knowing waiver in Florida

2017Prior to sentencing, “even if a defendant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.” Hardy v. State, 655 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1992) (“Any waiver of this right must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and courts generally will indulge every reasonable presumption-against waiver of this fundamental right.”).

2017Prior to sentencing, “even if a defendant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.” Hardy v. State, 655 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see Traylor, 596 So.2d at 968 (“Any waiver of this right must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and courts generally will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of this fundamental right.”).

2025See Hooks, 286 So. 3d at 169 (“[T]he defendant’s understanding of the rules of criminal procedure—is only relevant if assessing the accused’s ‘technical legal knowledge.’ . . . [T]his is clearly an improper consideration.” (citations omitted)); Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 1996) (“We emphasize that a defendant does not need to possess the technical legal knowledge of an attorney before being permitted to proceed pro se . . . . [T]he judge was not required to give Hill a lesson on how to try a lawsuit before finding that Hill was making a knowing waiver of his right to counsel.

2008See Bowen, 698 So.2d at 250-51 ; see also Hill v. State, 688 So.2d 901, 904-05 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 , 118 S.Ct. 265 , 139 L.Ed.2d 191 (1997).

2000See State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla.1986); Rivera v. State, 745 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Austin v. State, 699 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Waldon v. State, 670 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

1992There is no question either that (a) as a general proposition, a right to double jeopardy protection against multiple adjudications is susceptible to a knowing waiver by the defendant, [1] Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 , 107 S.Ct. 2680 , 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1986); Guardado v. State, 562 So.2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1990); Rodriguez v. State, 441 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 451 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1984), and that (b) in this district, a waiver of a Cleveland -type violation with respect to m

2026Hardy v. State, 655 So. 2d 1245 , 1247−48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also Chestnut v. State, 578 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (same).

1995Chestnut v. State, 578 So.2d 27, 28 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

2017Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988).

2017Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988).

2017Prior to sentencing, “even if a defendant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.” Hardy v. State, 655 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1992) (“Any waiver of this right must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and courts generally will indulge every reasonable presumption-against waiver of this fundamental right.”).

2017Prior to sentencing, “even if a defendant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.” Hardy v. State, 655 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see Traylor, 596 So.2d at 968 (“Any waiver of this right must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and courts generally will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of this fundamental right.”).

2005Thus, the record should "reflect a defendant's knowing waiver of his or her right to present mitigating evidence." Mora v. State, 814 So.2d 322, 332-33 (Fla.2002).

2005Instead, Koon simply developed a procedure so that the record clearly reflects "a defendant's knowing waiver of his or her right to present mitigating evidence." Id. at 332-33 .

2011“Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, and a trial court must renew the offer of counsel even if the defendant has previously waived counsel.” Beard v. State, 751 So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “[E]ven if a defendant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel” before sentencing.

2011“Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, and a trial court must renew the offer of counsel even if the defendant has previously waived counsel.” Monte v. State, 51 So.3d 1196, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Beard v. State, 751 So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). “[Ejven if a defen dant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel” before sentencing.

2008See Bowen, 698 So.2d at 250-51 ; see also Hill v. State, 688 So.2d 901, 904-05 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 , 118 S.Ct. 265 , 139 L.Ed.2d 191 (1997).

2002See State v. Bowen, 698 So.2d 248 (Fla.1997)(holding that once the trial court determines that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, the defendant may proceed unrepresented); see also Hill v. State, 688 So.2d 901 (Fla.1996)(holding that a defendant does not need to possess the technical legal knowledge of a lawyer to proceed pro se).

1992The opinion relied upon the holding in Caristi v. State, 578 So.2d 769, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), that a defendant's knowing waiver of the procedural rights available under section 775.084, by entering into a plea agreement for an habitual offender sentence, precludes post-conviction relief for failure to follow the requirements of the statute.

