an appropriate motion addressed to it." Hope's Architectural Products, Inc. v. Fox Steel Co. , 44 Conn. App. 759 , 762-63 n.4, 692 A.2d 829 , cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915 , 696 A.2d 985 (1997) ; see also Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. , 78 Conn. App. 715 , 726, 829 A.2d 47 (2003) ("[b]ec | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Phillips v. Warden
green
1 sentence2002In Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 344 , 350 (1980), a petitioner's burden is stated: "he must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." (See Phillips v. Warden , 220 Conn. 112 , 133 (1991). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator
green
1 sentence2001Accordingly, the decision of the Board was not "unreasonable, illegal or an abuse of discretion." United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator Unemployments Compensation Act, 209 Conn. 381 , 385 (1988). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bigelow Co. v. Waselik
green
1 sentence1997Bigelow Co. v. Waselik , 133 Conn. 304 , 308-309 (1946); Sharkiewicz v. Cushman Church Co. , 11 Conn. Sup. 221 , 224 (1942); Bailey v. Administrator , 3 Conn. App. 494 , 495 (1985). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Doe v. Marselle
green
1 sentence1997Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845 , 860 , 862 (1996). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Rasmussen
green
2 sentences1997Evidence that the defendant appeared distraught does not alone prevent a knowing waiver of Miranda rights.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993). 1997Evidence that the defendant appeared distraught does not alone prevent a knowing waiver of Miranda rights.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Sharkiewicz v. Cushman Chuck Co.
neutral
1 sentence1997Bigelow Co. v. Waselik , 133 Conn. 304 , 308-309 (1946); Sharkiewicz v. Cushman Church Co. , 11 Conn. Sup. 221 , 224 (1942); Bailey v. Administrator , 3 Conn. App. 494 , 495 (1985). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Roseboro
green
2 sentences1993State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 441-43 , 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. 1993State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 441-43 , 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences1993State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 441-43 , 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. 1993State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 441-43 , 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Tietbohl v. Woods
green
1 sentence1993State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 441-43 , 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Harvey v. Estelle
green
1 sentence1993State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 441-43 , 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
White v. Estelle
green
1 sentence1993State v. Roseboro, 221 Conn. 430, 441-43 , 604 A.2d 1286 (1992); State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Carnley v. Cochran
green
2 sentences1986Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 , 82 S. Ct. 884 , 8 L. 1986Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 , 82 S. Ct. 884 , 8 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, in granting summary judgment for the defendant Raybestos, erred in that: (1) the Workers’ Compensation Act does not constitute an employee’s sole remedy “if the employer engages in serious and willful misconduct”; (2) “a knowing violation of an employer’s duty to provide his employees with a safe place to work permits a direct action against the employer” under General Statutes § 31-49; and (3) summary judgment was improper in this case because of the existence of “unresolved questions of fact.” Under our Workers’ Compensation Act, “[a]n em 1985On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, in granting summary judgment for the defendant Raybestos, erred in that: (1) the Workers’ Compensation Act does not constitute an employee’s sole remedy “if the employer engages in serious and willful misconduct”; (2) “a knowing violation of an employer’s duty to provide his employees with a safe place to work permits a direct action against the employer” under General Statutes § 31-49; and (3) summary judgment was improper in this case because of the existence of “unresolved questions of fact.” Under our Workers’ Compensation Act, “[a]n em | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Jett v. Dunlap
green
2 sentences1985On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, in granting summary judgment for the defendant Raybestos, erred in that: (1) the Workers’ Compensation Act does not constitute an employee’s sole remedy “if the employer engages in serious and willful misconduct”; (2) “a knowing violation of an employer’s duty to provide his employees with a safe place to work permits a direct action against the employer” under General Statutes § 31-49; and (3) summary judgment was improper in this case because of the existence of “unresolved questions of fact.” Under our Workers’ Compensation Act, “[a]n em 1985On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, in granting summary judgment for the defendant Raybestos, erred in that: (1) the Workers’ Compensation Act does not constitute an employee’s sole remedy “if the employer engages in serious and willful misconduct”; (2) “a knowing violation of an employer’s duty to provide his employees with a safe place to work permits a direct action against the employer” under General Statutes § 31-49; and (3) summary judgment was improper in this case because of the existence of “unresolved questions of fact.” Under our Workers’ Compensation Act, “[a]n em | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.