17 Oklahoma opinions name it 1 courts 1912–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Jenkinsgreen1 sentence1999Thus, any award of attorney fees must be based upon the successful defense of the property claim or counterclaim asserted. ¶ 6 At this point in its analysis, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that a prevailing party is one “(a) who at the conclusion of the case, has an affirmative judgment in its favor or (b) who has secured a net recovery on its own claim,” quoting Smith v. Jenkins, 873 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Okla.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Kelleygreen1 sentence1960See Cox v. Kelley, supra, and Gooding v. Edwards, Okl., 290 P.2d 408 and cited cases. | 1 | 1 |
Gooding v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence1960See Cox v. Kelley, supra, and Gooding v. Edwards, Okl., 290 P.2d 408 and cited cases. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Whelan
green
2 sentences1972Under the rule of Johnson v. Whelan, 186 Okl. 511 , 98 P.2d 1103 , Tanner was occupying this property under a claim of right. 1972Under the rule of Johnson v. Whelan, 186 Okl. 511 , 98 P.2d 1103 , Tanner was occupying this property under a claim of right. | 2 | 1951–1972 |
Cross v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1962Anderson v. Francis, 177 Okl. 47 , 57 P.2d 619 ; Hass v. Gregg, 52 Okl. 51 , 152 P. 1126 ; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392 , 256 P. 80 , 57 A.L.R. 578 ; 42 Am.Jur., Possession, Sec. 42; 73 C.J.S. 1962Anderson v. Francis, 177 Okl. 47 , 57 P.2d 619 ; Hass v. Gregg, 52 Okl. 51 , 152 P. 1126 ; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392 , 256 P. 80 , 57 A.L.R. 578 ; 42 Am.Jur., Possession, Sec. 42; 73 C.J.S. | 2 | 1954–1962 |
Hass v. Gregg
neutral
2 sentences1962Anderson v. Francis, 177 Okl. 47 , 57 P.2d 619 ; Hass v. Gregg, 52 Okl. 51 , 152 P. 1126 ; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392 , 256 P. 80 , 57 A.L.R. 578 ; 42 Am.Jur., Possession, Sec. 42; 73 C.J.S. 1962Anderson v. Francis, 177 Okl. 47 , 57 P.2d 619 ; Hass v. Gregg, 52 Okl. 51 , 152 P. 1126 ; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392 , 256 P. 80 , 57 A.L.R. 578 ; 42 Am.Jur., Possession, Sec. 42; 73 C.J.S. | 2 | 1954–1962 |
Anderson v. Francis
green
2 sentences1962Anderson v. Francis, 177 Okl. 47 , 57 P.2d 619 ; Hass v. Gregg, 52 Okl. 51 , 152 P. 1126 ; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392 , 256 P. 80 , 57 A.L.R. 578 ; 42 Am.Jur., Possession, Sec. 42; 73 C.J.S. 1962Anderson v. Francis, 177 Okl. 47 , 57 P.2d 619 ; Hass v. Gregg, 52 Okl. 51 , 152 P. 1126 ; Gross v. Robinson, 36 Wyo. 392 , 256 P. 80 , 57 A.L.R. 578 ; 42 Am.Jur., Possession, Sec. 42; 73 C.J.S. | 2 | 1954–1962 |
Nickels & Brown Bros. v. Buhman Bros.
