knowing waiver in New York

2024In view of the defendant's knowing waiver of his right to prosecution by information, the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument must be assessed under the standard required of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v Dumay , 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]).

2024In view of the defendant's knowing waiver of his right to prosecution by information, the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument must be assessed under the standard required of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v Dumay , 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]).

2015Defendant initially asserts that County Court erred in declin *730 ing to suppress his oral statements to police, as the People failed to meet their burden of “proving the voluntariness of defendant’s statements beyond a reasonable doubt, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant’s knowing waiver of his Miranda rights” (People v Mattis, 108 AD3d 872, 874 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 957 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Rankin, 127 AD3d 1335, 1339 [2015]).

2015The People bore the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt “that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant’s knowing waiver of his Miranda rights” (People v Mattis, 108 AD3d 872, 874 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 957 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2013“A knowing violation of an employer’s established policy or reasonable request may constitute disqualifying misconduct, particularly where, as here, the claimant has received prior warnings about similar behavior” (Matter of Aguasvivas [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 787 , 787 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Washington [Commissioner of Labor], 84 AD3d 1603, 1604 [2011]).

2013“A knowing violation of an employer’s established policy or reasonable request may constitute disqualifying misconduct, particularly where, as here, the claimant has received prior warnings about similar behavior” (Matter of Aguasvivas [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 787 , 787 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Washington [Commissioner of Labor], 84 AD3d 1603, 1604 [2011]).

2025"Evidence of a written or oral confession, admission, or other statement made by a defendant with respect to his [or her] participation or lack of participation in the offense charged, may not be received in evidence against him [or her] in a criminal proceeding if such statement was involuntarily made" (CPL 60.45 [1]). "[O]n a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements to police were voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his

2024We disagree. "[O]n a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements to police were voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v High , 200 AD3d 1209, 1210 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 37 NY3d 1161 [2022]).

2013“A knowing violation of an employer’s established policy or reasonable request may constitute disqualifying misconduct, particularly where, as here, the claimant has received prior warnings about similar behavior” (Matter of Aguasvivas [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 787 , 787 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Cheek [Commissioner of Labor], 89 AD3d 1313, 1313-1314 [2011]).

2013“A knowing violation of an employer’s established policy or reasonable request may constitute disqualifying misconduct, particularly where, as here, the claimant has received prior warnings about similar behavior” (Matter of Aguasvivas [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 787 , 787 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Cheek [Commissioner of Labor], 89 AD3d 1313, 1313-1314 [2011]).

2021"On a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement to police was voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v Garrand , 189 AD3d 1763, 1767 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied ___ NY3d ___ [Apr. 11, 2021]; see People v Newell , 148 AD3d 1216, 1218-1219 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1035 [2017]).

2021As to the statements defendant made at the time of his arrest and at the police station thereafter, "[o]n a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement[s] to police [were] voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v Garrand , 189 AD3d 1763, 1767 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 1120 [2021]; see CPL 60.45; People v Muller , 155 AD3d 1091, 1092 [20

2017“The People bore the burden of proving the voluntariness of defendant’s statements beyond a reasonable doubt, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant’s knowing waiver of his Miranda rights” (People v Culver, 69 AD3d 976, 976 [2010] [citation omitted]; see People v Rizvi, 126 AD3d 1172, 1173 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1076 [2015]).

2013“The People bore the burden of proving the voluntariness of defendant’s statements beyond a reasonable doubt, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant’s knowing waiver of his Miranda rights” (People v Culver, 69 AD3d 976, 976 [2010] [citation omitted]).

2012Corp., 940 A2d 163, 168 [2008], cert denied 556 US 1104 [2009]; Smith & Wesson Corp. v City of Gary, 875 NE2d 422, 429-430 [Ind Ct App 2007]).

2012Corp., 940 A2d 163, 168 [2008], cert denied 556 US 1104 [2009]; Smith & Wesson Corp. v City of Gary, 875 NE2d 422, 429-430 [Ind Ct App 2007]).

2012Corp., 940 A2d 163, 168 [2008], cert denied 556 US 1104 [2009]; Smith & Wesson Corp. v City of Gary, 875 NE2d 422, 429-430 [Ind Ct App 2007]).

