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24 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1920–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mentz v. Town of Greenwichgreen2 sentences2022This issue involves an inquiry into his mental condition.’’ Id., 378–79; see id., 378 (‘‘ ‘[a]n essential element of the defendant’s claim of title by adverse possession was that the use or occupation of the property be under a claim of right, and the intention of the person or persons using the property was material [on] the issue as to the character of such use’ ’’), quoting Mentz v. Greenwich, 118 Conn. 137, 146 , 171 A. 10 (1934); see also 3 Am. 2022This issue involves an inquiry into his mental condition.’’ Id., 378–79; see id., 378 (‘‘ ‘[a]n essential element of the defendant’s claim of title by adverse possession was that the use or occupation of the property be under a claim of right, and the intention of the person or persons using the property was material [on] the issue as to the character of such use’ ’’), quoting Mentz v. Greenwich, 118 Conn. 137, 146 , 171 A. 10 (1934); see also 3 Am. | 1 | 2 |
Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccinogreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706, 722 , 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (broker ‘‘listing agreements are governed exclusively by [General Statutes] § 20-325a [and] such contracts do not fall within our statute of frauds’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brazo v. Real Estate Commission, 177 Conn. 515, 522 , 418 A.2d 883 (1979) (‘‘in this state, a contract employing a broker to sell land is not within the [s]tatute of [f]rauds’’). 2021See, e.g., Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706, 722 , 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (broker ‘‘listing agreements are governed exclusively by [General Statutes] § 20-325a [and] such contracts do not fall within our statute of frauds’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brazo v. Real Estate Commission, 177 Conn. 515, 522 , 418 A.2d 883 (1979) (‘‘in this state, a contract employing a broker to sell land is not within the [s]tatute of [f]rauds’’). | 1 | 1 |
Heyman v. CBS, INC.green2 sentences2021Compare General Statutes § 52-550 (a) (‘‘[n]o civil action may be maintained in the following cases unless the agreement . . . is made in writing and signed by the party . . . to be charged . . . (4) upon any agreement for the sale of real property or any interest in or concerning real property’’), with General Statutes § 42-134a (a) (5) (‘‘[t]he term ‘home solicitation sale’ does not include a transaction . . . pertaining to the sale or rental of real property’’); see also Heyman v. CBS, Inc., 178 Conn. 215, 221 , 423 A.2d 887 (1979) (‘‘the primary purpose of the statute [of frauds] is to pro 2021Compare General Statutes § 52-550 (a) (‘‘[n]o civil action may be maintained in the following cases unless the agreement . . . is made in writing and signed by the party . . . to be charged . . . (4) upon any agreement for the sale of real property or any interest in or concerning real property’’), with General Statutes § 42-134a (a) (5) (‘‘[t]he term ‘home solicitation sale’ does not include a transaction . . . pertaining to the sale or rental of real property’’); see also Heyman v. CBS, Inc., 178 Conn. 215, 221 , 423 A.2d 887 (1979) (‘‘the primary purpose of the statute [of frauds] is to pro | 1 | 1 |
First Federal Bank, FSB v. Whitney Development Corp.green2 sentences2017See First Federal Bank, FSB v. Whitney Development Corp. , 237 Conn. 679 , 682-84, 677 A.2d 1363 (1996) (elderly, disabled tenant challenging right of mortgagee to evict her through execution of eviction following vesting of title in mortgagee through strict foreclosure); see also Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgan , 98 Conn.App. 72 , 73-74, 909 A.2d 526 (2006) (issuance of execution of ejectment raised by party through appeal of denial of motion to open and set aside orders of trial court approving foreclosure sale and deed). **920 Although we are not unsympathetic to the fact that 2017See First Federal Bank, FSB v. Whitney Development Corp. , 237 Conn. 679 , 682-84, 677 A.2d 1363 (1996) (elderly, disabled tenant challenging right of mortgagee to evict her through execution of eviction following vesting of title in mortgagee through strict foreclosure); see also Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgan , 98 Conn.App. 72 , 73-74, 909 A.2d 526 (2006) (issuance of execution of ejectment raised by party through appeal of denial of motion to open and set aside orders of trial court approving foreclosure sale and deed). **920 Although we are not unsympathetic to the fact that | 1 | 1 |
Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgangreen2 sentences2017See First Federal Bank, FSB v. Whitney Development Corp. , 237 Conn. 679 , 682-84, 677 A.2d 1363 (1996) (elderly, disabled tenant challenging right of mortgagee to evict her through execution of eviction following vesting of title in mortgagee through strict foreclosure); see also Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgan , 98 Conn.App. 72 , 73-74, 909 A.2d 526 (2006) (issuance of execution of ejectment raised by party through appeal of denial of motion to open and set aside orders of trial court approving foreclosure sale and deed). **920 Although we are not unsympathetic to the fact that 2017See First Federal Bank, FSB v. Whitney Development Corp. , 237 Conn. 679 , 682-84, 677 A.2d 1363 (1996) (elderly, disabled tenant challenging right of mortgagee to evict her through execution of eviction following vesting of title in mortgagee through strict foreclosure); see also Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgan , 98 Conn.App. 72 , 73-74, 909 A.2d 526 (2006) (issuance of execution of ejectment raised by party through appeal of denial of motion to open and set aside orders of trial court approving foreclosure sale and deed). **920 Although we are not unsympathetic to the fact that | 1 | 1 |
Gaster v. McKiegreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 45 Conn. App. 207 , 208 n.2, 694 A.2d 830 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 , 118 S. Ct. 1091 , 140 L. | 1 | 1 |
Gomez-Pelayo v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 45 Conn. App. 207 , 208 n.2, 694 A.2d 830 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 , 118 S. Ct. 1091 , 140 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hiltongreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 45 Conn. App. 207 , 208 n.2, 694 A.2d 830 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 , 118 S. Ct. 1091 , 140 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Younggreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 45 Conn. App. 207 , 208 n.2, 694 A.2d 830 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 , 118 S. Ct. 1091 , 140 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hiltongreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 45 Conn. App. 207 , 208 n.2, 694 A.2d 830 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 , 118 S. Ct. 1091 , 140 L. 2012See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 45 Conn. App. 207 , 208 n.2, 694 A.2d 830 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925 , 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1134 , 118 S. Ct. 1091 , 140 L. | 1 | 1 |
Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobinagreen1 sentence2010General Statutes § 8-132 (b) (1); see also Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobina, 92 Conn. App. 15, 29 , 882 A. 2d 1265 (concluding that property owner may not, in context of valuation appeal taken pursuant to § 13a-76, challenge validity of condemnation), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 931 , 889 A.2d 816 (2005). *848 Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that, in the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town wrongfully took the property in violation of the public use requirement of the takings clause. | 1 | 1 |
Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobinagreen2 sentences2010General Statutes § 8-132 (b) (1); see also Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobina, 92 Conn. App. 15, 29 , 882 A. 2d 1265 (concluding that property owner may not, in context of valuation appeal taken pursuant to § 13a-76, challenge validity of condemnation), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 931 , 889 A.2d 816 (2005). *848 Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that, in the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town wrongfully took the property in violation of the public use requirement of the takings clause. 2010General Statutes § 8-132 (b) (1); see also Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobina, 92 Conn. App. 15, 29 , 882 A. 2d 1265 (concluding that property owner may not, in context of valuation appeal taken pursuant to § 13a-76, challenge validity of condemnation), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 931 , 889 A.2d 816 (2005). *848 Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that, in the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town wrongfully took the property in violation of the public use requirement of the takings clause. | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen1 sentence2010General Statutes § 8-132 (b) (1); see also Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobina, 92 Conn. App. 15, 29 , 882 A. 2d 1265 (concluding that property owner may not, in context of valuation appeal taken pursuant to § 13a-76, challenge validity of condemnation), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 931 , 889 A.2d 816 (2005). *848 Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that, in the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town wrongfully took the property in violation of the public use requirement of the takings clause. | 1 | 1 |
