5 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Buchanangreen2 sentences2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat 2024See Kaster, 454 24 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting S | 2 | 2 |
State v. Windersgreen2 sentences2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat 2024See Kaster, 454 24 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting S | 2 | 2 |
State v. Duncangreen2 sentences2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat 2024See Kaster, 454 24 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting S | 2 | 2 |
Campiti v. Walonisgreen2 sentences2017Id. at 267. “[E]vidence that defendants believed they were acting lawfully is pertinent to a determination of whether they acted with malice or wantonness so as to render punitive damages appropriate.” Campiti v. Walonis, 467 F. Supp. 464, 466 (D. 2017Id. at 267. “[E]vidence that defendants believed they were acting lawfully is pertinent to a determination of whether they acted with malice or wantonness so as to render punitive damages appropriate.” Campiti v. Walonis, 467 F.Supp. 464, 466 (D. | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Kastergreen1 sentence2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat | 1 | 1 |
In re the Claim of Overtgreen1 sentence1985Lundy’s Market, Inc. v. Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, 373 So.2d 433, 434 (Fla.App.1979) (repeated failure to comply with employer’s instruction prohibiting leaving the cash drawer open and leaving change on the counter was misconduct); Overt v. Levine, 50 A.D.2d 659, 659 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1975) (misconduct to leave security post after previous warning); Elias v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa.Commw. 263, 266, 325 A.2d 351, 352 (1974) (employee disqualified from benefits for repeated failure to follow employer rules in regar | 1 | 1 |
Elias v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1985Lundy’s Market, Inc. v. Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, 373 So.2d 433, 434 (Fla.App.1979) (repeated failure to comply with employer’s instruction prohibiting leaving the cash drawer open and leaving change on the counter was misconduct); Overt v. Levine, 50 A.D.2d 659, 659 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1975) (misconduct to leave security post after previous warning); Elias v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa.Commw. 263, 266, 325 A.2d 351, 352 (1974) (employee disqualified from benefits for repeated failure to follow employer rules in regar | 1 | 1 |
Lundy's Market v. Fla. Dept. of Commercegreen1 sentence1985Lundy’s Market, Inc. v. Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, 373 So.2d 433, 434 (Fla.App.1979) (repeated failure to comply with employer’s instruction prohibiting leaving the cash drawer open and leaving change on the counter was misconduct); Overt v. Levine, 50 A.D.2d 659, 659 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1975) (misconduct to leave security post after previous warning); Elias v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa.Commw. 263, 266, 325 A.2d 351, 352 (1974) (employee disqualified from benefits for repeated failure to follow employer rules in regar | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Claim of Rendina
neutral
1 sentence1985Lundy’s Market, Inc. v. Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, 373 So.2d 433, 434 (Fla.App.1979) (repeated failure to comply with employer’s instruction prohibiting leaving the cash drawer open and leaving change on the counter was misconduct); Overt v. Levine, 50 A.D.2d 659, 659 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1975) (misconduct to leave security post after previous warning); Elias v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa.Commw. 263, 266, 325 A.2d 351, 352 (1974) (employee disqualified from benefits for repeated failure to follow employer rules in regar | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.