1991As this court held in Caristi v. State, 578 So.2d 769, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), and Jefferson v. State, 571 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), a defendant's knowing waiver of the procedural rights accorded by § 775.084, the habitual offender statute, precludes any relief from the trial court's failure to strictly follow the statute.

1991As this court held in Caristi v. State, 578 So.2d 769, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), and Jefferson v. State, 571 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), a defendant's knowing waiver of the procedural rights accorded by § 775.084, the habitual offender statute, precludes any relief from the trial court's failure to strictly follow the statute.

1991Jefferson v. State, 571 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

2017Berkeley v. Eisen, 699 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). “[T]he party seeking discovery of confidential information must make a showing of necessity which outweighs the countervailing interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.” Higgs v. Kampgrounds of Am., 526 So.2d 980, 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see CAC-Ramsay Health Plans, Inc, v. Johnson, 641 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

2017See Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1065 .

2017Berkeley v. Eisen, 699 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). “[T]he party seeking discovery of confidential information must make a showing of necessity which outweighs the countervailing interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.” Higgs v. Kampgrounds of Am., 526 So.2d 980, 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see CAC-Ramsay Health Plans, Inc, v. Johnson, 641 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

2017Ortiz v. State, 9 So.3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“[f]ailure to obtain an on-the-record personal waiver of the right to a PSI is not required under current supreme court precedent, and it does not constitute fundamental error.”); Barton v. State, 706 So.2d 399, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Because the appellant bargained for a habitual offender sentence and signed the plea form which clearly contemplated a habitualized sentence, one which he does not contest he qualifies for, he effectively waived the requirement of the presentence investigation report.”); Likely v. State, 583 So.2d 414, 414-1

2017Ortiz v. State, 9 So.3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“[f]ailure to obtain an on-the-record personal waiver of the right to a PSI is not required under current supreme court precedent, and it does not constitute fundamental error.”); Barton v. State, 706 So.2d 399, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Because the appellant bargained for a habitual offender sentence and signed the plea form which clearly contemplated a habitualized sentence, one which he does not contest he qualifies for, he effectively waived the requirement of the presentence investigation report.”); Likely v. State, 583 So.2d 414, 414-1

2017Ortiz v. State, 9 So.3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“[f]ailure to obtain an on-the-record personal waiver of the right to a PSI is not required under current supreme court precedent, and it does not constitute fundamental error.”); Barton v. State, 706 So.2d 399, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Because the appellant bargained for a habitual offender sentence and signed the plea form which clearly contemplated a habitualized sentence, one which he does not contest he qualifies for, he effectively waived the requirement of the presentence investigation report.”); Likely v. State, 583 So.2d 414, 414-1

2017In Capitaine v. State, 58 So.3d 438, 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), this court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court did not renew' the offer of counsel before sentencing.

2017Hays v. State, 63 So.3d 887, 888 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Hardy v. State, 655 So.2d 1245, 1247-48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)); see also Fla. R.

2012See Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1997) (holding that the constitutional right to a six-member jury may be waived by a knowing and intelligent waiver); Fla. Fertilizer & Mfg.

2011“Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, and a trial court must renew the offer of counsel even if the defendant has previously waived counsel.” Monte v. State, 51 So.3d 1196, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Beard v. State, 751 So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). “[Ejven if a defen dant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel” before sentencing.

2011See Bakst, Cloyd & Bakst, P.A. v. Cole, 750 So.2d 676, 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that language in the contract was insufficient to prove a knowing waiver of party’s right to homestead exemption where nothing in the contract even hints that the party was waiving this right). .

2011The decision of the Third District on review turned on the court’s conclusion that “Sosa failed to allege sufficiently a knowing violation of the statute, and therefore his claim is not an appropriate claim for a class action.” Sosa, 15 So.3d at 9 (emphasis added).

2011The decision of the Third District on review turned on the court's conclusion that "Sosa failed to allege sufficiently a knowing violation of the statute, and therefore his claim is not an appropriate claim for a class action." Sosa, 15 So.3d at 9 (emphasis added).