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13 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Greergreen2 sentences2016See also State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 694 , 284 A.2d 233, 235 (1971) (“Forfeiture . . . is a civil in rem proceeding, separate from any criminal action and it is of little significance whether there is a criminal conviction.” (Citations 7 In Prince George’s Cnty. v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658 , 284 A.2d 203, 204-05 (1971), we stated as much and further explained forfeiture as follows: ‘It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. 2016See also State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 694 , 284 A.2d 233, 235 (1971) (“Forfeiture . . . is a civil in rem proceeding, separate from any criminal action and it is of little significance whether there is a criminal conviction.” (Citations 7 In Prince George’s Cnty. v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658 , 284 A.2d 203, 204-05 (1971), we stated as much and further explained forfeiture as follows: ‘It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. | 1 | 2 |
Director of Fin., Pr. Geo's Co. v. Colegreen2 sentences2016The Maryland forfeiture statute continued the common law rationale that “forfeiture was against the offending article and a penalty for carelessness” and that “property is treated as the offender”; indeed, under the forfeiture statute, “the innocence of the owner of the property is no defense” and “the forfeiture itself is not considered part of the punishment for the offense[.]” Id. at 618-19 , 465 A.2d at 457 (citations omitted).7 Moreover, in Maryland, forfeiture proceedings are civil proceedings completely separate and distinct from any criminal proceedings; “[t]he result of the civil proc 2016The Maryland forfeiture statute continued the common law rationale that “forfeiture was against the offending article and a penalty for carelessness” and that “property is treated as the offender”; indeed, under the forfeiture statute, “the innocence of the owner of the property is no defense” and “the forfeiture itself is not considered part of the punishment for the offense[.]” Id. at 618-19 , 465 A.2d at 457 (citations omitted).7 Moreover, in Maryland, forfeiture proceedings are civil proceedings completely separate and distinct from any criminal proceedings; “[t]he result of the civil proc | 1 | 1 |
Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co.green2 sentences2016See also State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 694 , 284 A.2d 233, 235 (1971) (“Forfeiture . . . is a civil in rem proceeding, separate from any criminal action and it is of little significance whether there is a criminal conviction.” (Citations 7 In Prince George’s Cnty. v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658 , 284 A.2d 203, 204-05 (1971), we stated as much and further explained forfeiture as follows: ‘It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. 2016See also State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 694 , 284 A.2d 233, 235 (1971) (“Forfeiture . . . is a civil in rem proceeding, separate from any criminal action and it is of little significance whether there is a criminal conviction.” (Citations 7 In Prince George’s Cnty. v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658 , 284 A.2d 203, 204-05 (1971), we stated as much and further explained forfeiture as follows: ‘It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. | 1 | 1 |
Houghton v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2012See State ex. rel Shorett, 156 P.2d at 670-71 (holding that public use of a beach was “presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act ... of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege”); Houghton v. Johnson, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 825 , 887 N.E.2d 1073, 1085 (2008) (holding that various acts on the beachfront were not examples from which it could be presumed that the owner knew that the actors were using the property under a claim of right). 2012See State ex. rel Shorett, 156 P.2d at 670-71 (holding that public use of a beach was “presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act ... of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege”); Houghton v. Johnson, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 825 , 887 N.E.2d 1073, 1085 (2008) (holding that various acts on the beachfront were not examples from which it could be presumed that the owner knew that the actors were using the property under a claim of right). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, Inc.green1 sentence2012See State ex. rel Shorett, 156 P.2d at 670-71 (holding that public use of a beach was “presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act ... of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege”); Houghton v. Johnson, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 825 , 887 N.E.2d 1073, 1085 (2008) (holding that various acts on the beachfront were not examples from which it could be presumed that the owner knew that the actors were using the property under a claim of right). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Guaranty Title & Trust Corp. v. United States
green
2 sentences2007On the other hand, when the occupant’s “claim of title” arises from her intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it against the title holder and world, without any assertion of “paper title” or any mistake as to boundary lines, this species of hostility is effectively differentiated from the former as a “claim of right.” By claim of right, then, we mean that the occupancy rests on the claimant’s demonstrated “intention to appropriate and hold the land as owner, and to the exclusion, rightfully or wrongfully, of every one else.” Guaranty Title & Trust Corp., 264 U.S. at 204-05 2007On the other hand, when the occupant’s “claim of title” arises from her intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it against the title holder and world, without any assertion of “paper title” or any mistake as to boundary lines, this species of hostility is effectively differentiated from the former as a “claim of right.” By claim of right, then, we mean that the occupancy rests on the claimant’s demonstrated “intention to appropriate and hold the land as owner, and to the exclusion, rightfully or wrongfully, of every one else.” Guaranty Title & Trust Corp., 264 U.S. at 204-05 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
2 sentences2007The hearing examiner, though engaging in the burden-shifting analysis enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), an employment discrimination case, seemingly recognized the legitimacy of an administrative burden defense only to the extent that the requirements “would be so onerous as to be considered an undue burden or an interference with an owner’s property rights,” i.e., a burden substantial enough to constitute either a taking of the property or a violation of due process. 2007The hearing examiner, though engaging in the burden-shifting analysis enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), an employment discrimination case, seemingly recognized the legitimacy of an administrative burden defense only to the extent that the requirements “would be so onerous as to be considered an undue burden or an interference with an owner’s property rights,” i.e., a burden substantial enough to constitute either a taking of the property or a violation of due process. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Equitable Bank, N.A.
