property claim in Arizona

2008See Paxson, 203 Ariz. 63, ¶ 22 , 50 P.3d at 424 . “[T]he claim of right is nothing more than the intention of the one wrongfully [using another’s property] to ... use the land ... irrespective of any semblance or shadow of actual title or right.” Weber, 126 Ariz. at 510-11 , 617 P.2d at 18-19 .

2008See Paxson, 203 Ariz. 63, ¶ 22 , 50 P.3d at 424 . “[T]he claim of right is nothing more than the intention of the one wrongfully [using another’s property] to ... use the land ... irrespective of any semblance or shadow of actual title or right.” Weber, 126 Ariz. at 510-11 , 617 P.2d at 18-19 .

2008See Paxson, 203 Ariz. 63, ¶ 22 , 50 P.3d at 424 . “[T]he claim of right is nothing more than the intention of the one wrongfully [using another’s property] to ... use the land ... irrespective of any semblance or shadow of actual title or right.” Weber, 126 Ariz. at 510-11 , 617 P.2d at 18-19 .

2008See Paxson, 203 Ariz. 63, ¶ 22 , 50 P.3d at 424 . “[T]he claim of right is nothing more than the intention of the one wrongfully [using another’s property] to ... use the land ... irrespective of any semblance or shadow of actual title or right.” Weber, 126 Ariz. at 510-11 , 617 P.2d at 18-19 .

2008In Lewis v. Pleasant Country, Ltd., 173 Ariz. 186, 190 , 840 P.2d 1051, 1055 (App.1992), Division One of this court suggested — albeit in dicta — that a use may be deemed permissive if the user “aeknowledge[s]” his or her use of property was “in subordination to the owner’s title.” This statement is consistent with the requirement that, to acquire an easement by prescription, the claimant must have used the property under a claim of right.

2008In Lewis v. Pleasant Country, Ltd., 173 Ariz. 186, 190 , 840 P.2d 1051, 1055 (App.1992), Division One of this court suggested — albeit in dicta — that a use may be deemed permissive if the user “aeknowledge[s]” his or her use of property was “in subordination to the owner’s title.” This statement is consistent with the requirement that, to acquire an easement by prescription, the claimant must have used the property under a claim of right.

2024Golder v. Dep’t of Revenue, 123 Ariz. 260, 263 (1979); see also § 42-16212(B) (allowing parties to present evidence of any matters related to the valuation of the property at a hearing).

2020Generally, "we will dismiss an appeal as moot when our action as a reviewing court will have no effect on the parties." Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 617, ¶ 5 (App. 2012).

2020See Tumacacori Mission Land Dev., 231 Ariz. at 519, ¶ 6 .

2017See PLM Tax Certificate Program 1991-92, L.P. v. Schweikert, 216 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 16 (App. 2007) (“Issues that should have been raised in a first appeal cannot be raised or considered in a second appeal.”).

2005Generally, a trial court’s factual findings must be accepted on appeal unless they are “clearly erroneous.” In re United States Currency *524 in the Amount of $26,980.00, 199 Ariz. 291, 295, ¶ 9 , 18 P.3d 85, 89 (App.2000).

2005Generally, a trial court’s factual findings must be accepted on appeal unless they are “clearly erroneous.” In re United States Currency *524 in the Amount of $26,980.00, 199 Ariz. 291, 295, ¶ 9 , 18 P.3d 85, 89 (App.2000).

2004Southwest Soil Remediation, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 201 Ariz. 438 , 442 ¶ 12, 36 P.3d 1208, 1212 (App.2001).

2004Southwest Soil Remediation, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 201 Ariz. 438 , 442 ¶ 12, 36 P.3d 1208, 1212 (App.2001).

1986However, the court permitted the wife reimbursement for mortgage and tax payments made from her separate funds on the property under the principle of joint tenancy law that: When one joint tenant expends sums to benefit the other joint tenant, as appellee did here by using her separate funds to pay the joint obligation, the paying joint tenant is entitled to reimbursement. 128 Ariz. at 337 , 625 P.2d at 926 (Emphasis added).

1986However, the court permitted the wife reimbursement for mortgage and tax payments made from her separate funds on the property under the principle of joint tenancy law that: When one joint tenant expends sums to benefit the other joint tenant, as appellee did here by using her separate funds to pay the joint obligation, the paying joint tenant is entitled to reimbursement. 128 Ariz. at 337 , 625 P.2d at 926 (Emphasis added).

1965The Court in looking at the terms of the contract noted that the following clause was included which distinguished it from the contract in the King ,& Boozer (supra) case and therefore, that case was not controlling: “The Contractor shall act as the purchasing agent of the Government in affecting such procurement and the Government shall be directly liable to *309 the vendors for the purchase price.” 347 U.S. 112 , 74 S.Ct. 405 , (Margin 2) (Emphasis supplied.) In Tawes v. Aerial Products, 210 Md. 627 , 124 A.2d 805, 809 (1956) wherein both United States Army and United States Navy contracts w

1965The Court in looking at the terms of the contract noted that the following clause was included which distinguished it from the contract in the King ,& Boozer (supra) case and therefore, that case was not controlling: “The Contractor shall act as the purchasing agent of the Government in affecting such procurement and the Government shall be directly liable to *309 the vendors for the purchase price.” 347 U.S. 112 , 74 S.Ct. 405 , (Margin 2) (Emphasis supplied.) In Tawes v. Aerial Products, 210 Md. 627 , 124 A.2d 805, 809 (1956) wherein both United States Army and United States Navy contracts w