knowing waiver in Indiana

2013This court has often stated that “[a]n employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule.” Id. at 1205 (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ind. Ct. App 1995)); see also Doughty v. Review Bd. of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Watterson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Serv., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105

2012This court has often stated that “[a]n employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule.” Id. at 1205 (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)); see also Doughty v. Review Bd. of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct.App.2003) (citing Watterson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Serv., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (In

2013Stanrail Corp. v. Review Bd. of Dept. of Workforce Dev., 735 N.E.2d 1197, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for “just cause” for the knowing violation of a rule.”).

2013This court has often stated that “[a]n employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule.” Id. at 1205 (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ind. Ct. App 1995)); see also Doughty v. Review Bd. of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Watterson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Serv., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105

2002In the context of the constitutional right to trial by jury, this court has explained that " '[a] voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand[.]' " Reynolds v. State, 703 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citation omitted). 13 .

2001In the context of waiver of the right to trial by jury, we have stated that " 'a) voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand[.]' "' Reynolds, 703 N.E.2d at 704 (citation omitted).

2013This court has often stated that “[a]n employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule.” Id. at 1205 (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ind. Ct. App 1995)); see also Doughty v. Review Bd. of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Watterson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Serv., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105

2012This court has often stated that “[a]n employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule.” Id. at 1205 (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)); see also Doughty v. Review Bd. of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct.App.2003) (citing Watterson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Serv., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (In

2014Gonzalez v. State, 757 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. “ ‘A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand....’” Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 842-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Eldridge v. State, 627 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied).

2014“A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an 3 informed will; an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand . . . .” Duncan, 975 N.E.2d at 842-43 (citation omitted).

2013This court has often stated that “[a]n employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule.” Id. at 1205 (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ind. Ct. App 1995)); see also Doughty v. Review Bd. of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Watterson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Serv., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105

2012This court has often stated that “[a]n employer’s asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule.” Id. at 1205 (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)); see also Doughty v. Review Bd. of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct.App.2003) (citing Watterson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Serv., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (In

2012We have already determined that Carter has not shown that demand was futile under Rales. 8 Delaware Code title 8, section 102(b)(7) provides, in relevant part, that a certificate of incorporation may include [a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in

2012Assuming for the sake of argument that the exculpatory provision applies to the claims in the Amended Complaint, we consider whether the Amended Complaint alleges particularized facts to show that demand would have been futile under the higher and slightly different standard that arises under CNO’s exculpatory clause. 7 CNO’s certifícate of incorporation contains an exculpatory provision provided for in Delaware Code title 8, section 102(b)(7). 8 In such cases, director defendants are “exculpate[d] from personal liability for violations of fiduciary duty, except for, among other things, breach

2014Gonzalez v. State, 757 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. “ ‘A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand....’” Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 842-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Eldridge v. State, 627 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied).

2014Gonzalez v. State, 757 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “‘A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand . . . .’” Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 842-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Eldridge v. State, 627 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied).

2015See City of Carmel, 970 N.E.2d at 245 (requiring a rule to be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence “to enable this court to fairly and reasonably review the determination that an employee was discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a rule”).

2014Id.

2025That is, based on the City’s allegations of unlawful conduct by Defendants, “we [could not] say that [Defendants] are engaged in the ‘lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale to the public of firearms or ammunition products’ … or that the harm ‘is solely caused by Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CT-2381 | December 29, 2025 Page 7 of 33 others.’” Id. at 433 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (a)(5) (emphasis added by Gary 2 court) and (6)).

2025Id. at 432-33 (observing that the City’s complaint alleged illegal and unlawful conduct/sales by Defendants and the knowing violation of Indiana statutes – both the public nuisance statute and regulatory statutes – applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms).

2020Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Poore v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind. 1997).

2020Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Poore v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind. 1997).

2020“A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand[.]” Johnson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 491, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). [11] A knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial cannot be inferred from a record which does not evidence such personal choice.

2018See id. at 1273 (finding no difference between a translated “advisement from the mouth of the court-appointed interpreter” and the same advisement from the trial court). [18] To prove that Zuniga made a knowing waiver of his Boykin rights, the State introduced: . . . (1) the rights advisement videotape played before the initial hearing; (2) a DVD copy of the rights advisement videotape, produced for the convenience of the Court in viewing the rights advisement; (3) testimony of Jon Hallett, who produced the DVD copy, that it contained a true and accurate copy of the contents of the videotape;

2018It is in this context of a knowing waiver that this court has held that " '[a] valid waiver cannot be made pursuant to [Rule] 22 in the absence of an advisement by the trial court of the consequences of a failure to demand a trial by jury not later than ten days prior to the trial date.' " Hanna-Womack v. State , 623 N.E.2d 439 , 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ( quoting Vukadinovich v. State , 529 N.E.2d 837 , 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) ); see also Fiandt , 996 N.E.2d 421 ; Levels v. State , 972 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). [9] In Duncan , this court squarely addressed the issue presented herein.

2018It is in this context of a knowing waiver that this court has held that " '[a] valid waiver cannot be made pursuant to [Rule] 22 in the absence of an advisement by the trial court of the consequences of a failure to demand a trial by jury not later than ten days prior to the trial date.' " Hanna-Womack v. State , 623 N.E.2d 439 , 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ( quoting Vukadinovich v. State , 529 N.E.2d 837 , 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) ); see also Fiandt , 996 N.E.2d 421 ; Levels v. State , 972 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). [9] In Duncan , this court squarely addressed the issue presented herein.

2018See Levels , 972 N.E.2d 972 ; Vukadinovich , 529 N.E.2d 837 .

2015See Coleman v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 905 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).

2014See State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154, 167 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (concluding that, despite lack of knowing waiver of Miranda rights during first interview during which defendant made incriminating statements, statements made by the defendant during second interview conducted the following day in which a knowing waiver was obtained was admissible because such a situation bore little resemblance to the situation in Seibert where the police purposefully withheld Miranda warnings until confession was obtained).

2014Gonzalez v. State, 757 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. “ ‘A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand....’” Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 842-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Eldridge v. State, 627 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied).

2014Gonzalez v. State, 757 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “‘A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; [and] an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand . . . .’” Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 842-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Eldridge v. State, 627 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied).

2003"In order to establish a prima facie case for violation of an employer rule under [Indiana Code Section] 22-4-15-1(d)(2), the employer must demonstrate that the employee knowingly violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule." McClain v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Ind.1998). "[AJn employer's asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence in order for us to fairly and reasonably evaluate a determination that an employee was justly discharged for a knowing violation of that rule.

2003"In order to establish a prima facie case for violation of an employer rule under [Indiana Code Section] XX-X-XX-X(d)(2), the employer must demonstrate that the employee knowingly violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule." McClain v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Ind.1998). "[A]n employer's asserted work rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into evidence in order for us to fairly and reasonably evaluate a determination that an employee was justly discharged for a knowing violation of that rule.

2002See Gilbert v. State, 182 Ind.App. 286, 291 , 395 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1979) ("Here, the trial court followed the appropriate procedure.

2002See Gilbert v. State, 182 Ind.App. 286, 291 , 395 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1979) ("Here, the trial court followed the appropriate procedure.

2000Union Tank Car, Fleet Operations v. Commissioner of Labor, 671 N.E.2d 885, 890 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans denied.

1997See id.

1996See also Russell v. Review Bd., 586 N.E.2d 942, 948 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) ("had [employee] been discharged, while her two companions ... were retained by [the company), a different case would be presented, seriously bringing [the company's] uniform enforcement of the rule into question.") Discharge for just cause includes the knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer.