property claim in Texas

2021Code § 37.004(a) (authorizing person to obtain declaration of rights under instrument such as deed); Cooke v. Morrison, 404 S.W.3d 100, 110 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (explaining that “prescriptive easement may arise from a property owner’s knowing acquiescence (whether actual or constructive) in a claimant’s adverse use of the property under a claim of right continuously for ten years or more” (citing Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied))).

2013See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied); Wiegand v. Riojas, 547 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1977, no writ).

2023See Amador v. Berrospe, 961 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. denied); see also Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992, no writ) (“As a general rule, property conveyed to one spouse during a marriage is presumed to be community property unless that presumption be displaced by a different or contrary presumption that would show that the property so conveyed was in fact, separate property.”) Although this separate property presumption is rebuttable, the Muenches 13 contended that UpCurve failed to rebut the presumption by proving Dorothy’s lack of do

2023See Jennings v. Piazza, No. 12- 18-00253-CV, 2019 WL 2710276 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying the parent-child gift presumption and ultimately finding the separate property presumption was not overcome by clear and convincing evidence of lack of donative intent); 15 Hallum v. Hallum, No. 01-09-00095-CV, 2010 WL 4910232 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Blair v. Blair, No. 14-97-00832-CV, 1999 WL 649082 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 1999, no pet.) (stating that when property is deeded from a p

2013See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied); Wiegand v. Riojas, 547 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1977, no writ).

2013See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied); Wiegand v. Riojas, 547 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. Civ.

2016After considering .the evidence, the trial court must grant the motion for expunction of a lis pendens notice if the claimant failed “to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim[.]” Id. § 12.0071(c)(2); Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Ortiz, 401 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).

2015In another case, the Fourteenth Court described section 12.0071 as requiring that “[t]he court shall order the notice of lis pendens expunged if the court determines that . . . the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim . . . .” Nat'l City Bank of Indiana, 401 S.W.3d at 887 (ellipses original).

2015Id. at 587; Texas Natural Resource Conservation Com'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864,869-70 (Tex. 2001); Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1996); see also López v. McMillion, 113 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that claim based on failure to restrain inmate by handcuffing or shackling was allegation of non-use of property for which TTCA did not waive immunity); Lacy v. Rusk State Hosp., 31 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (holding that failure to lock door, through which patient escaped and later drowned, was non-use of property, fo

2005Id. at 587 ; White, 46 S.W.3d at 869-70 ; Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex.1996).

2026Although GEL objected to the letter in the trial court, as we have discussed, it waived any complaint regarding this evidence on appeal. 18 separate funds and separate property, we conclude that this creates a separate property presumption in his favor.4 See, e.g., Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d at 702– 03 (holding that a deed recital that land was conveyed to the husband “a married man, as his sole and separate property and not joined [by] his spouse” together with a promissory note signed only by the husband and a deed of trust signed by both spouses but listing only the husband as the borrowe

2018Henry S. Miller, 452 S.W.2d at 430 .

2022Yet, because Texie was not a party to the deed transactions involving the Post Ranch Tracts, she only needed to “[p]resent[] some evidence to rebut the deed’s recital’s separate property presumption,” and, if she did, “the burden shift[ed] back to [Michael] to prove that the property [was] actually separate property.” Weed, 565 S.W.3d at 407 (citing Hodge, 277 S.W.2d at 906– 07).

2018In determining whether the separate property presumption created by the deed recitals is a Thayer-type presumption or a Morgan-type presumption, we look again to Hodge v. Ellis, 154 - 23 - 04-17-00811-CV Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955).

2023See Amador v. Berrospe, 961 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. denied); see also Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992, no writ) (“As a general rule, property conveyed to one spouse during a marriage is presumed to be community property unless that presumption be displaced by a different or contrary presumption that would show that the property so conveyed was in fact, separate property.”) Although this separate property presumption is rebuttable, the Muenches 13 contended that UpCurve failed to rebut the presumption by proving Dorothy’s lack of do

2023See Amador v. Berrospe, 961 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. denied); see also Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992, no writ) (“As a general rule, property conveyed to one spouse during a marriage is presumed to be community property unless that presumption be displaced by a different or contrary presumption that would show that the property so conveyed was in fact, separate property.”) Although this separate property presumption is rebuttable, the Muenches 13 contended that UpCurve failed to rebut the presumption by proving Dorothy’s lack of do

2017See generally Kinzbach Tool Co., 160 S.W.2d at 509 ; Restatement of Restitution Ch. 12 (1937).

