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10 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dettmangreen2 sentences2026Although Nunez does not mention Duncan, its rationale reflects the need for a specific rather than general jury trial waiver of a fact that will enhance a defendant's sentence. 319 Kan. at 354 (quoting with favor State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 652 [Minn. 2006] ["'[A] defendant's admission of a fact supporting an upward sentencing departure [must] be accompanied by a knowing waiver of his right to a jury finding on that fact before the admission may be used to enhance his sentence.'"]); see State v. Contreras, 66 Kan. 2024And: "The Supreme Court's equation of sentencing factors with elements of an offense compels the conclusion that, just as a defendant's admission to an element of an offense cannot be used in lieu of a jury finding unless the defendant knowingly waives his right to a jury trial on that element, so too must a defendant's admission of a fact supporting an upward sentencing departure be accompanied by a knowing waiver of his right to a jury finding on that fact before the admission may be used to enhance his sentence." State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 652 (Minn. 2006). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Manuel Guerrero-Jassogreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Guerrero-Jasso, 752 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2014) ("We treat defendant admissions as analogous to jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt for Apprendi purposes only when those admissions are made with knowledge of the penal consequences that attend those admissions."); State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 652 (Minn. 2006) ("[A] defendant's admission of a fact supporting an upward sentencing departure [must] be accompanied by a knowing waiver of his right to a jury finding on that fact before the admission may be used to enhance his sentence."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duncan
green
1 sentence2026App. 2d 182 , 189, 579 P.3d 1278 (2025) ("The holding in Nunez teaches us this: Before a district court sentences a defendant to lifetime postrelease supervision for the conviction of a sexually violent crime, it should obtain a jury finding that the defendant was at least 18 years old when they committed the crime or, in the case of a plea, it should obtain a knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver that includes informing the defendant they are waiving the right to a jury finding on their age."). [1] 3 [1] In Duncan, the district court considered a fact that would support an upward durational | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Gillon
green
1 sentence2022The court found that "'knowingly'" only modified the possession element, while the barrel-length requirement only modified "'shotgun.'" Thus, the phrases were unconnected, and the knowing requirement did not apply to the barrel length. 25 Kan. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Molnar
green
1 sentence2020The court also pointed out that convicted sex offenders typically would be informed of their statutory duty to register and, therefore, would have 52 actual notice. 222 Ill. 2d at 513 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Antwine
green
1 sentence1996Antwine, 4 Kan. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Nguyen
green
2 sentences1993In State v. Nguyen, 251 Kan. at 75 , the Supreme Court stated the applicable standard of review, as quoted from State v. Zuniga: “When a trial court conducts a full . . . hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely, voluntarily and knowingly given, and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, the appellate court should accept that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence.” In this case, the trial court held that the defendant’s statements were admissible because he had been fully informed of his 1993In State v. Nguyen, 251 Kan. at 75 , the Supreme Court stated the applicable standard of review, as quoted from State v. Zuniga: “When a trial court conducts a full . . . hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely, voluntarily and knowingly given, and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, the appellate court should accept that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence.” In this case, the trial court held that the defendant’s statements were admissible because he had been fully informed of his | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States
green
1 sentence1990Ed. 367 , 72 S. Ct. 329 (1952), a statute required drivers transporting explosives to avoid crowded thoroughfares “so far as practicable.” The United States Supreme Court concluded that the statute, which was enacted following extensive participation by the trucking industry in a process of suggesting drafts of the legislation, was not void for vagueness because it required a knowing violation. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences1989Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 , 45 L. 1989Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 , 45 L. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Massiah v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Our holding in this regard was based upon Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 (1964). 1978Our holding in this regard was based upon Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 (1964). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.