property claim in Tennessee

24 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Catlett v. Whaleygreen tennctapp · 1987 · cited in 7 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1997–2014 2 sentences 2014Adverse possession requires “an occupation of the property under a claim of right or title which is open, actual, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious.” Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). -24- Mitchell, 2006 WL 1735142 , at 2. 2012*Adverse possession requires “an occupation of the property under a claim of right or title which is open, actual, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious.” Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987).	7	7
Tidwell v. Van Deventergreen tennctapp · 1984 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1987–2008 2 sentences 1998The Chancellor was correct in finding the Plaintiff bore the burden of proving by clear and positive proof, McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn.App.1991); Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984), that she met the requirements necessary to establish title by adverse possession.2 These requirements are set out in Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn.App.1987), a recent opinion of this Court, as follows: To establish title by adverse possession, there must be an occupation of the property under a claim of right or title which is open, actual, continuous, exclusive, 1998The Chancellor was correct in finding the Plaintiff bore the burden of proving by clear and positive proof, McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn.App.1991); Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984), that she met the requirements necessary to establish title by adverse possession.2 These requirements are set out in Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn.App.1987), a recent opinion of this Court, as follows: To establish title by adverse possession, there must be an occupation of the property under a claim of right or title which is open, actual, continuous, exclusive,	1	4
Redd v. Tennessee Department of Safetygreen tenn · 1995 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017Due process requires that the forfeiture of private property cannot constitutionally occur ―without first providing those with an interest in the property to a hearing held at a reasonable time and in a meaningful manner.‖ Redd v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 895 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn. 1995). 2017Notice must be provided ―in a manner reasonably calculated to notify all interested parties of the pending forfeiture of the property in order to afford the opportunity to object to the State’s taking.‖ Id. at 334-35 .	1	1
Branstetter v. Poyntergreen tennctapp · 1949 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012“The mere possession of land does not in and of itself show an adverse claim to the owner thereof, and no adverse claim arises from a use permissive in its inception until a distinct and positive assertion of a right adverse to the owner has been brought home to him.” Branstetter v. Poynter, 32 Tenn.App. 189 , 222 S.W.2d 214, 217 (1949). 2012“The mere possession of land does not in and of itself show an adverse claim to the owner thereof, and no adverse claim arises from a use permissive in its inception until a distinct and positive assertion of a right adverse to the owner has been brought home to him.” Branstetter v. Poynter, 32 Tenn.App. 189 , 222 S.W.2d 214, 217 (1949).	1	1
Houston v. Memphis & Shelby County Board of Adjustmentgreen tennctapp · 1972 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004(Citing Houston v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 488 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). 2004See, Houston, supra; Father Ryan High School v. Oak Hill, 774 S.W.2d 190 , (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).	1	1
McClurkan v. Board of Zoning Appealsgreen tennctapp · 1977 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, 565 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), the zoning ordinance at issue “contemplate[d] that it is the peculiar circumstances of the land that must be the primary consideration, rather than any hardship personal to or created by an owner of it.” We held that the board of zoning appeals is not “authorized to grant a variance when the only hardship to the owner in complying with the zoning regulations is the result of a condition existing not in the land itself but in a structure which was created or altered by an owner of the property in violation of the 2004Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, 565 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), the zoning ordinance at issue “contemplate[d] that it is the peculiar circumstances of the land that must be the primary consideration, rather than any hardship personal to or created by an owner of it.” We held that the board of zoning appeals is not “authorized to grant a variance when the only hardship to the owner in complying with the zoning regulations is the result of a condition existing not in the land itself but in a structure which was created or altered by an owner of the property in violation of the	1	1
