knowing waiver in Georgia

2014See Beaudoin, 311 Ga. App. at 94 (4) (where defendant took the polygraph and stipulated as to its admissibility while under investigation for alleged child molestation and “the evidence show[ed] that [defendant] knew and understood his rights before he waived counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of the polygraph results, the trial court’s determination that stipulation was valid... will be affirmed”) (citations omitted); Ivey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 886, 887 (1) ( 418 SE2d 71 ) (1992) (where a defendant being investigated for alleged child molestation made “a knowing waiver of his right

2014See Beaudoin, 311 Ga. App. at 94 (4) (where defendant took the polygraph and stipulated as to its admissibility while under investigation for alleged child molestation and “the evidence show[ed] that [defendant] knew and understood his rights before he waived counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of the polygraph results, the trial court’s determination that stipulation was valid... will be affirmed”) (citations omitted); Ivey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 886, 887 (1) ( 418 SE2d 71 ) (1992) (where a defendant being investigated for alleged child molestation made “a knowing waiver of his right

2019Compare Sanders v. State , 182 Ga. App. 581 , 582-583 (1), 356 S.E.2d 537 (1987) (The defendant waived his previously invoked right to counsel when he reinitiated conversation with the police, was reminded that he had asked for a lawyer, and said he wanted to continue making a statement.), with Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175 , 182 (2), 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008) (In an interview conducted two days after the initial invocation of the right to counsel, the investigator neither reread nor **64 reminded the defendant of his Miranda rights.

2019Compare Sanders v. State , 182 Ga. App. 581 , 582-583 (1), 356 S.E.2d 537 (1987) (The defendant waived his previously invoked right to counsel when he reinitiated conversation with the police, was reminded that he had asked for a lawyer, and said he wanted to continue making a statement.), with Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175 , 182 (2), 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008) (In an interview conducted two days after the initial invocation of the right to counsel, the investigator neither reread nor **64 reminded the defendant of his Miranda rights.

2019Compare Sanders v. State , 182 Ga. App. 581 , 582-583 (1), 356 S.E.2d 537 (1987) (The defendant waived his previously invoked right to counsel when he reinitiated conversation with the police, was reminded that he had asked for a lawyer, and said he wanted to continue making a statement.), with Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175 , 182 (2), 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008) (In an interview conducted two days after the initial invocation of the right to counsel, the investigator neither reread nor **64 reminded the defendant of his Miranda rights.

2019Compare Sanders v. State , 182 Ga. App. 581 , 582-583 (1), 356 S.E.2d 537 (1987) (The defendant waived his previously invoked right to counsel when he reinitiated conversation with the police, was reminded that he had asked for a lawyer, and said he wanted to continue making a statement.), with Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175 , 182 (2), 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008) (In an interview conducted two days after the initial invocation of the right to counsel, the investigator neither reread nor **64 reminded the defendant of his Miranda rights.

2014See Beaudoin, 311 Ga. App. at 94 (4) (where defendant took the polygraph and stipulated as to its admissibility while under investigation for alleged child molestation and “the evidence show[ed] that [defendant] knew and understood his rights before he waived counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of the polygraph results, the trial court’s determination that stipulation was valid... will be affirmed”) (citations omitted); Ivey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 886, 887 (1) ( 418 SE2d 71 ) (1992) (where a defendant being investigated for alleged child molestation made “a knowing waiver of his right

2014See Beaudoin, 311 Ga. App. at 94 (4) (where defendant took the polygraph and 7 stipulated as to its admissibility while under investigation for alleged child molestation and “the evidence show[ed] that [defendant] knew and understood his rights before he waived counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of the polygraph results, the trial court’s determination that stipulation was valid . . . will be affirmed”) (citations omitted); Ivey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 886, 887 (1) ( 418 SE2d 71 ) (1992) (where a defendant being investigated for alleged child molestation made “a knowing waiver of his r

2014See Beaudoin, 311 Ga. App. at 94 (4) (where defendant took the polygraph and stipulated as to its admissibility while under investigation for alleged child molestation and “the evidence show[ed] that [defendant] knew and understood his rights before he waived counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of the polygraph results, the trial court’s determination that stipulation was valid... will be affirmed”) (citations omitted); Ivey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 886, 887 (1) ( 418 SE2d 71 ) (1992) (where a defendant being investigated for alleged child molestation made “a knowing waiver of his right

2014See Beaudoin, 311 Ga. App. at 94 (4) (where defendant took the polygraph and 7 stipulated as to its admissibility while under investigation for alleged child molestation and “the evidence show[ed] that [defendant] knew and understood his rights before he waived counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of the polygraph results, the trial court’s determination that stipulation was valid . . . will be affirmed”) (citations omitted); Ivey v. State, 203 Ga. App. 886, 887 (1) ( 418 SE2d 71 ) (1992) (where a defendant being investigated for alleged child molestation made “a knowing waiver of his r

2021See Hill v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 23-24 (2) ( 494 SE2d 661 ) (1998). 4 Houston appears to argue that the trial court should have held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975), to determine whether he was competent to represent himself at his plea hearing.

