29 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Princegreen2 sentences2019See State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 (1984) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by the defendant.") (emphasis added); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 120, ¶ 9 (App. 2007) ("[W]e must examine the record to determine whether Baker effectively waived his constitutional right.") (emphasis added). 2009That court held that "[b]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by the defendant." Id. at 258 , 689 P.2d at 517 (emphasis added). | 3 | 4 |
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Superior Court (Ochoa), 183 Ariz. 139, 144-45 (App. 1995). ¶11 At sentencing, Johnson was given an opportunity to speak, and the trial court stated on the record the evidence, materials, and factors it considered in imposing sentence. 2005Romley, 183 Ariz. at 143 , 901 P.2d at 1173 (citations omitted). . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gainesgreen2 sentences1980In reviewing the transcript we are satisfied that there is a sufficient showing to support the conclusion of the trial judge that there was a knowing waiver.” State v. *25 Gaines, 113 Ariz. 206, 207 , 549 P.2d 574, 575 (1976). 1980In reviewing the transcript we are satisfied that there is a sufficient showing to support the conclusion of the trial judge that there was a knowing waiver.” State v. *25 Gaines, 113 Ariz. 206, 207 , 549 P.2d 574, 575 (1976). | 1 | 3 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2005See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) ("for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'") (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ); State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 338, ¶ 16 , 4 P.3d 388, 393 (App.1999) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by defendant.") (quoting State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 , 689 P.2d 515, 517 (1984)). 2005See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) ("for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'") (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ); State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 338, ¶ 16 , 4 P.3d 388, 393 (App.1999) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by defendant.") (quoting State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 , 689 P.2d 515, 517 (1984)). | 1 | 2 |
Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corporationgreen1 sentence2025See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 761 (holding that claims asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act are analogous to claims asserted under Title VII and require knowing waiver of judicial remedies); Kummetz, 152 F.3d at 1155 (recognizing that an employee does not knowingly waive his right to a judicial determination of discrimination claims when the employee handbook acknowledgment page does not explicitly reference an arbitration provision). | 1 | 1 |
William E. Kummetz, Husband Arlene A. Kummetz, Wife v. Tech Mold, Inc.green1 sentence2025See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 761 (holding that claims asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act are analogous to claims asserted under Title VII and require knowing waiver of judicial remedies); Kummetz, 152 F.3d at 1155 (recognizing that an employee does not knowingly waive his right to a judicial determination of discrimination claims when the employee handbook acknowledgment page does not explicitly reference an arbitration provision). | 1 | 1 |
Crowder v. Vandendealegreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022 , 1030–31 (Idaho 1987) (permitting disclaimer of the implied warranty outside boilerplate clauses if builder shows a knowing waiver); Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978) (to same effect). 15 ZAMBRANO V. | 1 | 1 |
Tusch Enterprises v. Coffingreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022 , 1030–31 (Idaho 1987) (permitting disclaimer of the implied warranty outside boilerplate clauses if builder shows a knowing waiver); Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978) (to same effect). 15 ZAMBRANO V. | 1 | 1 |
Meyer v. Grantgreen1 sentence2022See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425 (explaining that a Colorado statute prohibiting circulator compensation “trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is ‘at its zenith’”). ¶34 The State’s suggestion that we should impute a knowing requirement to allow the statute to withstand a vagueness challenge is untenable. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bakergreen1 sentence2019See State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 (1984) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by the defendant.") (emphasis added); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 120, ¶ 9 (App. 2007) ("[W]e must examine the record to determine whether Baker effectively waived his constitutional right.") (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Andre M.green2 sentences2017However, a knowing waiver of Rule 410 only requires a defendant to have “a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” See In re Andre M., 207 Ariz. 482 , 484 ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 552, 554 (2004) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). 2017However, a knowing waiver of Rule 410 only requires a defendant to have “a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” See In re Andre M., 207 Ariz. 482 , 484 ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 552, 554 (2004) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Derrick Myran Frankson, (Two Cases)green1 sentence2011See Shatzer, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219. ¶ 11 Relying on United States v. Frank-son, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir.1973); and United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 374-75, 376-77 (2d Cir.1970), the state maintains a general statement about the right to counsel is sufficient to satisfy Miranda , at least when no other statement is given suggesting a temporal limitation on the right. 1 But see United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (general statement insuf | 1 | 1 |