Bond v. Benninggreen2 sentences2006See Bond v. Benning, 175 Conn. 308, 313-14 , 398 A.2d 1158 (1978). 4 To constitute color of title, an instrument should sufficiently describe the property and claim to convey title. 2 C.J.S., supra, §§ 91-92, p. 524. 5 See the crosshatched area on the appendix to this opinion. 2006See Bond v. Benning, 175 Conn. 308, 313-14 , 398 A.2d 1158 (1978). 4 To constitute color of title, an instrument should sufficiently describe the property and claim to convey title. 2 C.J.S., supra, §§ 91-92, p. 524. 5 See the crosshatched area on the appendix to this opinion. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2003This is not to say, however, that evidence indicating a lack of permission is irrelevant to whether the plaintiff has established use under a claim of right.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 873. | 1 | 1 |
Nolan v. Morelligreen1 sentence2002See Nolan v. Morelli , 154 Conn. 432 , 441 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Tarzia
neutral
2 sentences2020In Brander v. Stoddard, 173 Conn. App. 730 , 745–48, 164 A.3d 889 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 928 , 171 A.3d 456 (2017), this court upheld the decision of the trial court that ‘‘[t]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other. . . . 2020In Brander v. Stoddard, 173 Conn. App. 730 , 745–48, 164 A.3d 889 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 928 , 171 A.3d 456 (2017), this court upheld the decision of the trial court that ‘‘[t]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other. . . . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Marra v. Comm'r of Corr.
neutral
2 sentences2020In Brander v. Stoddard, 173 Conn. App. 730 , 745–48, 164 A.3d 889 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 928 , 171 A.3d 456 (2017), this court upheld the decision of the trial court that ‘‘[t]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other. . . . 2020In Brander v. Stoddard, 173 Conn. App. 730 , 745–48, 164 A.3d 889 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 928 , 171 A.3d 456 (2017), this court upheld the decision of the trial court that ‘‘[t]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other. . . . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Brander v. Stoddard
green
2 sentences2020In Brander v. Stoddard, 173 Conn. App. 730 , 745–48, 164 A.3d 889 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 928 , 171 A.3d 456 (2017), this court upheld the decision of the trial court that ‘‘[t]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other. . . . 2020In Brander v. Stoddard, 173 Conn. App. 730 , 745–48, 164 A.3d 889 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 928 , 171 A.3d 456 (2017), this court upheld the decision of the trial court that ‘‘[t]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other. . . . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Dowling
green
2 sentences2021Builders, Inc. v. Dowling, 247 Conn. 218, 231 , 720 A.2d 235 (1998) (‘‘The HIA is a remedial statute that was enacted for the purpose of providing the public with a form of consumer protection against unscrupulous home improvement contractors. . . .The aim of the statute is to promote understanding on the part of consumers with respect to the terms of home improvement contracts and their right to cancel such contracts so as to allow them to make informed decisions when purchasing home improvement services.’’ (Citation omitted.)). 20 The defendants argue that the real property exception to the 2021Builders, Inc. v. Dowling, 247 Conn. 218, 231 , 720 A.2d 235 (1998) (‘‘The HIA is a remedial statute that was enacted for the purpose of providing the public with a form of consumer protection against unscrupulous home improvement contractors. . . .The aim of the statute is to promote understanding on the part of consumers with respect to the terms of home improvement contracts and their right to cancel such contracts so as to allow them to make informed decisions when purchasing home improvement services.’’ (Citation omitted.)). 20 The defendants argue that the real property exception to the | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Crystal v. West & Callahan, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021It is clear that the real property exception to the FTC rule and analogous state statutes adopted in conformity therewith do not encompass routine transactions for home improvement goods and services, regardless of the purpose for which these goods and services are purchased.19 See, e.g., Crystal v. West & Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 333 , 614 A.2d 560 (1992) (holding that ‘‘home improvement transactions are not excluded from the Maryland Door-to-Door Sales Act’’ because ‘‘the General Assembly necessarily intended the exemp- tion for real estate to be construed in the same manner as the compa 2021It is clear that the real property exception to the FTC rule and analogous state statutes adopted in conformity therewith do not encompass routine transactions for home improvement goods and services, regardless of the purpose for which these goods and services are purchased.19 See, e.g., Crystal v. West & Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 333 , 614 A.2d 560 (1992) (holding that ‘‘home improvement transactions are not excluded from the Maryland Door-to-Door Sales Act’’ because ‘‘the General Assembly necessarily intended the exemp- tion for real estate to be construed in the same manner as the compa | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission
green