2021See Hill v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 23-24 (2) ( 494 SE2d 661 ) (1998). 4 Houston appears to argue that the trial court should have held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975), to determine whether he was competent to represent himself at his plea hearing.

2002He relies on authority which includes Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (95 SC 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975), and Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194 ( 275 SE2d 49 ) (1981).

2002He relies on authority which includes Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (95 SC 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975), and Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194 ( 275 SE2d 49 ) (1981).

2026Cf. Stewart v. State, 361 Ga. App. 636 , 644(2)(b) ( 865 SE2d 237 ) (2021) (“Even when the evidence against a defendant is substantial, error in finding a knowing waiver of the right to counsel may not be harmless where the record shows that the defendant did not mount an able defense.”(emphasis added)); Middletown v. State, 254 Ga. App. 648, 650 (2) ( 563 SE2d 543 ) (2002) (“[S]trong evidence of guilt does not mean that the trial court’s failure to establish a valid waiver of counsel was harmless error.” (emphasis added)). 22 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b). 11 Freeman never made such a requ

2026Cf. Stewart v. State, 361 Ga. App. 636 , 644(2)(b) ( 865 SE2d 237 ) (2021) (“Even when the evidence against a defendant is substantial, error in finding a knowing waiver of the right to counsel may not be harmless where the record shows that the defendant did not mount an able defense.”(emphasis added)); Middletown v. State, 254 Ga. App. 648, 650 (2) ( 563 SE2d 543 ) (2002) (“[S]trong evidence of guilt does not mean that the trial court’s failure to establish a valid waiver of counsel was harmless error.” (emphasis added)). 22 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b). 11 Freeman never made such a requ

2026Cf. Stewart v. State, 361 Ga. App. 636 , 644(2)(b) ( 865 SE2d 237 ) (2021) (“Even when the evidence against a defendant is substantial, error in finding a knowing waiver of the right to counsel may not be harmless where the record shows that the defendant did not mount an able defense.”(emphasis added)); Middletown v. State, 254 Ga. App. 648, 650 (2) ( 563 SE2d 543 ) (2002) (“[S]trong evidence of guilt does not mean that the trial court’s failure to establish a valid waiver of counsel was harmless error.” (emphasis added)). 22 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b). 11 Freeman never made such a requ

2025See, e.g., Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771 , 778– 79 (2013) (citing OCGA § 1-3-6 in rejecting argument that a validly enacted law takes effect for ex post facto purposes only after it has been added to the compilation of Georgia laws contained in the Georgia Code); Cornell v. Camellia Corp., 248 Ga. 449, 450 (1981) (citing precursor to OCGA § 1-3-6 in concluding that civil defendant’s ignorance of safety regulation would “not relieve [it] of [its] statutory duty”); O’Callaghan v. Bank of Eastman, 180 Ga. 812, 820 (1935) (citing precursor to OCGA § 1-3-6 in concluding that ignorance of the law do

2025See, e.g., Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771 , 778– 79 (2013) (citing OCGA § 1-3-6 in rejecting argument that a validly enacted law takes effect for ex post facto purposes only after it has been added to the compilation of Georgia laws contained in the Georgia Code); Cornell v. Camellia Corp., 248 Ga. 449, 450 (1981) (citing precursor to OCGA § 1-3-6 in concluding that civil defendant’s ignorance of safety regulation would “not relieve [it] of [its] statutory duty”); O’Callaghan v. Bank of Eastman, 180 Ga. 812, 820 (1935) (citing precursor to OCGA § 1-3-6 in concluding that ignorance of the law do

2025See, e.g., Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771 , 778– 79 (2013) (citing OCGA § 1-3-6 in rejecting argument that a validly enacted law takes effect for ex post facto purposes only after it has been added to the compilation of Georgia laws contained in the Georgia Code); Cornell v. Camellia Corp., 248 Ga. 449, 450 (1981) (citing precursor to OCGA § 1-3-6 in concluding that civil defendant’s ignorance of safety regulation would “not relieve [it] of [its] statutory duty”); O’Callaghan v. Bank of Eastman, 180 Ga. 812, 820 (1935) (citing precursor to OCGA § 1-3-6 in concluding that ignorance of the law do

2024“The determination of whether a defendant is capable of making a knowing waiver of his right to counsel is a factual determination that we accept on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.” Houston, 312 Ga. at 857 (2).

2021See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88-94; Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 798 (524 9 whether a defendant is capable of making a knowing waiver of his right to counsel is a factual determination that we accept on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.

2021Whether a defendant is capable of making a knowing and intelligent decision “will depend on a range of case- specific factors, including the defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.” Id. at 88 .4 The determination of whether a defendant is capable of making a knowing waiver of his representation by counsel of choice.