State v. Offinggreen2 sentences2011See State v. Offing, 113 Ariz. 287, 289 , 551 P.2d 556, 558 (1976) (ordering new trial after defendant had submitted case to be tided by the court based on preliminary hearing transcript because record did not show knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to jury trial and right to call witnesses); State v. Cochran, 109 Ariz. 327, 328 , 509 P.2d 220, 221 (1973) (new trial ordered after counsel stipulated to waive jury trial in defendant’s absence). 2011See State v. Offing, 113 Ariz. 287, 289 , 551 P.2d 556, 558 (1976) (ordering new trial after defendant had submitted case to be tided by the court based on preliminary hearing transcript because record did not show knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to jury trial and right to call witnesses); State v. Cochran, 109 Ariz. 327, 328 , 509 P.2d 220, 221 (1973) (new trial ordered after counsel stipulated to waive jury trial in defendant’s absence). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Anthony Anthongreen1 sentence2011See Shatzer, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219. ¶ 11 Relying on United States v. Frank-son, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir.1973); and United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 374-75, 376-77 (2d Cir.1970), the state maintains a general statement about the right to counsel is sufficient to satisfy Miranda , at least when no other statement is given suggesting a temporal limitation on the right. 1 But see United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (general statement insuf | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Notigreen1 sentence2011See Shatzer, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219. ¶ 11 Relying on United States v. Frank-son, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir.1973); and United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 374-75, 376-77 (2d Cir.1970), the state maintains a general statement about the right to counsel is sufficient to satisfy Miranda , at least when no other statement is given suggesting a temporal limitation on the right. 1 But see United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (general statement insuf | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Anthony Caldwellgreen1 sentence2011See Shatzer, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219. ¶ 11 Relying on United States v. Frank-son, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir.1973); and United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 374-75, 376-77 (2d Cir.1970), the state maintains a general statement about the right to counsel is sufficient to satisfy Miranda , at least when no other statement is given suggesting a temporal limitation on the right. 1 But see United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (general statement insuf | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cochrangreen2 sentences2011See State v. Offing, 113 Ariz. 287, 289 , 551 P.2d 556, 558 (1976) (ordering new trial after defendant had submitted case to be tided by the court based on preliminary hearing transcript because record did not show knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to jury trial and right to call witnesses); State v. Cochran, 109 Ariz. 327, 328 , 509 P.2d 220, 221 (1973) (new trial ordered after counsel stipulated to waive jury trial in defendant’s absence). 2011See State v. Offing, 113 Ariz. 287, 289 , 551 P.2d 556, 558 (1976) (ordering new trial after defendant had submitted case to be tided by the court based on preliminary hearing transcript because record did not show knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to jury trial and right to call witnesses); State v. Cochran, 109 Ariz. 327, 328 , 509 P.2d 220, 221 (1973) (new trial ordered after counsel stipulated to waive jury trial in defendant’s absence). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Anthony Lamiagreen1 sentence2011See Shatzer, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219. ¶ 11 Relying on United States v. Frank-son, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir.1973); and United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 374-75, 376-77 (2d Cir.1970), the state maintains a general statement about the right to counsel is sufficient to satisfy Miranda , at least when no other statement is given suggesting a temporal limitation on the right. 1 But see United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (general statement insuf | 1 | 1 |
Guadalupe O. Sanchez v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2011See Shatzer, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219. ¶ 11 Relying on United States v. Frank-son, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir.1973); and United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 374-75, 376-77 (2d Cir.1970), the state maintains a general statement about the right to counsel is sufficient to satisfy Miranda , at least when no other statement is given suggesting a temporal limitation on the right. 1 But see United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (general statement insuf | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Raymond Adamsgreen1 sentence2011See Shatzer, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219. ¶ 11 Relying on United States v. Frank-son, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir.1973); and United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 374-75, 376-77 (2d Cir.1970), the state maintains a general statement about the right to counsel is sufficient to satisfy Miranda , at least when no other statement is given suggesting a temporal limitation on the right. 1 But see United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (general statement insuf | 1 | 1 |