Hill v. Hillgreen tennctapp · 1965 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997Furthermore, “[t]here is no question but that the taking of possession of parties, where neither had as much as twenty years possession, but together their period of adverse possession had been far more than twenty years, without interruption, the title and right by prescription prevailed.” Hill v. Hill, 403 S.W.2d 769, 781 , 55 Tenn. App. 589, 617 (Tenn. App. 1965). 1997Furthermore, “[t]here is no question but that the taking of possession of parties, where neither had as much as twenty years possession, but together their period of adverse possession had been far more than twenty years, without interruption, the title and right by prescription prevailed.” Hill v. Hill, 403 S.W.2d 769, 781 , 55 Tenn. App. 589, 617 (Tenn. App. 1965).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
Smith v. Adkison green tennctapp · 1981 2 sentences 1998Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984); Smith v. Adkison, 622 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn.App.1981); and Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn.App. 222 , 293 S.W.2d 51 (1955). 1998Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984); Smith v. Adkison, 622 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn.App.1981); and Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn.App. 222 , 293 S.W.2d 51 (1955).	3	1987–1998
Preston v. Smith green tennctapp · 1956 2 sentences 1998Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984); Smith v. Adkison, 622 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn.App.1981); and Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn.App. 222 , 293 S.W.2d 51 (1955). 1998Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984); Smith v. Adkison, 622 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn.App.1981); and Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn.App. 222 , 293 S.W.2d 51 (1955).	3	1987–1998
Richardson v. Lanius neutral tenn · 1923 2 sentences 2016See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. Minter Co., supra; Richardson v. Lanius, 150 Tenn. 133 , 263 S.W. 799 (1923 [1924]); Variety Fire Door Co. v. Hanson-Worden, 10 Tenn.App. 254 (1929). 1980See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. Minter Co., supra; Richardson v. Lanius, 150 Tenn. 133 , 263 S.W. 799 (1923); Variety Fire Door Co. v. Hanson-Worden, 10 Tenn.App. 254 (1929).	2	1980–2016
Variety Fire Door Co. v. Hanson-Worden Co. neutral tennctapp · 1929 2 sentences 2016See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. Minter Co., supra; Richardson v. Lanius, 150 Tenn. 133 , 263 S.W. 799 (1923 [1924]); Variety Fire Door Co. v. Hanson-Worden, 10 Tenn.App. 254 (1929). 1980See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. Minter Co., supra; Richardson v. Lanius, 150 Tenn. 133 , 263 S.W. 799 (1923); Variety Fire Door Co. v. Hanson-Worden, 10 Tenn.App. 254 (1929).	2	1980–2016
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. E. W. Minter Co. green tenn · 1927 2 sentences 2016However the statute also may be relied upon as a defense by the owner of the property in that the ‘.... limitation that the liens claimed shall in no case exceed the contract price is not a part of the definition of the rights conferred by the statute upon furnishers of labor and material, but is a limitation upon the enforcement of such rights, which may be relied upon by the owner of the property as a defense.’ Richmond, Screw Anchor Co. v. Minter Co., 156 Tenn. 19 , 300 S.W. 574 (1927).” However, the defense set forth in T.C.A. s 64-1120 is not available to the owner unless he can trace pay 2016However the statute also may be relied upon as a defense by the owner of the property in that the ‘.... limitation that the liens claimed shall in no case exceed the contract price is not a part of the definition of the rights conferred by the statute upon furnishers of labor and material, but is a limitation upon the enforcement of such rights, which may be relied upon by the owner of the property as a defense.’ Richmond, Screw Anchor Co. v. Minter Co., 156 Tenn. 19 , 300 S.W. 574 (1927).” However, the defense set forth in T.C.A. s 64-1120 is not available to the owner unless he can trace pay	2	1980–2016
