property claim in New York

2020"A party asserting a separate property claim must trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property" ( Gately v Gately , 113 AD3d 1093 , 1093 [4th Dept 2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1048 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bailey v Bailey , 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [4th Dept 2008]).

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2021"Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital unless the presumption is rebutted by the party asserting the separate property claim" ( Solomon v Solomon , 307 AD2d 558, 559 [2003] [citations omitted], lv dismissed 1 NY3d 546 [2003]; accord Saia v Saia , 91 AD3d 1110, 1110 [2012]).

2012“Property acquired during [the] marriage is presumed to be marital unless the presumption is rebutted by the party asserting the separate property claim” (Solomon v Solomon, 307 AD2d 558, 559 [2003], appeal dismissed 1 NY3d 546 [2003] [citation omitted]; accord Cease v Cease 72 AD3d 1450, 1451 [2010]).

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2023The motion court properly determined that plaintiff established by clear and convincing evidence that he actually, exclusively possessed the property under a claim of right, openly and notoriously, for a continuous period since 1992, entitling him to a declaration that he is the sole and exclusive owner of the premises and dismissal of defendant's counterclaims ( Estate of Becker v Murtagh , 19 NY3d 75, 81 [2012]).

2023The motion court properly determined that plaintiff established by clear and convincing evidence that he actually, exclusively possessed the property under a claim of right, openly and notoriously, for a continuous period since 1992, entitling him to a declaration that he is the sole and exclusive owner of the premises and dismissal of defendant's counterclaims ( Estate of Becker v Murtagh , 19 NY3d 75, 81 [2012]).

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014A party asserting a separate property claim must “ ‘trace the source of the funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Swett, 89 AD3d at 1561-1562 ; Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). “[S]eparate property which is commingled with marital property or is subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to be marital property” (Chiotti v Chiotti, 12 AD3d 995, 996 [2004]; see Richter v Richter, 77 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2010]; Di Nardo v Di

2014The party seeking a finding of separate property has the burden of rebutting that presumption (see Frost, 49 AD3d at 1151 ; Haas v Haas, 265 AD2d 887, 888 [1999]), and we conclude that defendant failed to meet that burden with respect to the assets in question.

2014The party seeking a finding of separate property has the burden of rebutting that presumption (see Frost, 49 AD3d at 1151 ; Haas v Haas, 265 AD2d 887, 888 [1999]), and we conclude that defendant failed to meet that burden with respect to the assets in question.

2025Analysis "To acquire an easement by prescription, it must be shown that the use was hostile, open and notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period of 10 years" ( Aboulissan v Kingsland 79, LLC , 179 AD3d 878, 879 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morales v Riley , 28 AD3d 623 [2d Dept 2006]).

2025Analysis "To acquire an easement by prescription, it must be shown that the use was hostile, open and notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period of 10 years" ( Aboulissan v Kingsland 79, LLC , 179 AD3d 878, 879 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morales v Riley , 28 AD3d 623 [2d Dept 2006]).

2025Analysis "To acquire an easement by prescription, it must be shown that the use was hostile, open and notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period of 10 years" ( Aboulissan v Kingsland 79, LLC , 179 AD3d 878, 879 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morales v Riley , 28 AD3d 623 [2d Dept 2006]).

2025Analysis "To acquire an easement by prescription, it must be shown that the use was hostile, open and notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period of 10 years" ( Aboulissan v Kingsland 79, LLC , 179 AD3d 878, 879 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morales v Riley , 28 AD3d 623 [2d Dept 2006]).

