19 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jordan v. Sheagreen2 sentences2023Ct. June 1, 2021). b, Plaintiffs' use of Navy Road under a claim of right adverse to Defendants, "To use a property under a claim of right, a claimant must be in possession as the owner, intending to claim the land as his own, and may not be in recognition of or subordination to the record title owner." Jordan v. Shea, 2002 ME 36 , ,i 23, 791 A.2d 116 . 2023Ct. June 1, 2021). b, Plaintiffs' use of Navy Road under a claim of right adverse to Defendants, "To use a property under a claim of right, a claimant must be in possession as the owner, intending to claim the land as his own, and may not be in recognition of or subordination to the record title owner." Jordan v. Shea, 2002 ME 36 , ,i 23, 791 A.2d 116 . | 2 | 3 |
Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman Partnershipgreen2 sentences2019See Strie[el, 1999 ME 111 , Pl4, 733 A.2d at 991-92 . 2019See Strie[el, 1999 ME 111 , Pl4, 733 A.2d at 991-92 . | 2 | 2 |
Androkites v. Whitegreen2 sentences2014We write to address Smith and Hayes’s argument urging us to explicitly adopt a friendly-neighbor exception to the presumption of adversity that may arise when the other elements of a prescriptive easement have been established. [¶ 6] “[W]hen the first and third elements of a private prescriptive easement are established, ... a presumption arises that the use of the property was under a claim of right adverse to the owner....” Androkites, 2010 ME 133, ¶ 17 , 10 A.3d 677 . “[I]f there is an explanation of the use that contradicts the rationale of the presumption,” however, the presumption will n 2014We write to address Smith and Hayes’s argument urging us to explicitly adopt a friendly-neighbor exception to the presumption of adversity that may arise when the other elements of a prescriptive easement have been established. [¶ 6] “[W]hen the first and third elements of a private prescriptive easement are established, ... a presumption arises that the use of the property was under a claim of right adverse to the owner....” Androkites, 2010 ME 133, ¶ 17 , 10 A.3d 677 . “[I]f there is an explanation of the use that contradicts the rationale of the presumption,” however, the presumption will n | 1 | 2 |
Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Traininggreen2 sentences2013As far as the second component of the test is concerned, namely under a "claim of right adverse to the owner", the Maine Courts have recognized in a number of cases, when the first and third elements of a private prescriptive easements are established, a presumption arises that the use of the property was under a claim of right adverse to the owners, Androkites, ~17, citing Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137 , ~18, 804 A.2d 364, 370 . 2013As far as the second component of the test is concerned, namely under a "claim of right adverse to the owner", the Maine Courts have recognized in a number of cases, when the first and third elements of a private prescriptive easements are established, a presumption arises that the use of the property was under a claim of right adverse to the owners, Androkites, ~17, citing Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137 , ~18, 804 A.2d 364, 370 . | 1 | 2 |
Jacobs v. Boomergreen1 sentence2010Jacobs v. Boomer, 267 A.2d 376, 378 (Me.1970) (presumption applies unless “contradicted or explained”); Burnham v. Burnham, 130 Me. 409, 411 , 156 A. 823, 824 (1931). [¶ 18] When, as here, the dominant and servient estates were owned within the same family during the period in which the prescriptive right of access is alleged to have accrued, application of such a presumption that shifts the burden of proof is inappropriate. | 1 | 1 |
Burnham v. Burnhamgreen2 sentences2010Jacobs v. Boomer, 267 A.2d 376, 378 (Me.1970) (presumption applies unless “contradicted or explained”); Burnham v. Burnham, 130 Me. 409, 411 , 156 A. 823, 824 (1931). [¶ 18] When, as here, the dominant and servient estates were owned within the same family during the period in which the prescriptive right of access is alleged to have accrued, application of such a presumption that shifts the burden of proof is inappropriate. 2010Jacobs v. Boomer, 267 A.2d 376, 378 (Me.1970) (presumption applies unless “contradicted or explained”); Burnham v. Burnham, 130 Me. 409, 411 , 156 A. 823, 824 (1931). [¶ 18] When, as here, the dominant and servient estates were owned within the same family during the period in which the prescriptive right of access is alleged to have accrued, application of such a presumption that shifts the burden of proof is inappropriate. | 1 | 1 |
Northeast Bank of Lewiston & Auburn v. Murphygreen1 sentence1989See Northeast Bank of Lewiston & Auburn v. Murphy, 512 A.2d 344, 347 (Me.1986); W. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Andersongreen2 sentences1974See, Anderson v. Anderson, 1942, 155 Kan. 69 , 123 P.2d 315 ; Diaz v. The S. S. Seathunder, 1961, 191 F.Supp. 807, at 823 . 1974See, Anderson v. Anderson, 1942, 155 Kan. 69 , 123 P.2d 315 ; Diaz v. The S. S. Seathunder, 1961, 191 F.Supp. 807, at 823 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rubin v. Josephson
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Stephen W. Riffle v. S. David Smith
neutral
2 sentences2020Having satisfied the first and third elements, the burden then shifts to Defendant to rebut the presumption that "the use of the property was under a claim of right adverse to the owner ...." 10 See Riffle v. Smith, 2014 ME 21 , 'II'II 6, 8, 86 A.3d 1165 (citation omitted) (noting, however, that the 10It's unclear whether the opposing party has the burden of rebutting the presumption that the claimant's use was "under a claim of right," in addition to the element of adversity. 2020Having satisfied the first and third elements, the burden then shifts to Defendant to rebut the presumption that "the use of the property was under a claim of right adverse to the owner ...." 10 See Riffle v. Smith, 2014 ME 21 , 'II'II 6, 8, 86 A.3d 1165 (citation omitted) (noting, however, that the 10It's unclear whether the opposing party has the burden of rebutting the presumption that the claimant's use was "under a claim of right," in addition to the element of adversity. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Gile
