knowing waiver in Maryland

2021The federal courts also did not mention the relevant analysis and legislative history examined by the Court of Appeals in Patton v. Wells Fargo Financial Maryland, Inc., 437 Md. 83 (2014). 6 Practically speaking, it is difficult to imagine the imposition of money damages under CL § 12-1018 where the borrower has not paid the principal amount; however, it is conceivable that the forfeiture of interest penalty, CL § 12-1018(a)(2), may obtain under (Continued) 15 It is axiomatic that the ‘“plain meaning’ of a statute can only be assessed in the context in which it appears.” Patton v. Wells Fargo

2014As this Court found in Crowder , and the Court of Special Appeals noted in its decision, such a claim brought under CL § 12 — 413 is not a claim that seeks to enforce an instrument or to “invalidate or reform them based on any alleged imperfection in the instruments themselves.” Crowder, 409 Md. at 64 , 972 A.2d 864 .

2014As this Court found in Crowder , and the Court of Special Appeals noted in its decision, such a claim brought under CL § 12 — 413 is not a claim that seeks to enforce an instrument or to “invalidate or reform them based on any alleged imperfection in the instruments themselves.” Crowder, 409 Md. at 64 , 972 A.2d 864 .

2013In Morales , the trial judge “advised [the defendant] of his right to remain silent and explained that if he exercised this right no inference of guilt could be drawn from his refusal.” Morales, 325 Md. at 336 , 600 A.2d at 854 .

2013In Morales , the trial judge “advised [the defendant] of his right to remain silent and explained that if he exercised this right no inference of guilt could be drawn from his refusal.” Morales, 325 Md. at 336 , 600 A.2d at 854 .

2013Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dietz, 331 Md. 637 [ 629 A.2d 678 ] (1993).

2013Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dietz, 331 Md. 637 [ 629 A.2d 678 ] (1993).

2013As discussed below, although having "some knowledge" of a jury trial is necessary for a knowing waiver, see Wallter, 406 Md. at 378 , 958 A.2d at 920 , where the trial judge gives erroneous advice that would reasonably influence the decision, which is not corrected before the right to a jury is waived, the trial judge cannot ensure that the waiver is knowing.

2013As discussed below, although having "some knowledge" of a jury trial is necessary for a knowing waiver, see Wallter, 406 Md. at 378 , 958 A.2d at 920 , where the trial judge gives erroneous advice that would reasonably influence the decision, which is not corrected before the right to a jury is waived, the trial judge cannot ensure that the waiver is knowing.

2012Before trial, the petitioner sought to suppress the statement on the basis that he did not receive warnings in accordance with, and as required by, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and, as a result, he could not, and did not, make a knowing waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

2012Before trial, the petitioner sought to suppress the statement on the basis that he did not receive warnings in accordance with, and as required by, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and, as a result, he could not, and did not, make a knowing waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

2008This Court held that the record was “woefully deficient” to establish a knowing waiver of Tibbs’ right to a jury trial because he had received no information concerning “the nature of a jury trial,” “notwithstanding that Tibbs may have had some prior unspecified experience with the criminal justice system.” ' Id. at 31-32 , 590 A.2d at 551 .

2008This Court held that the record was “woefully deficient” to establish a knowing waiver of Tibbs’ right to a jury trial because he had received no information concerning “the nature of a jury trial,” “notwithstanding that Tibbs may have had some prior unspecified experience with the criminal justice system.” ' Id. at 31-32 , 590 A.2d at 551 .

2007Moreover, where the borrower can establish that the lender “knowingly” violated the SMLL provisions regulating the amount of interest and other charges imposed by the lender, the borrower may recover enhanced damages from the lender, i.e., “three times the amount of interest and charges collected in excess of that authorized by law.” (Quoting CL § 12-413.) In Duckworth v. Bernstein, 55 Md.App. 710, 724 , 466 A.2d 517 , cert. denied, 298 Md. 243 , 469 A.2d 452 (1983), we pointed out that the prohibition upon the lender’s right to collect any payment in excess of the principal “does not require

2007Moreover, where the borrower can establish that the lender “knowingly” violated the SMLL provisions regulating the amount of interest and other charges imposed by the lender, the borrower may recover enhanced damages from the lender, i.e., “three times the amount of interest and charges collected in excess of that authorized by law.” (Quoting CL § 12-413.) In Duckworth v. Bernstein, 55 Md.App. 710, 724 , 466 A.2d 517 , cert. denied, 298 Md. 243 , 469 A.2d 452 (1983), we pointed out that the prohibition upon the lender’s right to collect any payment in excess of the principal “does not require

2006Baker, 367 Md. at 691 , 790 A.2d at 654 . [21] While the presence of an attorney to discuss the waiver election tends to show that a defendant has made a knowing waiver, see Baker, that fact will not mitigate an inaccurate or incomplete court instruction on the jury sentencing right, see Trimble and Harris .