2012Corp., 940 A2d 163, 168 [2008], cert denied 556 US 1104 [2009]; Smith & Wesson Corp. v City of Gary, 875 NE2d 422, 429-430 [Ind Ct App 2007]).

2023"On a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement to police was voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v Dawson , 195 AD3d 1157, 1158 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], affd 38 NY3d 1055 [2022]; see People v Logan , 198 AD3d 1181, 1184 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1162 [2022]).

2021Defendant first argues that County Court erred in declining to suppress the statements he made to police. [FN1] When suppression is sought, "the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement to police was voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v Dawson , 195 AD3d 1157, 1158 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Davis , 196 AD3d 918, 919-920 [2021]).

2022On a motion to suppress, "the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement[s] to police [were] voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v Teixeira-Ingram , 199 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2022Defendant next challenges the denial of his suppression motion. "[O]n a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements to police were voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights and were not the product of unduly coercive or deceptive police conduct" ( People v High , 200 AD3d 1209, 1210 [2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets [*2]and citations omitted], lv denied 37 NY3d 1161 [2022]; see People v Teixeira-I

2021"The People bore the burden of proving the voluntariness of defendant's statements beyond a reasonable doubt, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant's knowing waiver of his Miranda rights" ( People v Byrd , 152 AD3d 984, 985 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Fisher , 126 AD3d 1048, 1049 [2015]).

2017“The People bore the burden of proving the voluntariness of defendant’s statements beyond a reasonable doubt, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant’s knowing waiver of his Miranda rights” (People v Byrd, 152 AD3d 984, 985 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2021As to the statements defendant made at the time of his arrest and at the police station thereafter, "[o]n a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement[s] to police [were] voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v Garrand , 189 AD3d 1763, 1767 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 1120 [2021]; see CPL 60.45; People v Muller , 155 AD3d 1091, 1092 [20

2017It was the People’s burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant’s statement to police was voluntarily entered into and “that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant’s knowing waiver of his Miranda rights” (People v Muller, 155 AD3d 1091, 1092 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2021Determining whether a statement is voluntary is a factual issue governed by the totality of the circumstances and the credibility assessments of the suppression court in making that determination are entitled to deference" ( People v Davis , 196 AD3d 918, 919 [2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Rudolph , 170 AD3d 1258 , 1259 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 937 [2019]).

2021Defendant first argues that County Court erred in declining to suppress the statements he made to police. [FN1] When suppression is sought, "the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement to police was voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" ( People v Dawson , 195 AD3d 1157, 1158 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Davis , 196 AD3d 918, 919-920 [2021]).

2021"The People bore the burden of proving the voluntariness of defendant's statements beyond a reasonable doubt, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and defendant's knowing waiver of his Miranda rights" ( People v Byrd , 152 AD3d 984, 985 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Fisher , 126 AD3d 1048, 1049 [2015]).

2021"Determining whether a statement is voluntary is a factual issue governed by the totality of the circumstances and the credibility assessments of the suppression court in making that determination are entitled to deference" ( People v Fisher , 126 AD3d at 1049 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]).

2013Although a knowing violation of an employer’s established policies that has a detrimental effect on the employer’s interests can constitute disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Spierto [Commissioner of Labor], 78 AD3d 1365, 1365 [2010]; Matter of Clum [All-Lifts, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 51 AD3d at 1172 ; see also Matter of Briskie [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 786 , 786-787 [2012]), we find that claimant’s misconduct in this case did not rise to a disqualifying level.

2013Although a knowing violation of an employer’s established policies that has a detrimental effect on the employer’s interests can constitute disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Spierto [Commissioner of Labor], 78 AD3d 1365, 1365 [2010]; Matter of Clum [All-Lifts, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 51 AD3d at 1172 ; see also Matter of Briskie [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 786 , 786-787 [2012]), we find that claimant’s misconduct in this case did not rise to a disqualifying level.

2013Although a knowing violation of an employer’s established policies that has a detrimental effect on the employer’s interests can constitute disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Spierto [Commissioner of Labor], 78 AD3d 1365, 1365 [2010]; Matter of Clum [All-Lifts, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 51 AD3d at 1172 ; see also Matter of Briskie [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 786 , 786-787 [2012]), we find that claimant’s misconduct in this case did not rise to a disqualifying level.