green
1 sentence2017Thus, a necessary party is one whose absence prevents the court from finally determining the matter before it, see id. ¶ 12: “Joinder is required in circumstances where the absence of 4 We are not persuaded by MTGLQ’s argument that Alley should be deemed to have assumed the obligations of the note by accepting the deed to the property in violation of the provisions in the mortgage and note allowing the lender to accelerate the note if the property was transferred without the lender’s prior written consent. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
William J. Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland
green
2 sentences2016Although we are cognizant of the deferential standard of review concerning a trial court’s discovery rulings generally, Picher, 2013 ME 99, ¶ 6 , 82 A.3d 101 , we must conclude that the discovery rulings here prevented Pinkham from having that fair trial. 2016Although we are cognizant of the deferential standard of review concerning a trial court’s discovery rulings generally, Picher, 2013 ME 99, ¶ 6 , 82 A.3d 101 , we must conclude that the discovery rulings here prevented Pinkham from having that fair trial. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ocean National Bank of Kennebunk v. Diment
green
1 sentence2015"The retention of the property must be in violation of a duty that the law imposes." Id. at 39 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Garland v. Roy
green
1 sentence2011Id. ¶22, 976 A.2d at 947 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Stickney v. City of Saco
green
2 sentences2010The claimant’s use of the property is “adverse to the owner” only when the claimant “has received no permission from the owner of the soil, and uses the way as the owner would use it, disregarding [the owner’s] claims entirely, using it as though [she] owned the property [her]self.” Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 21 , 770 A.2d 592, 602 ; see also Jordan, 2002 ME 36, ¶ 23 , 791 A.2d at 122-23 . 7 [¶ 17] Although we have held that, when the first and third elements of a private prescriptive easement are established, as we assume they are in this case, a presumption arises that the use o 2010The claimant’s use of the property is “adverse to the owner” only when the claimant “has received no permission from the owner of the soil, and uses the way as the owner would use it, disregarding [the owner’s] claims entirely, using it as though [she] owned the property [her]self.” Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 21 , 770 A.2d 592, 602 ; see also Jordan, 2002 ME 36, ¶ 23 , 791 A.2d at 122-23 . 7 [¶ 17] Although we have held that, when the first and third elements of a private prescriptive easement are established, as we assume they are in this case, a presumption arises that the use o | 1 | 2010–2010 |
York Insurance of Maine, Inc. v. Superintendent of Insurance
green
2 sentences2006Although Peerless did submit sixteen exhbits, it did not submit evidence to demonstrate how the existence of short terms rentals increases its exposure to liability.' Rather, it relies on the following language from York: "A decision not to renew homeowner's insurance is not per se irrational because it is not supported by empirical data." York, 2004 ME 45 , ql 22, 845 A.2d 1155,1160 . 2006Although Peerless did submit sixteen exhbits, it did not submit evidence to demonstrate how the existence of short terms rentals increases its exposure to liability.' Rather, it relies on the following language from York: "A decision not to renew homeowner's insurance is not per se irrational because it is not supported by empirical data." York, 2004 ME 45 , ql 22, 845 A.2d 1155,1160 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Maxwell v. Mitchell
neutral
1 sentence2004In support of the motion as to count I, the defendants cite two older Maine cases -- Maxwell v. Mitchell, 61 Me. 106 (1873); Thurston v. McMillan, 78 A. 1122 (Me. 1911) -- which both concern actions under the common law for trespass (quare clausum). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Thurston v. McMillan
green
1 sentence2004In support of the motion as to count I, the defendants cite two older Maine cases -- Maxwell v. Mitchell, 61 Me. 106 (1873); Thurston v. McMillan, 78 A. 1122 (Me. 1911) -- which both concern actions under the common law for trespass (quare clausum). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Walsh v. City of Brewer
green
2 sentences1996In Walsh v. City of Brewer, 315 A.2d 200 (Me.1974), and again in Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564 (Me.1985), we found that a potential plaintiff lacked standing because they had no “right, title, or interest,” in property subject to the challenged order and, therefore, lacked the requisite “stake” in the proceedings. 1996In Walsh v. City of Brewer, 315 A.2d 200 (Me.1974), and again in Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564 (Me.1985), we found that a potential plaintiff lacked standing because they had no "right, title, or interest," in property subject to the challenged order and, therefore, lacked the requisite "stake" in the proceedings. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit
green
2 sentences1996In Walsh v. City of Brewer, 315 A.2d 200 (Me.1974), and again in Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564 (Me.1985), we found that a potential plaintiff lacked standing because they had no “right, title, or interest,” in property subject to the challenged order and, therefore, lacked the requisite “stake” in the proceedings. 1996In Walsh v. City of Brewer, 315 A.2d 200 (Me.1974), and again in Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564 (Me.1985), we found that a potential plaintiff lacked standing because they had no "right, title, or interest," in property subject to the challenged order and, therefore, lacked the requisite "stake" in the proceedings. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Diaz v. the S.S. Seathunder
green
1 sentence1974See, Anderson v. Anderson, 1942, 155 Kan. 69 , 123 P.2d 315 ; Diaz v. The S. S. Seathunder, 1961, 191 F.Supp. 807, at 823 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.