green
1 sentence1999For purposes of this appeal, the relevant issue regarding conversion concerns possession of the property and the requirement that appellant must “have been in actual possession or have had the right to immediate possession in the converted asset.” Id. at 327, 550 A.2d 407 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lewis v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998On appeal, this Court viewed the Lewises’ application as urging it “to create a duty of care in real estate brokers which has been resisted by the Court for many years.” Id. at 759 , 584 A.2d 1325 . 1998On appeal, this Court viewed the Lewises’ application as urging it “to create a duty of care in real estate brokers which has been resisted by the Court for many years.” Id. at 759 , 584 A.2d 1325 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Allentown Plaza Associates v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp.
green
2 sentences1994Allentown Plaza, 43 Md.App. at 346 , 405 A.2d at 332 . 1994Allentown Plaza, 43 Md.App. at 346 , 405 A.2d at 332 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Trupiano v. United States
red
1 sentence1967This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform.” After citing from Jones v. U. S., supra, he continued at pgs. 305-6: “* * * And with particular relevance here, we have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the complete absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items which at common law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 ; instrumentalities, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 ; McDonald v. United States, supra; and contarband, Trupiano v. United State, | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Henry v. United States
green
1 sentence1967This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform.” After citing from Jones v. U. S., supra, he continued at pgs. 305-6: “* * * And with particular relevance here, we have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the complete absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items which at common law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 ; instrumentalities, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 ; McDonald v. United States, supra; and contarband, Trupiano v. United State, | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Beck v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1967This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform.” After citing from Jones v. U. S., supra, he continued at pgs. 305-6: “* * * And with particular relevance here, we have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the complete absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items which at common law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 ; instrumentalities, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 ; McDonald v. United States, supra; and contarband, Trupiano v. United State, | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
1 sentence1967This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform.” After citing from Jones v. U. S., supra, he continued at pgs. 305-6: “* * * And with particular relevance here, we have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the complete absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items which at common law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 ; instrumentalities, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 ; McDonald v. United States, supra; and contarband, Trupiano v. United State, | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Gary Leland Cotton v. United States
green
1 sentence1967For just as the suppression of evidence does not entail a declaration of superior property interest in the person aggrieved, thereby enabling him to suppress evidence unlawfully seized despite his inability, to demonstrate such an interest (as with fruits, instrumentalities, contraband), the refusal to suppress evidence carries no declaration of superior property interest in the State, and should thereby enable the State to introduce evidence lawfully seized despite its inability to demonstrate such an interest. * * *” See Cotton v. U. S., 371 F. 2d 385 (1967) where the Ninth 'Circuit Court of | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Hungerford v. Hungerford
green
2 sentences1961The property rule referred to was recently reiterated by this Court in Hungerford v. Hungerford, 223 Md. 316 , 164 A. 2d 518 (1960). 1961The property rule referred to was recently reiterated by this Court in Hungerford v. Hungerford, 223 Md. 316 , 164 A. 2d 518 (1960). | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Mong v. Roush
neutral
1 sentence1948Monng v. Roush, 29 W. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Fisher, Trustee v. State
neutral
1 sentence1913Those principles wore again announced by Judge Briscoe in Fisher, Trustee, v. State, 106 Md. 104 . • It is thoroughly settled that it is not a tax on the property but on the privilege of succeeding to the inheritance or of becoming a beneficiary under the will. 37 Cyc. 1553; 27 Am. & Eng. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
People v. Converse
neutral
1 sentence1907But cases of commission merchants, auctioneers, and attorneys authorized to collect demands stand upon a different footing; and a failure to pay over the balance due to their employers, upon their collections, will not, under the ordinary circumstances attending such agency, subject them to the heavy penalties consequent upon a conviction of the crime of embezzlement. ” In People v. Converse, 74 Mich. 478 , it was held by the Supreme Court of that State, under a statute similar in language to ours, that if an attorney collects money for his client, he, in so doing acts as the agent of his clie | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.