2006Baker, 367 Md. at 691 , 790 A.2d at 654 . [21] While the presence of an attorney to discuss the waiver election tends to show that a defendant has made a knowing waiver, see Baker, that fact will not mitigate an inaccurate or incomplete court instruction on the jury sentencing right, see Trimble and Harris .

2005Id. at 408 , 100 S.Ct. 624 .

2005Id. at 408 , 100 S.Ct. 624 .

2002With regard to the willfulness of the possession or transportation of unstamped cigarettes, the Court of Special Appeals relied on this Court’s decision in Deibler v. State, 365 Md. 185 , 776 A.2d 657 (2001) to conclude that the term “willfully” as used in Sections 13-1014 and 13-1015 of the Tax-General Article means that the conduct was purposeful, rather than inadvertent; willful conduct does not require a knowing violation of a legal duty.

2002With regard to the willfulness of the possession or transportation of unstamped cigarettes, the Court of Special Appeals relied on this Court’s decision in Deibler v. State, 365 Md. 185 , 776 A.2d 657 (2001) to conclude that the term “willfully” as used in Sections 13-1014 and 13-1015 of the Tax-General Article means that the conduct was purposeful, rather than inadvertent; willful conduct does not require a knowing violation of a legal duty.

1999Palmgren, 231 Kan. at 531 , 646 P.2d 1091 .

1999Palmgren, 231 Kan. at 531 , 646 P.2d 1091 .

1997It is also significant to us that the Court in Moten expressly refused to assume that attorneys properly advise their clients, even though the Court recognized the reality that counsel “routinely inform their clients of the charges and penalties they face____” Id. at 412, 663 A.2d 593 .

1995In United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370 (4th Cir.1991), the Court explained: When the risk of a conflict of interest is brought to the attention of the trial court, however, the court has the responsibility to investigate further, to advise the defendant personally, and to receive a knowing waiver if that is the expressed wish of the defendant.

1991Citing Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 592 (amended 1983), 1 appellant argues that “the State’s use of a criminal information, absent a knowing waiver by the Defendant of his absolute right to a preliminary hearing, rendered the Court below without jurisdiction to hear felony counts two, three [four], and five.” Appellant relies on Walters v. State, 242 Md. 235, 240 , 218 A.2d 678 (1965), wherein the Court stated that “an accused may not be prosecuted for a felony upon a criminal information unless he has first waived his right to action by the grand jury.” In Walters, the State did not obtain a waiver

1991Citing Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 592 (amended 1983), 1 appellant argues that “the State’s use of a criminal information, absent a knowing waiver by the Defendant of his absolute right to a preliminary hearing, rendered the Court below without jurisdiction to hear felony counts two, three [four], and five.” Appellant relies on Walters v. State, 242 Md. 235, 240 , 218 A.2d 678 (1965), wherein the Court stated that “an accused may not be prosecuted for a felony upon a criminal information unless he has first waived his right to action by the grand jury.” In Walters, the State did not obtain a waiver

1991Since the only crime for which Walters was convicted was a misdemeanor, the Court held that the procedure was proper under Maryland Rule 708. 2 Likewise, in Landaker v. State, 234 Md. 489 , 200 A.2d 44 (1964), the defendant argued that he was improperly tried on information.

1991Since the only crime for which Walters was convicted was a misdemeanor, the Court held that the procedure was proper under Maryland Rule 708. 2 Likewise, in Landaker v. State, 234 Md. 489 , 200 A.2d 44 (1964), the defendant argued that he was improperly tried on information.

1985Procunier, 434 U.S. at 562 , 98 S.Ct. at 859 . “[A]n official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments.” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 , 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2495 , 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975).

1985Procunier, 434 U.S. at 562 , 98 S.Ct. at 859 . “[A]n official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments.” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 , 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2495 , 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975).