neutral
2 sentences1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Griffin v. Warner
neutral
2 sentences1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return.” See, also, Griffin, Ex’r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack’s Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 Pac. 1057 ; In re Leonis’ Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 Pac 1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Perkins v. Gridley
neutral
2 sentences1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return.” See, also, Griffin, Ex’r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack’s Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 Pac. 1057 ; In re Leonis’ Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 Pac 1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 | 2 | 1913–1913 |
In re Estate Durham
neutral
2 sentences1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return.” See, also, Griffin, Ex’r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack’s Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 Pac. 1057 ; In re Leonis’ Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 Pac 1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 | 2 | 1913–1913 |
In re Estate of Jack
neutral
2 sentences1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 | 2 | 1913–1913 |
In Re Estate of Reed
neutral
2 sentences1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Andrada v. Kelsey
green
2 sentences1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 1913The object of the provision in the above section is that the court may secure as high a price for the property as possible, and, if it can accomplish this result without subjecting the estate to the expense and delay attendant upon a new sale, it would seem to be in the exercise of a wise discretion to permit a competitive bidding for the property at the hearing upon the return." See, also, Griffin, Ex'r, v. Warner et al., 48 Cal. 383 ; Estate of Durham, 49 Cal. 490 ; Perkins v. Gridley, 50 Cal. 97 ; In re Jack's Estate, 115 Cal. 203 , 46 P. 1057 ; In re Leonis' Estate, 138 Cal. 194 , 71 P. 17 | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Klemens v. Badger Mutual Insurance Co. of Milwaukee
green
2 sentences1980Bellman, supra, holds, as does Klemens v. Badger Mutual Insurance Co., 8 Wis.2d 565 , 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959), that where the policy is issued jointly one spouse is precluded from recovering on the contract after the other spouse intentionally burned the property under a clause denying liability where the insured neglected to save and preserve the property at and after loss. 1980Bellman, supra, holds, as does Klemens v. Badger Mutual Insurance Co., 8 Wis.2d 565 , 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959), that where the policy is issued jointly one spouse is precluded from recovering on the contract after the other spouse intentionally burned the property under a clause denying liability where the insured neglected to save and preserve the property at and after loss. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Commercial Discount Co. v. Midwest Chevrolet Co.
neutral
1 sentence1966In Commercial Discount Co. v. Midwest Chevrolet Co., Okl., 301 P.2d 356 (1956) we held: “In a replevin action where plaintiff and defendant each affirmatively assert a first lien on the property and claim right of possession, the party for whom judgment is rendered is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs-in the action.” *637 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s contention must be rejected, and we conclude that in this action the successful party is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed as costs in the action. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
McCarty v. Broneaugh
green
2 sentences1959McCarty v. Broneaugh, 128 Okl. 36 , 261 P. 165 . 1959McCarty v. Broneaugh, 128 Okl. 36 , 261 P. 165 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Wiruth v. Hillcrest Memorial Hospital
neutral
2 sentences1956Wiruth v. Hillcrest Memorial Hospital, 201 Okl. 607 , 207 P.2d 782 . 1956Wiruth v. Hillcrest Memorial Hospital, 201 Okl. 607 , 207 P.2d 782 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Stricker v. Billingsley
neutral
2 sentences1952In support of this contention plaintiff cites Bunte v. Hasley, 122 Okl. 81 , 251 P. 591 ; Stricker v. Billingsley, 169 Okl. 145 , 36 P.2d 474 ; Perry v. Shaver, 101 Okl. 248 , 225 P. 359 , and many decisions from other jurisdictions. 1952In support of this contention plaintiff cites Bunte v. Hasley, 122 Okl. 81 , 251 P. 591 ; Stricker v. Billingsley, 169 Okl. 145 , 36 P.2d 474 ; Perry v. Shaver, 101 Okl. 248 , 225 P. 359 , and many decisions from other jurisdictions. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Perry v. Shaver
neutral
2 sentences1952In support of this contention plaintiff cites Bunte v. Hasley, 122 Okl. 81 , 251 P. 591 ; Stricker v. Billingsley, 169 Okl. 145 , 36 P.2d 474 ; Perry v. Shaver, 101 Okl. 248 , 225 P. 359 , and many decisions from other jurisdictions. 1952In support of this contention plaintiff cites Bunte v. Hasley, 122 Okl. 81 , 251 P. 591 ; Stricker v. Billingsley, 169 Okl. 145 , 36 P.2d 474 ; Perry v. Shaver, 101 Okl. 248 , 225 P. 359 , and many decisions from other jurisdictions. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Bunte v. Hasley
green
2 sentences1952In support of this contention plaintiff cites Bunte v. Hasley, 122 Okl. 81 , 251 P. 591 ; Stricker v. Billingsley, 169 Okl. 145 , 36 P.2d 474 ; Perry v. Shaver, 101 Okl. 248 , 225 P. 359 , and many decisions from other jurisdictions. 1952In support of this contention plaintiff cites Bunte v. Hasley, 122 Okl. 81 , 251 P. 591 ; Stricker v. Billingsley, 169 Okl. 145 , 36 P.2d 474 ; Perry v. Shaver, 101 Okl. 248 , 225 P. 359 , and many decisions from other jurisdictions. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Templeton v. Ferguson
green
1 sentence1928Other portions of the same act made careful provision for the taking charge of and' administration of the estate by the executor or administrator, whereby the property is to be (1) applied to the various classes of claims, and (21 the remainder is to be delivered to the heirs, devisees and legatees. .Under the well settled construction of these provisions, the heirs, devisees, and legatees cannot make such a disposition of any part of the estate during the period in which it is subject to administration that will defeat the subjection thereof to the claims of creditors through such administrat | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Graham v. Vining
green
1 sentence1928Graham v. Vining, 1 Tex. 639 ; Graham v. Vining. 2 Tex. 433 ; Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 474 : Ansley v. Baker. 14 Tex. 607 ; Cunningham v. Taylor, 20 Tex. 126 ; Green v. Rugley, 23 Tex. 536 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Ansley v. Baker
green
1 sentence1928Graham v. Vining, 1 Tex. 639 ; Graham v. Vining. 2 Tex. 433 ; Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 474 : Ansley v. Baker. 14 Tex. 607 ; Cunningham v. Taylor, 20 Tex. 126 ; Green v. Rugley, 23 Tex. 536 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Graham v. Vining
green
1 sentence1928Graham v. Vining, 1 Tex. 639 ; Graham v. Vining. 2 Tex. 433 ; Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 474 : Ansley v. Baker. 14 Tex. 607 ; Cunningham v. Taylor, 20 Tex. 126 ; Green v. Rugley, 23 Tex. 536 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Cunningham v. Taylor
neutral
1 sentence1928Graham v. Vining, 1 Tex. 639 ; Graham v. Vining. 2 Tex. 433 ; Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 474 : Ansley v. Baker. 14 Tex. 607 ; Cunningham v. Taylor, 20 Tex. 126 ; Green v. Rugley, 23 Tex. 536 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Cooper v. Loughlin
green
1 sentence1928Other portions of the same act made careful provision for the taking charge of and' administration of the estate by the executor or administrator, whereby the property is to be (1) applied to the various classes of claims, and (21 the remainder is to be delivered to the heirs, devisees and legatees. .Under the well settled construction of these provisions, the heirs, devisees, and legatees cannot make such a disposition of any part of the estate during the period in which it is subject to administration that will defeat the subjection thereof to the claims of creditors through such administrat | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Consolidated Alfalfa Milling Co. v. Roberts
neutral
1 sentence1926This precludes the defendant from denying the ownership of the property under the rule announced iu the case of Collier v. Gannon, 40 Okla. 275 . 137 Pac. 1179 , ia® follows: “An agreement, after seizure of chattels attached, that the sheriff shall sell summarily and retain the proceeds, or place them in a designated depository to abide the final judgment in said proceeding, precludes the defendant from insisting on a dissolution of the writ.” As to the contention of the defendant, that the acceptance of the check by the plaintiff constituted an assignment to the plaintiff of the funds represe | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Collier v. Gannon
neutral
1 sentence1926This precludes the defendant from denying the ownership of the property under the rule announced iu the case of Collier v. Gannon, 40 Okla. 275 . 137 Pac. 1179 , ia® follows: “An agreement, after seizure of chattels attached, that the sheriff shall sell summarily and retain the proceeds, or place them in a designated depository to abide the final judgment in said proceeding, precludes the defendant from insisting on a dissolution of the writ.” As to the contention of the defendant, that the acceptance of the check by the plaintiff constituted an assignment to the plaintiff of the funds represe | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Ex Parte Bochmann
green
1 sentence1914In Alberti v. Moore et al., 20 Okla. 78, 93 , Pac. 543, in the syllabus, we said: “A subcontractor, materialman or workman, between whom and the owner there is no privity of contract, and in whose favor no direct liability has been imposed upon the owner, is not entitled to a personal judgment against the owner. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Moore v. Maxwell neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.