2021See Brown v. State, 259 Ga. 453, 454 (2) (b) (383 SE2d 882) (1989); cf. Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 535 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 347) (2020) (“A trial court’s decision as to whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2021See Brown v. State, 259 Ga. 453, 454 (2) (b) (383 SE2d 882) (1989); cf. Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 535 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 347) (2020) (“A trial court’s decision as to whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2021See Hill v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 23-24 (2) ( 494 SE2d 661 ) (1998). 4 Houston appears to argue that the trial court should have held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975), to determine whether he was competent to represent himself at his plea hearing.

2021See Hill v. State, 269 Ga. 23, 23-24 (2) ( 494 SE2d 661 ) (1998). 4 Houston appears to argue that the trial court should have held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975), to determine whether he was competent to represent himself at his plea hearing.

2021See Brown v. State, 259 Ga. 453, 454 (2) (b) (383 SE2d 882) (1989); cf. Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 535 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 347) (2020) (“A trial court’s decision as to whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2021See Brown v. State, 259 Ga. 453, 454 (2) (b) (383 SE2d 882) (1989); cf. Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 535 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 347) (2020) (“A trial court’s decision as to whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2021See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88-94; Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 798 (524 9 whether a defendant is capable of making a knowing waiver of his right to counsel is a factual determination that we accept on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.

2019While articulated findings on the record by a trial court are preferable, "it is not required when the record as a whole demonstrates a defendant's knowing waiver." Martin-Argaw , 343 Ga. App. at 870 (2), 806 S.E.2d 247 (citation omitted).

2019While articulated findings on the record by a trial court are preferable, "it is not required when the record as a whole demonstrates a defendant's knowing waiver." Martin-Argaw , 343 Ga. App. at 870 (2), 806 S.E.2d 247 (citation omitted).

2017Such a finding, while 11 preferable, is not required “when the record as a whole demonstrates a defendant’s knowing waiver.” McDaniel, supra, 327 Ga. App. at 675 (1) (a) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).

2017Such a finding, while 11 preferable, is not required “when the record as a whole demonstrates a defendant’s knowing waiver.” McDaniel, supra, 327 Ga. App. at 675 (1) (a) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).

2010The trial court recalled that it was only after this bench conference that Smith raised questions about venue. 3 Although Smith’s trial attorney did not raise an objection at trial, the Supreme Court of Georgia has “clarified that a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 will always constitute ‘plain error,’ meaning that the failure to object at trial will not waive the issue on appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 ( 690 SE2d 164 ) (2010), citing Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 858 (2) ( 655 SE2d 813 ) (2008). 4 The trial court did not make an inquiry into whether Smith had

2010The trial court recalled that it was only after this bench conference that Smith raised questions about venue. 3 Although Smith’s trial attorney did not raise an objection at trial, the Supreme Court of Georgia has “clarified that a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 will always constitute ‘plain error,’ meaning that the failure to object at trial will not waive the issue on appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 ( 690 SE2d 164 ) (2010), citing Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 858 (2) ( 655 SE2d 813 ) (2008). 4 The trial court did not make an inquiry into whether Smith had

2010The trial court recalled that it was only after this bench conference that Smith raised questions about venue. 3 Although Smith’s trial attorney did not raise an objection at trial, the Supreme Court of Georgia has “clarified that a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 will always constitute ‘plain error,’ meaning that the failure to object at trial will not waive the issue on appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 ( 690 SE2d 164 ) (2010), citing Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 858 (2) ( 655 SE2d 813 ) (2008). 4 The trial court did not make an inquiry into whether Smith had

2010The trial court recalled that it was only after this bench conference that Smith raised questions about venue. 3 Although Smith’s trial attorney did not raise an objection at trial, the Supreme Court of Georgia has “clarified that a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 will always constitute ‘plain error,’ meaning that the failure to object at trial will not waive the issue on appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 ( 690 SE2d 164 ) (2010), citing Chumley v. State, 282 Ga. 855, 858 (2) ( 655 SE2d 813 ) (2008). 4 The trial court did not make an inquiry into whether Smith had

2000Moreover, given Raines’ repeated assertions that he could not afford an attorney, it is likely he chose to represent himself “because he believed he did not qualify for a court-appointed attorney and he could not afford to retain a private attorney.” Martin v. State, 240 Ga. App. 246, 248 (1) ( 523 SE2d 84 ) (1999).

2000Moreover, given Raines’ repeated assertions that he could not afford an attorney, it is likely he chose to represent himself “because he believed he did not qualify for a court-appointed attorney and he could not afford to retain a private attorney.” Martin v. State, 240 Ga. App. 246, 248 (1) ( 523 SE2d 84 ) (1999).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).

2000See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745 (2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998); May v. State, 217 Ga.App. 427, 428 , 457 S.E.2d 694 (1995); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 796 (1), 397 S.E.2d 68 (1990); Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 833 , 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989); Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733 , 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985); Callahan v. State, 175 Ga.App. 303, 304-305 , 333 S.E.2d 179 (1985).