2013Although a knowing violation of an employer’s established policies that has a detrimental effect on the employer’s interests can constitute disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Spierto [Commissioner of Labor], 78 AD3d 1365, 1365 [2010]; Matter of Clum [All-Lifts, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 51 AD3d at 1172 ; see also Matter of Briskie [Commissioner of Labor], 98 AD3d 786 , 786-787 [2012]), we find that claimant’s misconduct in this case did not rise to a disqualifying level.

2013“Determining whether a statement is voluntary is a factual issue governed by the totality of the circumstances [and] [t]he credibility assessments of the suppression court in making that determination are entitled to deference” (Pe ople v Davis, 18 AD3d 1016, 1017 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 805 [2005] [citations omitted]; see People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38-39 [1977]).

2013“Determining whether a statement is voluntary is a factual issue governed by the totality of the circumstances [and] [t]he credibility assessments of the suppression court in making that determination are entitled to deference” (Pe ople v Davis, 18 AD3d 1016, 1017 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 805 [2005] [citations omitted]; see People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38-39 [1977]).

2013Initially, we note that, although the policy in question was not in writing, claimant was clearly aware of the policy as he signed a warning letter affirming his understanding of it in July 2009 (see Matter of Kapelewski [Holiday Inn—Commissioner of Labor], 275 AD2d 855, 855 [2000]).

2013Initially, we note that, although the policy in question was not in writing, claimant was clearly aware of the policy as he signed a warning letter affirming his understanding of it in July 2009 (see Matter of Kapelewski [Holiday Inn—Commissioner of Labor], 275 AD2d 855, 855 [2000]).

2013Our dissenting colleague also notes that if this were a matter involving a defendant’s uncounseled waiver of her privilege against self-incrimination, the evidence obtained from a defendant pursuant to a knowing waiver of that constitutional right, prior to counsel’s entry in the matter, would not be subject to suppression (see People v Garofolo, 46 NY2d at 601-602).

2013Our dissenting colleague also notes that if this were a matter involving a defendant’s uncounseled waiver of her privilege against self-incrimination, the evidence obtained from a defendant pursuant to a knowing waiver of that constitutional right, prior to counsel’s entry in the matter, would not be subject to suppression (see People v Garofolo, 46 NY2d at 601-602).

2013Furthermore, both the United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals have acknowledged, in different factual contexts, that the conduct of an interrogation can render the Miranda warnings insufficient to secure a suspect’s rights, and vitiate a knowing waiver of those rights (see Missouri v Seibert, 542 US at 611 ; People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130 ; People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364, 367 [1986]; People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]).

2013Furthermore, both the United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals have acknowledged, in different factual contexts, that the conduct of an interrogation can render the Miranda warnings insufficient to secure a suspect’s rights, and vitiate a knowing waiver of those rights (see Missouri v Seibert, 542 US at 611 ; People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130 ; People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364, 367 [1986]; People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]).

2016Finally, the defendant had the benefit of standby counsel throughout the proceedings and proceeded at his own peril, fully aware of the consequences of his chosen course (see People v Cusamano, 22 AD3d 427, 428 [2005]; People v Delaron, 184 AD2d 653, 654 [1992]).

2011In addition, the record establishes that “[defendant had the benefit of standby counsel throughout the proceedings and proceeded at his own peril, fully aware of the consequences of his chosen course” (People v Cusamano, 22 AD3d 427 , 428 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 775 [2006]).

2009An employee’s knowing violation of an employer’s reasonable rules and policies has been held to constitute disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Graham [Commissioner of Labor], 305 AD2d 922, 922 [2003]), particularly where the employee has received repeated warnings (see Matter of Baker [Eastern Connection—Commissioner of Labor], 10 AD3d 763, 764 [2004]; Matter of Limarzi [Sweeney], 244 AD2d 750, 751 [1997]).

2004It is well settled that a knowing violation of an employer’s established policies can constitute disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Graham [Commissioner of Labor], 305 AD2d 922 [2003]).