McCammon v. Meredith green tennctapp · 1991 2 sentences 1998The Chancellor was correct in finding the Plaintiff bore the burden of proving by clear and positive proof, McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn.App.1991); Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984), that she met the requirements necessary to establish title by adverse possession.2 These requirements are set out in Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn.App.1987), a recent opinion of this Court, as follows: To establish title by adverse possession, there must be an occupation of the property under a claim of right or title which is open, actual, continuous, exclusive, 1998The Chancellor was correct in finding the Plaintiff bore the burden of proving by clear and positive proof, McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn.App.1991); Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1984), that she met the requirements necessary to establish title by adverse possession.2 These requirements are set out in Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn.App.1987), a recent opinion of this Court, as follows: To establish title by adverse possession, there must be an occupation of the property under a claim of right or title which is open, actual, continuous, exclusive,	2	1998–1998
Fritts v. Abbott green tennctapp · 1996 1 sentence 2024“Undue influence can occur when a confidential relationship places one party in the capacity to exert control over the mind and will of another person.” In re Est. of Lipscomb, No. W2018-01935-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 1549596 , at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020) (citing Fritts v. Abbott, 938 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)).	1	2024–2024
Young v. Barrow green tennctapp · 2003 1 sentence 2018When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, “the nonmoving party ‘may -2- not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,’ but must respond, and by affidavits or one of the other means provided in [Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure], ‘set forth specific facts’ at the summary judgment stage ‘showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 265 (quoting Tenn. R.	1	2018–2018
Castleman Construction Company v. Pennington green tenn · 1968 1 sentence 2010The title companies alleged that they were entitled to recover payments made to clear title to the property under the doctrine of subrogation.9 Id. at 672 .	1	2010–2010
Bowers v. Bowers green tenn · 1982 1 sentence 2006The body of case law applicable to this controversy arose in the seminal case of Bowers v. Bowers, 637 S.W.2d 456 (Tenn. 1982).	1	2006–2006
Molloy v. City of Chattanooga green tenn · 1950 2 sentences 2001Relying on Malloy v. City of Chattanooga, 191 Tenn. 173 , 232 S.W.2d 24 (1950), he maintains that only after Pat Conatser agreed that he could use the route, he bought the 1,600 acre piece of property and upgraded and built roads on the Conatser tract in reliance on her assent. 2001Relying on Malloy v. City of Chattanooga, 191 Tenn. 173 , 232 S.W.2d 24 (1950), he maintains that only after Pat Conatser agreed that he could use the route, he bought the 1,600 acre piece of property and upgraded and built roads on the Conatser tract in reliance on her assent.	1	2001–2001
Carson v. City of Maryville green tennctapp · 1987 1 sentence 1999However, because the claim is against a municipality of the State of Tennessee, it must be adjudicated under the provisions of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. §§ 29-20-101, et seq. (1980 and Supp. 1987). 747 S.W.2d at 350 .	1	1999–1999
Converse v. Hamilton green scotus · 1912 2 sentences 1968Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 , 32 S.Ct. 415 , 56 L.Ed. 749 . 1968Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 , 32 S.Ct. 415 , 56 L.Ed. 749 .	1	1968–1968
Daugherty v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. green tenn · 1935 2 sentences 1957In the case of Daugherty v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., 169 Tenn. 300 , 86 S. W. (2d) 1095 , the Supreme Court held, however, that the imposition of this penalty had been properly allowed by the trial court and added to the recovery on a fire insurance policy, where the only defense had been the contention that the transfer of notes secured by the property which had burned operated as a transfer of title to the property in violation of a provision of the policy, which defense was held to be wholly without merit. 1957In the case of Daugherty v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., 169 Tenn. 300 , 86 S. W. (2d) 1095 , the Supreme Court held, however, that the imposition of this penalty had been properly allowed by the trial court and added to the recovery on a fire insurance policy, where the only defense had been the contention that the transfer of notes secured by the property which had burned operated as a transfer of title to the property in violation of a provision of the policy, which defense was held to be wholly without merit.	1	1957–1957
