property claim in Montana

1971The voluntary surrender, by the bankrupt, of his property to the bankruptcy court or its officers, was equivalent to consenting to the jurisdiction of that court over the subject-matter (1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 759; Wells & Co. v. Sharp [C.C.A.] 208 F. 393 ; In re Brantman [C.C.A.] 244 F. 101 ), and when the bank filed its claim in the bankruptcy proceeding it consented to the jurisdiction of that court, both as to the property and its claim (1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 761; In re Howard Laundry Co. [C.C.A.] 203 F. 445 ).

1931A. 529 ), and when the bank filed its claim in the bankruptcy proceeding it consented to the jurisdiction of that court, both as to the property and its claim (1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 761; In re Howard Laundry Co., 203 Fed. 445 , 121 C.

1937Section 9019 of our Codes provides: “When it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some part of the property, under such claim, for ten years, the property so included is deemed to have been held adverse

1937Section 9019 of our Codes provides: “When it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some part of the property, under such claim, for ten years, the property so included is deemed to have been held adverse

2018A person enters into possession under claim of title pursuant to the statute when the person holds land under "any instrument purporting to convey the land or the right to its possession, provided the claim is made thereunder in good faith." Fitschen , 76 Mont. at 196 , 246 P. at 779 .

2018A person enters into possession under claim of title pursuant to the statute when the person holds land under "any instrument purporting to convey the land or the right to its possession, provided the claim is made thereunder in good faith." Fitschen , 76 Mont. at 196 , 246 P. at 779 .

2002Lopez v. Josephson, 2001MT 133, ¶ 14, 305 Mont. 446, ¶ 14 , 30 P.3d 326, ¶ 14 .

2002Lopez v. Josephson, 2001MT 133, ¶ 14, 305 Mont. 446, ¶ 14 , 30 P.3d 326, ¶ 14 .

1976There was not a scintilla of evidence that the motel property was within the boundaries of the Red Lodge municipal water service area; so the district court could not indulge in the presumption that the city had a “duty” to furnish.water to the property under the rule of Polson v. Public Service Commission, 155 Mont. 464 , 473 P.2d 508 .

1976There was not a scintilla of evidence that the motel property was within the boundaries of the Red Lodge municipal water service area; so the district court could not indulge in the presumption that the city had a “duty” to furnish.water to the property under the rule of Polson v. Public Service Commission, 155 Mont. 464 , 473 P.2d 508 .

1971The voluntary surrender, by the bankrupt, of his property to the bankruptcy court or its officers, was equivalent to consenting to the jurisdiction of that court over the subject-matter (1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 759; Wells & Co. v. Sharp [C.C.A.] 208 F. 393 ; In re Brantman [C.C.A.] 244 F. 101 ), and when the bank filed its claim in the bankruptcy proceeding it consented to the jurisdiction of that court, both as to the property and its claim (1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 761; In re Howard Laundry Co. [C.C.A.] 203 F. 445 ).

1971The voluntary surrender, by the bankrupt, of his property to the bankruptcy court or its officers, was equivalent to consenting to the jurisdiction of that court over the subject-matter (1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 759; Wells & Co. v. Sharp [C.C.A.] 208 F. 393 ; In re Brantman [C.C.A.] 244 F. 101 ), and when the bank filed its claim in the bankruptcy proceeding it consented to the jurisdiction of that court, both as to the property and its claim (1 Collier on Bankruptcy, 761; In re Howard Laundry Co. [C.C.A.] 203 F. 445 ).

1940(Taylor v. Bunnell, 77 Cal. App. 525 , 247 Pac. 240 .) It must be kept in mind that plaintiff here seeks to have the declaration of Mrs. Baxter held to be against the three defendants, who not only have no interest in the property but claim none.

1940(Taylor v. Bunnell, 77 Cal. App. 525 , 247 Pac. 240 .) It must be kept in mind that plaintiff here seeks to have the declaration of Mrs. Baxter held to be against the three defendants, who not only have no interest in the property but claim none.

1901Our view that the introduction of the judgment roll (in cause 1,331) and the introduction of evidence to show the identity of the property at the hearing of the motion to show cause why an injunction pendente lite should not issue was not error, is further supported by a very well considered opinion in Smith v. Smith, 134 Cal. 117 , 66 Pac. 81 , wherein a deed was erroneously excluded from evidence, the validity of the conveyance resting upon a judgment from which an appeal was pending.

1901Our view that the introduction of the judgment roll (in cause 1,331) and the introduction of evidence to show the identity of the property at the hearing of the motion to show cause why an injunction pendente lite should not issue was not error, is further supported by a very well considered opinion in Smith v. Smith, 134 Cal. 117 , 66 Pac. 81 , wherein a deed was erroneously excluded from evidence, the validity of the conveyance resting upon a judgment from which an appeal was pending.