6 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Flanigan v. Stategreen2 sentences2009But in Brockway v. State, 37 P.3d 427 (Alaska App.2001), this Court held that such cireum-stances do not constitute the kind of denial of counsel that deprives a court of jurisdiction: [A] defendant [is] completely denied the right to counsel ... [if] the defendant ask{s] for counsel and [is] denied one or ... [if] the defendant proceed[s] without counsel and the trial judge did not obtain a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.... [Als we recognized in Flanigan v. State, [ 3 P.3d 372, 376 (Alaska App.2000),] when a defendant is completely deprived of the right to counsel, it is equivalent t 2009But in Brockway v. State, 37 P.3d 427 (Alaska App.2001), this Court held that such circumstances do not constitute the kind of denial of counsel that deprives a court of jurisdiction: [A] defendant [is] completely denied the right to counsel ... [if] the defendant ask[s] for counsel and [is] denied one or... [if] the defendant proceed[s] without counsel and the trial judge did not obtain a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.... [A]s we recognized in Flanigan v. State, [ 3 P.3d 372, 376 (Alaska App.2000),] when a defendant is completely deprived of the right to counsel, it is equivalent to | 1 | 1 |
Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage School Districtgreen2 sentences1984We discussed what constitutes a knowing waiver in Tunley, 631 P.2d at 73 . 1984We discussed what constitutes a knowing waiver in Tunley, 631 P.2d at 73 . | 1 | 1 |
Dimmick v. Stategreen2 sentences1983Refusing to permit standing would represent “an open invitation to adopt such procedures as a standard method for the solution of particular crimes or for conducting generalized crime hunts.” Dimmick, 473 P.2d at 623 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 1983Refusing to permit standing would represent "an open invitation to adopt such procedures as a standard method for the solution of particular crimes or for conducting generalized crime hunts." Dimmick, 473 P.2d at 623 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
Love v. Stategreen1 sentence1980In that case, the defendant was twice individually asked if he wanted a jury trial and declined to accept one. [9] If the construction which we place on Criminal Rule 39 is constitutionally required, a possibility noted in n. 3 supra, then the Love standard may be inappropriate, and the applicable standard may be that the error must be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-33 (Alaska 1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1980This case is distinguishable from Williams v. State, 616 P.2d 881 (Alaska, 1980), in which the majority concluded that a knowing waiver had occurred. 1980The advice, however, must be unconditional, which was not the case here. [8] Compare Williams v. State, 616 P.2d 881 , (Alaska, 1980), in which a knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial was found. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brockway v. State
green
2 sentences2009But in Brockway v. State, 37 P.3d 427 (Alaska App.2001), this Court held that such cireum-stances do not constitute the kind of denial of counsel that deprives a court of jurisdiction: [A] defendant [is] completely denied the right to counsel ... [if] the defendant ask{s] for counsel and [is] denied one or ... [if] the defendant proceed[s] without counsel and the trial judge did not obtain a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.... [Als we recognized in Flanigan v. State, [ 3 P.3d 372, 376 (Alaska App.2000),] when a defendant is completely deprived of the right to counsel, it is equivalent t 2009But in Brockway v. State, 37 P.3d 427 (Alaska App.2001), this Court held that such circumstances do not constitute the kind of denial of counsel that deprives a court of jurisdiction: [A] defendant [is] completely denied the right to counsel ... [if] the defendant ask[s] for counsel and [is] denied one or... [if] the defendant proceed[s] without counsel and the trial judge did not obtain a knowing waiver of the right to counsel.... [A]s we recognized in Flanigan v. State, [ 3 P.3d 372, 376 (Alaska App.2000),] when a defendant is completely deprived of the right to counsel, it is equivalent to | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Bostic v. State
green
1 sentence2007The normal remedy is to grant a continuance (%.e., delay the trial) to allow the defendant and their attorney to re-evaluate the defense case in light of the new information. 3 But if the trial has already started, and if the defendant's preparation or presentation of the case has been prejudiced by the lack of this information, the trial court should ordinarily grant a defendant's request for a mistrial. 4 A few Alaska cases mention a third potential option: suppressing the non-disclosed evidence if the defendant has suffered substantial prejudice, or if the State's failure to disclose the in | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gregory v. State
green
1 sentence1985In Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1976), the supreme court held that, under the facts of that case, it was error to refuse to allow a defendant who claimed he did not make a knowing waiver of counsel to withdraw his plea. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1980In that case, the defendant was twice individually asked if he wanted a jury trial and declined to accept one. [9] If the construction which we place on Criminal Rule 39 is constitutionally required, a possibility noted in n. 3 supra, then the Love standard may be inappropriate, and the applicable standard may be that the error must be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-33 (Alaska 1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). 1980In that case, the defendant was twice individually asked if he wanted a jury trial and declined to accept one. [9] If the construction which we place on Criminal Rule 39 is constitutionally required, a possibility noted in n. 3 supra, then the Love standard may be inappropriate, and the applicable standard may be that the error must be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-33 (Alaska 1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Berger v. New York
green
1 sentence1980In that case, the defendant was twice individually asked if he wanted a jury trial and declined to accept one. [9] If the construction which we place on Criminal Rule 39 is constitutionally required, a possibility noted in n. 3 supra, then the Love standard may be inappropriate, and the applicable standard may be that the error must be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-33 (Alaska 1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Seymour v. United States
green
1 sentence1980In that case, the defendant was twice individually asked if he wanted a jury trial and declined to accept one. [9] If the construction which we place on Criminal Rule 39 is constitutionally required, a possibility noted in n. 3 supra, then the Love standard may be inappropriate, and the applicable standard may be that the error must be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-33 (Alaska 1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.