11 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cummins v. Dumasgreen2 sentences2010“Adverse use is defined as such a use of the property as the owner himself would exercise, disregarding the claims of others entirely, asking permission from no one, and using the property under a claim of right.” Peagler v. Measells, 743 So.2d 389, 391 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (quoting Cummins v. Dumas, 147 Miss. 215 , 113 So. 332, 334 (1927)). ¶24. 2010“Adverse use is defined as such a use of the property as the owner himself would exercise, disregarding the claims of others entirely, asking permission from no one, and using the property under a claim of right.” Peagler v. Measells, 743 So.2d 389, 391 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (quoting Cummins v. Dumas, 147 Miss. 215 , 113 So. 332, 334 (1927)). ¶24. | 3 | 3 |
Peagler v. Measellsgreen2 sentences2017“Adverse use is defined as such a use of the property as the owner . . . would exercise, disregarding the claims of others entirely, asking permission from no one, and using the property under a claim of right.” Peagler v. Measlells, 743 So. 2d 389, 391 (¶9) (Miss. 2017"Adverse use is defined as such a use of the property as the owner ... would exercise, disregarding the claims of others entirely, asking permission from no one, and using the property under a claim of right." Peagler v. Measells , 743 So.2d 389 , 391 (¶ 9) (Miss. | 3 | 3 |
Traxler v. Traxlergreen2 sentences2012See Traxler v. Traxler, 730 So.2d 1098, 1102-03 (¶ 23) (Miss.1998) (holding that a chancellor’s failure to discuss a wife’s social security benefits in equitably dividing the parties’ property was error, but the error was harmless because the “overall distribution was equitable.”). 2011In Traxler v. Traxler, 730 So.2d 1098, 1102-03 (¶ 23) (Miss.1998), our supreme court held that a chancellor’s failure to discuss a wife’s social security benefits in equitably dividing the parties’ property was error, but such error was harmless because “the overall distribution was equitable.” In Murphy v. Murphy, 797 So.2d 325, 330 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2001), a husband contributed to his federal civil service retirement account pri- or to and during the marriage, and such contributions were mandatory, taking the place of social security. | 2 | 2 |
Lundquist v. Todd Construction, LLCgreen1 sentence2013Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), absent certification by the trial court of the order’s finality, “a trial court order which disposes of less than all of the claims against all of the parties in a multiple party or multiple claim aetion[] is interlocutory.” Lundquist v. Todd Constr., LLC, 75 So.3d 606, 608 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So.2d 897, 900 (¶ 4) (Miss.2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Mwf v. Ddfgreen1 sentence2013Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), absent certification by the trial court of the order’s finality, “a trial court order which disposes of less than all of the claims against all of the parties in a multiple party or multiple claim aetion[] is interlocutory.” Lundquist v. Todd Constr., LLC, 75 So.3d 606, 608 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So.2d 897, 900 (¶ 4) (Miss.2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Murphygreen1 sentence2011In Traxler v. Traxler, 730 So.2d 1098, 1102-03 (¶ 23) (Miss.1998), our supreme court held that a chancellor’s failure to discuss a wife’s social security benefits in equitably dividing the parties’ property was error, but such error was harmless because “the overall distribution was equitable.” In Murphy v. Murphy, 797 So.2d 325, 330 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2001), a husband contributed to his federal civil service retirement account pri- or to and during the marriage, and such contributions were mandatory, taking the place of social security. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rice v. Pritchard
green
1 sentence2000The Peagler court cited Rice v. Pritchard, 611 So.2d 869 (Miss.1992), affirming the rule that if the person using the land never waivered from his or her claim of ownership, and if the actual legal owner never contested such proposed ownership, such use was not "permissive." Further, if no permission to use such land was ever requested or granted, such use could not be considered "permissive" but, rather, was "adverse." Peagler, 743 So.2d at 391 (¶ 11). ¶ 15. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Wilder v. Currie
green
2 sentences1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. 1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Anderson v. Boyd
neutral
2 sentences1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. 1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Vanzandt v. Vanzandt
neutral
2 sentences1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. 1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc.
green
2 sentences1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. 1961But it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the chancellor erred in his finding that Bales’ exclusive and hostile possession of the property under claim of ownership was sufficient to establish title in him by adverse possession, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants had actual knowledge, or the equivalent thereof, that Bales and his wife were in exclusive possession of the property claiming it as their own; and the appellants’ attorneys cite in support of their contention on that point the cases of Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 222 Miss. 207 , 75 So. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Gage v. School-District No. 7
green
1 sentence1952In Gage v. School District No. 7, 1887, 64 N. H. 232, 9 A. 387 , the condition in the deed provided that the land should be used for a public school and should revert to the grantor when it ceased for two years to be used for such purposes. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Koonz v. Joint School District No. 4
green
2 sentences1952We think the trial court correctly held that the use to which appellee proposes to put the property is not in violation of the limitations in said deed and that appellee has not abandoned it for school purposes although it has done so as a school.” See also Koonz v. Joint School District No. 4, 1950, 256 Wis. 456 , 41 N. W. (2d) 616 . 1952We think the trial court correctly held that the use to which appellee proposes to put the property is not in violation of the limitations in said deed and that appellee has not abandoned it for school purposes although it has done so as a school.” See also Koonz v. Joint School District No. 4, 1950, 256 Wis. 456 , 41 N. W. (2d) 616 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Hunt v. City of Boston
green
2 sentences1940Of like effect is the case of Hunt v. City of Boston, 183 Mass. 303 , 67 N. E. 244 , where a sale of land for taxes was held to extinguish an outstanding right, license and permission to enter upon the land, at any and all times for a specified number of years from the date of the deed granting such right, for the purpose of removing gravel. 1940Of like effect is the case of Hunt v. City of Boston, 183 Mass. 303 , 67 N. E. 244 , where a sale of land for taxes was held to extinguish an outstanding right, license and permission to enter upon the land, at any and all times for a specified number of years from the date of the deed granting such right, for the purpose of removing gravel. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Hennessee
green
1 sentence1940In Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Hennessee, 40 N. M. 162, 56 P. (2d) 1127 , that court held that the statute *824 provided that the tax should vest iu the purchaser at tax sale a perfect title in fee simple; and that a tax sale created a new and paramount title, clear of all prior liens and encumbrances of every character, so that the possibility of reversion, on account of the violation of a covenant contained in a deed prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, created a negative limitation, and an action by the grantor to forfeit the property for such violation could not | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Biddle v. Paine
neutral
1 sentence1903It is true, as decided in Biddle v. Paine, 74 Miss., 494 , 21 South., 250 , that the value of the property is the test of jurisdiction in actions of replevin; but, as value is only a question of estimation, varying as the individual judgments of men may differ, the valuation fixed by the pleadings is primarily accepted as true. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.