knowing waiver in New Jersey

2024Although willful misconduct "is not immutably defined but takes its meaning from the context and purpose of its use," the Court explained "[p]rior decisions have suggested that willful misconduct is the equivalent of reckless disregard for safety [and] more than an absence of 'good faith.'" Alston, 168 N.J. at 185 (first alteration in original) (quoting Fielder, 141 N.J. at 124 ). "[I]n the context of a police officer's enforcement of the law, . . . willful misconduct is ordinarily limited to a knowing violation of a specific command by a superior, or a standing order, that would subject that

2024Although willful misconduct "is not immutably defined but takes its meaning from the context and purpose of its use," the Court explained "[p]rior decisions have suggested that willful misconduct is the equivalent of reckless disregard for safety [and] more than an absence of 'good faith.'" Alston, 168 N.J. at 185 (first alteration in original) (quoting Fielder, 141 N.J. at 124 ). "[I]n the context of a police officer's enforcement of the law, . . . willful misconduct is ordinarily limited to a knowing violation of a specific command by a superior, or a standing order, that would subject that

2005NOTES [1] State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 269 , 627 A. 2d 630 (1993) (when officers know that "an attorney has been retained on behalf of a person in custody on suspicion of crime and is present or readily available to assist that person, the communication of that information to the suspect is essential to making a knowing waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination[.]") [2] The following account of the circumstances surrounding defendant's request to speak with his parents is derived from the testimony presented at the motion to suppress, unless trial testimony is specifically referenced.

2005NOTES [1] State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 269 , 627 A. 2d 630 (1993) (when officers know that "an attorney has been retained on behalf of a person in custody on suspicion of crime and is present or readily available to assist that person, the communication of that information to the suspect is essential to making a knowing waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination[.]") [2] The following account of the circumstances surrounding defendant's request to speak with his parents is derived from the testimony presented at the motion to suppress, unless trial testimony is specifically referenced.

2004While the United States Supreme Court has held that the failure of the police to inform a defendant that his attorney was available to assist him is irrelevant to the assessment of a suspect’s waiver of his Miranda rights, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), defendant makes an argument based on additional protections provided under State law.

2004While the United States Supreme Court has held that the failure of the police to inform a defendant that his attorney was available to assist him is irrelevant to the assessment of a suspect’s waiver of his Miranda rights, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), defendant makes an argument based on additional protections provided under State law.

2021Ball, 381 N.J.

2019A-4286-16T3 14 Conversely, the AG Policy tells an officer that it may pursue a suspect if the officer "reasonably believes [the suspect] poses an immediate threat to the public." Ibid.

2017Cruz and Imperiale acted reasonably. "[T]here was neither a knowing violation of law nor a transgression of the competence standard demanded of law enforcement officers for qualified immunity to provide a shield from personal liability . . . ." Morillo, supra, 222 N.J. at 108 .

2017Cruz and Imperiale acted reasonably. "[T]here was neither a knowing violation of law nor a transgression of the competence standard demanded of law enforcement officers for qualified immunity to provide a shield from personal liability . . . ." Morillo, supra, 222 N.J. at 108 .

2016However, the Supreme Court, in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 , 99 A.3d 306 (2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2804 , 192 L.Ed.2d 847 (2015), while stressing that arbitration was favored by the law, explained that even under prior existing law relating to arbitration provisions in contracts, a knowing waiver of constitutional rights to a jury trial must be explicit in order to enforce the arbitration clause.

2016However, the Supreme Court, in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 , 99 A.3d 306 (2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2804 , 192 L.Ed.2d 847 (2015), while stressing that arbitration was favored by the law, explained that even under prior existing law relating to arbitration provisions in contracts, a knowing waiver of constitutional rights to a jury trial must be explicit in order to enforce the arbitration clause.

2012Defendant’s predicament was similar to that in State v. Finamore, 338 N.J.Super. 130, 132 , 768 A.2d 248 (App.Div.2001), where we held that a charge of contempt was defective because the restraining order “was unclear ... and the defendant’s actions that prompted the contempt charge could not, as a matter of law, be found to constitute a knowing violation of an existing domestic violence restraining order.” Domestic violence orders can and typically do prohibit contact and communications with the victim, or harassment and stalking of the victim, no matter where that conduct occurs.

2012Defendant’s predicament was similar to that in State v. Finamore, 338 N.J.Super. 130, 132 , 768 A.2d 248 (App.Div.2001), where we held that a charge of contempt was defective because the restraining order “was unclear ... and the defendant’s actions that prompted the contempt charge could not, as a matter of law, be found to constitute a knowing violation of an existing domestic violence restraining order.” Domestic violence orders can and typically do prohibit contact and communications with the victim, or harassment and stalking of the victim, no matter where that conduct occurs.

2010For purposes of the TCA, willful misconduct has been defined as the "commission *32 of a forbidden act with actual knowledge that the act is forbidden." Id. at 470, 669 A. 2d 845 (citing Marley v. Borough of Palmyra, 193 N.J.Super. 271, 294-95 , 473 A. 2d 554 (Law Div.1983)).

2010For purposes of the TCA, willful misconduct has been defined as the "commission *32 of a forbidden act with actual knowledge that the act is forbidden." Id. at 470, 669 A. 2d 845 (citing Marley v. Borough of Palmyra, 193 N.J.Super. 271, 294-95 , 473 A. 2d 554 (Law Div.1983)).

2010Kollar v. Lozier, 286 N.J.Super. 462, 472 , 669 A. 2d 845 (App.Div.) ("Without a knowing violation of an unequivocal order there can be no willful misconduct."), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 373 , 678 A. 2d 714 (1996).

2010Kollar v. Lozier, 286 N.J.Super. 462, 472 , 669 A. 2d 845 (App.Div.) ("Without a knowing violation of an unequivocal order there can be no willful misconduct."), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 373 , 678 A. 2d 714 (1996).

2010Kollar v. Lozier, 286 N.J.Super. 462, 472 , 669 A. 2d 845 (App.Div.) ("Without a knowing violation of an unequivocal order there can be no willful misconduct."), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 373 , 678 A. 2d 714 (1996).

2008Section 227(c)(5)(B) clearly permitted "an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater." However, the court rejected a claim for treble damages because it could not find "defendant's actions were `knowing' in the sense of [section (c)(5)'s requirement] which contemplates that defendant affirmatively knew at the time each telemarket call to plaintiff was made, that such call was a knowing violation of the statute." Id. at 269 , 668 A. 2d 1099 . 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (b)(3) has language identical to

2008Section 227(c)(5)(B) clearly permitted "an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater." However, the court rejected a claim for treble damages because it could not find "defendant's actions were `knowing' in the sense of [section (c)(5)'s requirement] which contemplates that defendant affirmatively knew at the time each telemarket call to plaintiff was made, that such call was a knowing violation of the statute." Id. at 269 , 668 A. 2d 1099 . 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (b)(3) has language identical to

2007Under Finklea, supra, Luna’s absence on August 12 could be deemed a knowing waiver of the right to be present at trial. 147 N.J. at 213 , 686 A.2d 322 (holding that nonappearance on adjourned date is deemed waiver once defendant has actual notice of original trial date).

2007Under Finklea, supra, Luna’s absence on August 12 could be deemed a knowing waiver of the right to be present at trial. 147 N.J. at 213 , 686 A.2d 322 (holding that nonappearance on adjourned date is deemed waiver once defendant has actual notice of original trial date).