2 sentences2021We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 686 , 986 A.2d 290 (2010). 2021We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 686 , 986 A.2d 290 (2010). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Brazo v. Real Estate Commission
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706, 722 , 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (broker ‘‘listing agreements are governed exclusively by [General Statutes] § 20-325a [and] such contracts do not fall within our statute of frauds’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brazo v. Real Estate Commission, 177 Conn. 515, 522 , 418 A.2d 883 (1979) (‘‘in this state, a contract employing a broker to sell land is not within the [s]tatute of [f]rauds’’). 2021See, e.g., Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706, 722 , 949 A.2d 1189 (2008) (broker ‘‘listing agreements are governed exclusively by [General Statutes] § 20-325a [and] such contracts do not fall within our statute of frauds’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brazo v. Real Estate Commission, 177 Conn. 515, 522 , 418 A.2d 883 (1979) (‘‘in this state, a contract employing a broker to sell land is not within the [s]tatute of [f]rauds’’). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Frimberger v. Anzellotti
green
2 sentences2020Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626 , 910 A.2d 209 (2006). ‘‘The essential elements of an action in [common-law] fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010). ‘‘The elements of innocent misrepresentation are (1) a representation of materia 2020Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626 , 910 A.2d 209 (2006). ‘‘The essential elements of an action in [common-law] fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010). ‘‘The elements of innocent misrepresentation are (1) a representation of materia | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC
green
2 sentences2020Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626 , 910 A.2d 209 (2006). ‘‘The essential elements of an action in [common-law] fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010). ‘‘The elements of innocent misrepresentation are (1) a representation of materia 2020Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626 , 910 A.2d 209 (2006). ‘‘The essential elements of an action in [common-law] fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010). ‘‘The elements of innocent misrepresentation are (1) a representation of materia | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2020Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626 , 910 A.2d 209 (2006). ‘‘The essential elements of an action in [common-law] fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010). ‘‘The elements of innocent misrepresentation are (1) a representation of materia 2020Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626 , 910 A.2d 209 (2006). ‘‘The essential elements of an action in [common-law] fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142 , 2 A.3d 859 (2010). ‘‘The elements of innocent misrepresentation are (1) a representation of materia | 1 | 2020–2020 |
669 Atlantic Street Associates v. Atlantic-Rockland Stamford Associates
green
1 sentence2010Id., at 116 , 682 A.2d 572 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission
green
1 sentence2003Plaintiff also claims that the denial of the application for a variance constitutes an improper taking of the property in violation of Article 1 , § 11 of the Connecticut Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States . "[T]he determination of whether a taking has occurred must be made on the facts of each case CT Page 3337 with consideration being given not only to the degree of diminution of the value of the land, but also to the nature and degree of public harm to be prevented and to the alternatives available to the landowner." Cioffoletti v. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Reynolds v. Soffer
green
2 sentences2002Reynolds v. Soffer, 190 Conn. 184, 188 , 459 A.2d 1027 (1983). 2002Reynolds v. Soffer, 190 Conn. 184, 188 , 459 A.2d 1027 (1983). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Hall v. Altomari green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hagist v. Washburn
green
2 sentences2001The plaintiffs cite Hagist v. Washburn, 16 Conn. App. 83 , 546 A.2d 947 (1988), and the defendants cite Hall v. Altomari, 19 Conn. App. 387 , 562 A.2d 574 (1989). 2001The plaintiffs cite Hagist v. Washburn, 16 Conn. App. 83 , 546 A.2d 947 (1988), and the defendants cite Hall v. Altomari, 19 Conn. App. 387 , 562 A.2d 574 (1989). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Willow Springs Condominium Ass'n v. Seventh BRT Development Corp. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Tucker v. Lopez neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Feigenbaum v. New Britain Housing Site Development Agency green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Greenwood v. Greenwood green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Guild v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Bishop v. City of New Haven green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.