Brookhart v. Janisgreen2 sentences2005See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) ("for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'") (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ); State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 338, ¶ 16 , 4 P.3d 388, 393 (App.1999) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by defendant.") (quoting State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 , 689 P.2d 515, 517 (1984)). 2005See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) ("for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'") (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ); State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 338, ¶ 16 , 4 P.3d 388, 393 (App.1999) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by defendant.") (quoting State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 , 689 P.2d 515, 517 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2005See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) ("for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'") (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ); State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 338, ¶ 16 , 4 P.3d 388, 393 (App.1999) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by defendant.") (quoting State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 , 689 P.2d 515, 517 (1984)). 2005See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) ("for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'") (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 ); State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, 338, ¶ 16 , 4 P.3d 388, 393 (App.1999) ("[B]efore there can be a waiver, the record must show a knowing waiver by defendant.") (quoting State v. Prince, 142 Ariz. 256, 258 , 689 P.2d 515, 517 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mahonegreen | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Freimarkgreen1 sentence2004See also State v. Mahone, 297 N.J.Super. 524, 529 , 688 A.2d 658, 661 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.), aff'd, 152 N.J. 44 , 702 A.2d 1286 (1997) (adequate notice to the defendant is an essential element of a knowing waiver of the right to attend trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mahonegreen1 sentence2004See also State v. Mahone, 297 N.J.Super. 524, 529 , 688 A.2d 658, 661 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.), aff'd, 152 N.J. 44 , 702 A.2d 1286 (1997) (adequate notice to the defendant is an essential element of a knowing waiver of the right to attend trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thuesgreen2 sentences2004See State v. Thues, 203 Ariz. 339 , 54 P.3d 368 (App.2002). 2004See State v. Thues, 203 Ariz. 339 , 54 P.3d 368 (App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Porrasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Butrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wilcynskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brownred2 sentences2004Resendis-Felix counters that he did not waive the claim because he could not have made a knowing waiver of his rights under Blakely before Blakely was decided; that, at the time of his sentencing, our prior decision in State v. Brown, 205 Ariz. 325 , 70 P.3d 454 (App.2003), later vacated by our supreme court, ___ Ariz. ___, 99 P.3d 15 (2004), had ruled Apprendi inapplicable to aggravating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13-702(C), further excusing his failure to raise the claim below; and that he had moved seasonably to supplement his petition to raise the issue within two weeks after the Supreme 2004Resendis-Felix counters that he did not waive the claim because he could not have made a knowing waiver of his rights under Blakely before Blakely was decided; that, at the time of his sentencing, our prior decision in State v. Brown, 205 Ariz. 325 , 70 P.3d 454 (App.2003), later vacated by our supreme court, ___ Ariz. ___, 99 P.3d 15 (2004), had ruled Apprendi inapplicable to aggravating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13-702(C), further excusing his failure to raise the claim below; and that he had moved seasonably to supplement his petition to raise the issue within two weeks after the Supreme | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Southwest Cooperative Wholesale v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2006We also rejected her argument that, unless a knowing waiver of the right to sue a nonposting employer is required, § 23-906 violates the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, article 18, § 6. ¶ 28 Division One reached a similar conclusion in Southwest Cooperative Wholesale v. Superior Court, 13 Ariz.App. 453 , 477 P.2d 572 (1970). 2006We also rejected her argument that, unless a knowing waiver of the right to sue a nonposting employer is required, § 23-906 violates the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, article 18, § 6. ¶ 28 Division One reached a similar conclusion in Southwest Cooperative Wholesale v. Superior Court, 13 Ariz.App. 453 , 477 P.2d 572 (1970). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
In the Matter of Rachel R. Alexander
green
1 sentence2025“To warrant suspension, the evidence must demonstrate that the lawyer knowingly violated ER 3.1.” Id. at 5 ¶ 13. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Moran v. Burbine
green
2 sentences2017However, a knowing waiver of Rule 410 only requires a defendant to have “a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” See In re Andre M., 207 Ariz. 482 , 484 ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 552, 554 (2004) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). 2017However, a knowing waiver of Rule 410 only requires a defendant to have “a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” See In re Andre M., 207 Ariz. 482 , 484 ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 552, 554 (2004) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lanett v. State
green
2 sentences2007It is also incumbent upon the judge to fully determine the ... patient’s capabilities to make a knowing waiver.” Id. 2007And, “the court should not summarily deny it simply because of the nature of the proceedings.” Id. ¶ 29 Recognizing that the patient had not been found to be mentally ill at the start of the proceeding, the court in that case examined the record and stated that “the court could have found that [the patient] was not capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving her right of court-appointed counsel.” Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Barker v. Wingo green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Eliason green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| State v. Banks green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Boykin v. Alabama green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State v. Davis neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State v. Mangrum green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.