Harton v. Lyons green tenn · 1896 2 sentences 1956It is said in Brooks, Neely & Co. v. Lowenstein, 95 Tenn, 262, 35 S. W. 89 , 91: “ ‘Declarations of a person in possession of property, explaining and characterizing that possession, and showing in what capacity he holds, whether as owner, solely or jointly, or as the agent, tenant, or trustee of another, and the like, are regarded as res gestae of the possession; and, when that or the ownership of the property are under inquiry, such declarations are received as explanatory of the possession.’ ” In Harton v. Lyons, 97 Tenn. 180 , 36 S. W. 851, 853 , it was said, “The court is of the opinion t 1956It is said in Brooks, Neely & Co. v. Lowenstein, 95 Tenn, 262, 35 S. W. 89 , 91: “ ‘Declarations of a person in possession of property, explaining and characterizing that possession, and showing in what capacity he holds, whether as owner, solely or jointly, or as the agent, tenant, or trustee of another, and the like, are regarded as res gestae of the possession; and, when that or the ownership of the property are under inquiry, such declarations are received as explanatory of the possession.’ ” In Harton v. Lyons, 97 Tenn. 180 , 36 S. W. 851, 853 , it was said, “The court is of the opinion t	1	1956–1956
Tom Love Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. green tenn · 1933 1 sentence 1956Hicks immediately after he made said deed to Pearcy, and at different times after that, while he was in possession, controlling and managing said land, were entirely competent as part of the res gestae of the possession, as explanatory of his possession. ’ ’ In Tom Love Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 166 Tenn. 276 , 61 S. W. (2d) 672 , it was held that, declarations as to revelant facts are admissible when it appears that the declarant is dead and that the declaration was made against his pecuniary or proprietary interest and that he had no probable motive to falsify the fact declared. *239 In	1	1956–1956
Patterson v. Hewitt green · 1904 2 sentences 1944In Perry on Trusts, sections 859, 850,'it is said: “If the cestui que trust concur in the breach of the trust, he. is estopped- from proceeding against' the trustee.” In Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S., 309 , 25 S. Ct., 35 , 49 L. 1944In Perry on Trusts, sections 859, 850,'it is said: “If the cestui que trust concur in the breach of the trust, he. is estopped- from proceeding against' the trustee.” In Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S., 309 , 25 S. Ct., 35 , 49 L.	1	1944–1944
Ward Seminary for Young Ladies v. Mayor of Nashville neutral tenn · 1913 1 sentence 1939State ex rel. v. Waggoner, 162 Tenn., 172 , 35 S. W. (2d), 389 ; Ward Seminary v. City Council, 129 Tenn., 412 , 167 S. W., 113 ; M.	1	1939–1939
State Ex Rel. v. Waggoner green tenn · 1931 2 sentences 1939State ex rel. v. Waggoner, 162 Tenn., 172 , 35 S. W. (2d), 389 ; Ward Seminary v. City Council, 129 Tenn., 412 , 167 S. W., 113 ; M. 1939State ex rel. v. Waggoner, 162 Tenn., 172 , 35 S. W. (2d), 389 ; Ward Seminary v. City Council, 129 Tenn., 412 , 167 S. W., 113 ; M.	1	1939–1939

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-4-201 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-4-202 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-4-205 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 228 (1896–2026) CA 125 (1881–2026) TX 124 (1902–2026) NY 79 (1826–2026) WA 58 (1918–2026) IL 38 (1899–2024) AL 25 (1849–2026) TN 24 (1939–2024) CT 24 (1920–2022) NJ 24 (1934–2019) OH 21 (1922–2026) GA 20 (1899–2026) IN 19 (1894–2024) FL 19 (1921–2026) ME 19 (1974–2023) LA 18 (1943–2016) MA 18 (1919–2026) MO 18 (1867–2020) OR 18 (1920–2020) OK 17 (1912–1999) IA 16 (1905–2021) MI 15 (1952–2022) CO 15 (1895–2024) AZ 14 (1923–2024) MD 13 (1907–2016) NC 13 (1901–2016) MS 11 (1903–2017) VA 10 (1960–2018) WI 10 (1899–2008) AR 10 (1904–2006) UT 10 (1900–2024) NE 9 (1878–2022) SD 9 (1954–2025) NM 9 (1946–2019) MT 9 (1901–2018) KY 8 (1912–2026) NH 7 (1878–2022) KS 7 (1927–2014) ID 6 (1913–1984) SC 6 (1911–2023) AK 6 (1987–2022) ND 6 (1913–2018) VT 5 (2003–2023) WV 5 (1888–2004) RI 5 (1998–2026) MN 4 (1885–2004) WY 4 (1981–2004) DE 4 (1970–2024) DC 3 (1960–2001) HI 3 (1998–2021) PR 2 (1911–1953) NV 2 (2014–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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