2024In one notable case following a nonjury trial, the petitioner's main argument on appeal was that the municipality completely failed to raise as an affirmative defense that the use of the property constituted a zoning violation; despite the failure to raise this as an affirmative defense, the Second Department still found that the petitioner's use of a property in violation of the zoning law barred it from receiving the tax exemption ( see brief for petitioner-appellant in Congregation Or Yosef v Town of Ramapo , 48 AD3d 731, 732 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 711 [2008], available at 2007 W

2024In one notable case following a nonjury trial, the petitioner's main argument on appeal was that the municipality completely failed to raise as an affirmative defense that the use of the property constituted a zoning violation; despite the failure to raise this as an affirmative defense, the Second Department still found that the petitioner's use of a property in violation of the zoning law barred it from receiving the tax exemption ( see brief for petitioner-appellant in Congregation Or Yosef v Town of Ramapo , 48 AD3d 731, 732 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 711 [2008], available at 2007 W

2023Where tenants in common are concerned, "the period required by RPAPL 541 is 20 years of continuous exclusive possession before a cotenant may acquire full title by adverse possession" ( Myers v Bartholomew , 91 NY2d 630, 632 [1998]).

2023Where tenants in common are concerned, "the period required by RPAPL 541 is 20 years of continuous exclusive possession before a cotenant may acquire full title by adverse possession" ( Myers v Bartholomew , 91 NY2d 630, 632 [1998]).

2022The burden then rests with the party asserting the separate property claim to rebut the presumption ( see Fields v Fields , 15 NY3d 158, 163 [2010]; Saia v Saia , 91 AD3d 1110, 1110 [3d Dept 2012]).

2021"Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital unless the presumption is rebutted by the party asserting the separate property claim" ( Solomon v Solomon , 307 AD2d 558, 559 [2003] [citations omitted], lv dismissed 1 NY3d 546 [2003]; accord Saia v Saia , 91 AD3d 1110, 1110 [2012]).

2010Moreover, as relevant herein, “the fact that property is conveyed by a nonspouse to only one spouse during the marriage is not necessarily determinative on the issue of whether the property is separate or marital in nature” (Dashnaw v Dashnaw, 11 AD3d 732, 733 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Seidman v Seidman, 226 AD2d 1011, 1012 [1996]).

2003Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital unless the presumption is rebutted by the party asserting the separate property claim (see Allen v Allen, 263 AD2d 691, 692 [1999]; Seidman v Seidman, 226 AD2d 1011, 1012 [1996]; Cerretani v Cerretani, 221 AD2d 814, 815 [1995]).

2022The burden then rests with the party asserting the separate property claim to rebut the presumption ( see Fields v Fields , 15 NY3d 158, 163 [2010]; Saia v Saia , 91 AD3d 1110, 1110 [3d Dept 2012]).

2020Decedent's interest in Four Points, which includes an interest in certain real property owned by Four Points, was acquired during the marriage, presumptively rendering it marital property ( see Fields , 15 NY3d at 165 ), but defendants contend that Four Points and the real property owned by Four Points are separate property because decedent used separate property to acquire those holdings.

2005The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d]; Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 15 [1986]; Majauskas v Majauskas, 61 NY2d 481, 489 [1984]; Farag v Farag, 4 AD3d 502, 503 [2004]; Saasto v Saasto, 211 AD2d 708 [1995]) and the party seeking to overcome the presumption that property is marital bears the burden of proving that the property in dispute is separate property (see Farag v Farag, supra; Barone v Barone, 292 AD2d 481, 483 [2002]).

1988Supreme Court properly based the value of the credit to defendant for the marital residence on its value at the time of the marriage, and not its future sale, since any appreciation in its value was taken out of the narrow separate property exception in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (d) (3) by plaintiff’s contributions as parent, homemaker and helpmate (see, Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 15-18 , supra; Brennan v Brennan, 103 AD2d 48 ).

2025Here, the City met its initial burden on its motion by establishing that it actually or reasonably believed that the property was in violation of the applicable housing standards ( see PJI 3:50A; see also Galland v Kossoff , 34 AD3d 306, 307 [1st Dept 2006]).

2025Co. , 80 NY2d 978, 980 [1992]).

2025Co. , 80 NY2d 978, 980 [1992]).