2000See generally Kinzbach Tool Co., 160 S.W.2d at 509 ; Restatement of Restitution Ch. 12 (1937).

2015Id. at 587; Texas Natural Resource Conservation Com'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864,869-70 (Tex. 2001); Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1996); see also López v. McMillion, 113 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that claim based on failure to restrain inmate by handcuffing or shackling was allegation of non-use of property for which TTCA did not waive immunity); Lacy v. Rusk State Hosp., 31 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (holding that failure to lock door, through which patient escaped and later drowned, was non-use of property, fo

2005See López v. McMillion, 113 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that claim based on failure to restrain inmate by handcuffing or shackling was allegation of non-use of property for which TTCA did not waive immunity); Lacy v. Rusk State Hosp., 31 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (holding that failure to lock door, through which patient escaped and later drowned, was non-use of property, for which TTCA did not waive immunity).

2015Id. at 587; Texas Natural Resource Conservation Com'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864,869-70 (Tex. 2001); Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1996); see also López v. McMillion, 113 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that claim based on failure to restrain inmate by handcuffing or shackling was allegation of non-use of property for which TTCA did not waive immunity); Lacy v. Rusk State Hosp., 31 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (holding that failure to lock door, through which patient escaped and later drowned, was non-use of property, fo

2005See López v. McMillion, 113 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that claim based on failure to restrain inmate by handcuffing or shackling was allegation of non-use of property for which TTCA did not waive immunity); Lacy v. Rusk State Hosp., 31 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (holding that failure to lock door, through which patient escaped and later drowned, was non-use of property, for which TTCA did not waive immunity).

2013Licata 11 S.W.3d at 274 ; see Landaverde v. Estate of Abedinzadeh, No. 14-11-0143-CV, 2011 Tex. App. Lexis 8668, at *4-5 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 1, 2011, no pet.) (on summary judgment party resisting a presumption must produce evidence sufficient to neutralize effect of presumption in order for case to proceed to trial).

2013See Licata, 11 S.W.3d at 274 (citing Kyles, 832 S.W.2d at 196 ).

2012See Mendoza , 606 S.W.2d at 694 .

2012See Mendoza, 606 S.W.2d at 694 .

2012See State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (stating that court considers substance of pleading, not merely form of its title, to determine nature of plea for relief).

2012See State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.1980) (stating that court considers substance of pleading, not merely form of its title, to determine nature of plea for relief).

2011E.g., First Nat’l Petroleum Corp. v. Lloyd, 908 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding) (reversing trial court order cancelling lis pendens because petition alleged “that a constructive trust in favor of [plaintiffs] should be imposed on the property covered by the notice of lis pendens and asked that title to the property be” returned to plaintiffs); Hughes v. Houston Nw.

2011E.g. , First Nat’l Petroleum Corp. v. Lloyd , 908 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding) (reversing trial court order cancelling lis pendens because petition alleged “that a constructive trust in favor of [plaintiffs] should be imposed on the property covered by the notice of lis pendens and asked that title to the property be” returned to plaintiffs); Hughes v. Houston Nw.

2009Condemnation The City’s eminent domain power derives from a grant of power by the state legislature.17 Section 251.001(a)(5) of the Local Government Code provides broad authority to the City to condemn private property “for any . . . 15 … See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984); Wyly v. Preservation Dallas, 165 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). 16 … See Wyly, 165 S.W.3d at 464 (“Generally, to establish standing, a plaintiff must establish that he has an individual interest in a conflict that is distinct from the interest of the general public, such that the defendant'

2009Condemnation The City’s eminent domain power derives from a grant of power by the state legislature. 17 Section 251.001(a)(5) of the Local Government Code provides broad authority to the City to condemn private property “for any . . . 15 … See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984); Wyly v. Preservation Dallas, 165 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). 16 … See Wyly, 165 S.W.3d at 464 (“Generally, to establish standing, a plaintiff must establish that he has an individual interest in a conflict that is distinct from the interest of the general public, such that the defendant

2009Condemnation The City’s eminent domain power derives from a grant of power by the state legislature.17 Section 251.001(a)(5) of the Local Government Code provides broad authority to the City to condemn private property “for any . . . 15 … See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984); Wyly v. Preservation Dallas, 165 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). 16 … See Wyly, 165 S.W.3d at 464 (“Generally, to establish standing, a plaintiff must establish that he has an individual interest in a conflict that is distinct from the interest of the general public, such that the defendant'

2009Condemnation The City’s eminent domain power derives from a grant of power by the state legislature.17 Section 251.001(a)(5) of the Local Government Code provides broad authority to the City to condemn private property “for any . . . 15 … See Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984); Wyly v. Preservation Dallas, 165 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). 16 … See Wyly, 165 S.W.3d at 464 (“Generally, to establish standing, a plaintiff must establish that he has an individual interest in a conflict that is distinct from the interest of the general public, such that the defendant'

2008It is settled law in Texas that “water which naturally flows from higher to lower land may continue to do so without subjecting the upper owner to any liability therefor.” Bunch v. Thomas, 121 Tex. 225, 229 , 49 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1932).

2008It is settled law in Texas that “water which naturally flows from higher to lower land may continue to do so without subjecting the upper owner to any liability therefor.” Bunch v. Thomas, 121 Tex. 225, 229 , 49 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1932).

2006No. 1, 73 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) ("It is not surprising that most article I, section 17 plaintiffs are the fee owners of the property they claim was taken or damaged; thus, whether the plaintiff has a sufficient property interest is usually not at issue."). [12] City of Austin is the foundational Texas case recognizing the common law rule that utilities must bear their own relocation costs.

2006No. 1, 73 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (“It is not surprising that most article I, section 17 plaintiffs are the fee owners of the property they claim was taken or damaged; thus, whether the plaintiff has a sufficient property interest is usually not at issue.”). 12 .

2017In support of this argument, the Association cites to In re Cohen, 340 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding), in which this Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a motion to expunge because the relator had adequately pleaded a real property claim.

2015Cohen, 340 S.W.3d at 893 . 4 For Moreno to be entitled to mandamus relief, she has the burden of demonstrating to this court that her petition in the underlying litigation “contain[s] a real property claim.” Tex. Prop.

2015Id. at 587; Texas Natural Resource Conservation Com'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864,869-70 (Tex. 2001); Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1996); see also López v. McMillion, 113 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that claim based on failure to restrain inmate by handcuffing or shackling was allegation of non-use of property for which TTCA did not waive immunity); Lacy v. Rusk State Hosp., 31 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (holding that failure to lock door, through which patient escaped and later drowned, was non-use of property, fo

2005Id. at 587 ; White, 46 S.W.3d at 869-70 ; Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex.1996).

2022“Thereafter, the spouse contending that the property is community property has the burden to defeat the separate property presumption.” In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d at 712–13 (quoting Sanders v. Sanders, No. 02-08-00201- CV, 2010 WL 4056196 , at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 14, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

2018See In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701, 712-13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (explaining that a separate property recital in an instrument displaces the community property presumption and becomes prima facie evidence that the property is separate property and that the spouse contending the property is community property then has the burden to rebut the separate property presumption); Sanders v. Sanders, No. 02-08-00201-CV, 2010 WL 4056196 , at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (same); Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992, no pet.) (same); see also Car

2022The second line of cases originates from the Austin Court of Appeals, which holds that “the validity of a filing of a notice of lis pendens is judged by the pleadings on file at the time the transaction with respect to the property occurred.” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied).

2011Specifically, the notice puts “prospective buyers on notice that they acquire any interest subject to the outcome of the pending litigation.” Countrywide , 240 S.W.3d at 4 .