property claim in New Jersey

2019We concluded that subsection (k) did not "provide a general exemption to [subsection](h)," ibid. , and that "Amato's appearance as an expert witness, seeking to convince his fellow Board members to allow him to develop this property in violation of the zoning ordinance requirements, created at least the potential for conflict." Id. at 74 , 684 A.2d 921 .

2019We concluded that subsection (k) did not "provide a general exemption to [subsection](h)," ibid. , and that "Amato's appearance as an expert witness, seeking to convince his fellow Board members to allow him to develop this property in violation of the zoning ordinance requirements, created at least the potential for conflict." Id. at 74 , 684 A.2d 921 .

2018Tax 250, 254 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 408 (1997), sent a timely response that its properties were “not income producing.” 5 is so egregiously ambiguous in its identification of the property or in the instruction to the taxpayer that due process principles are offended.” Id. at 284-85, n.3.

2018Tax 250, 254 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 408 (1997), sent a timely response that its properties were “not income producing.” 5 is so egregiously ambiguous in its identification of the property or in the instruction to the taxpayer that due process principles are offended.” Id. at 284-85, n.3.

2006In that case, we addressed whether a Delaware Corporation with New Jersey offices met the following coverage criteria under the PLIGA Act at N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5: “(1) The claimant or insured is a resident of this State at the time of the insured event; or (2) the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this State.” Eastern Seaboard, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 591 , 421 A.2d 597 .

2006In that case, we addressed whether a Delaware Corporation with New Jersey offices met the following coverage criteria under the PLIGA Act at N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5: “(1) The claimant or insured is a resident of this State at the time of the insured event; or (2) the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this State.” Eastern Seaboard, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 591 , 421 A.2d 597 .

2017The Appellate Division, in Caput Mortuum, LLC, supra, 366 N.J.Super. at 333-34 , 841 A.2d 430 noted that judgment creditors do not acquire the status of an owner until they purchase the property at an execution sale and that judgment creditors are not included under the aegis of mortgagees permitted to redeem as a mortgagee "has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation," and a judgment creditor, who could obtain a personal judgment and satisfy its judgment in a number of ways, does not have the same interest in p

2017The Appellate Division, in Caput Mortuum, LLC, supra, 366 N.J.Super. at 333-34 , 841 A.2d 430 noted that judgment creditors do not acquire the status of an owner until they purchase the property at an execution sale and that judgment creditors are not included under the aegis of mortgagees permitted to redeem as a mortgagee "has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation," and a judgment creditor, who could obtain a personal judgment and satisfy its judgment in a number of ways, does not have the same interest in p

2014Cf. Ocean Pines, supra, 112 N.J. at 9 - 11.

2011In this case, the notice aspect is lacking. [ Smyrnioudis, supra, 660 A. 2d at 949 .] Applying the Restatement of Property factors, the circumstances in this case support a finding of reasonableness.

2004Ibid.

2004It is also logical to include the holder of a prior tax sale certificate, as real estate taxes are only a lien on the land assessed and are not the personal obligation of the owner, S & R Assocs. v. Lynn Realty Corp., 338 N.J.Super. 350, 360 , 769 A. 2d 413 (App.Div.2001); City of Newark v. Cent. and Lafayette Realty Co., 150 N.J.Super. 18, 21 , 374 A. 2d 504 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 528 , 384 A. 2d 508 (1977), and a mortgagee, who has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation, Chemical Bank New Jersey,

2004It is also logical to include the holder of a prior tax sale certificate, as real estate taxes are only a lien on the land assessed and are not the personal obligation of the owner, S & R Assocs. v. Lynn Realty Corp., 338 N.J.Super. 350, 360 , 769 A. 2d 413 (App.Div.2001); City of Newark v. Cent. and Lafayette Realty Co., 150 N.J.Super. 18, 21 , 374 A. 2d 504 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 528 , 384 A. 2d 508 (1977), and a mortgagee, who has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation, Chemical Bank New Jersey,

2004It is also logical to include the holder of a prior tax sale certificate, as real estate taxes are only a lien on the land assessed and are not the personal obligation of the owner, S & R Assocs. v. Lynn Realty Corp., 338 N.J.Super. 350, 360 , 769 A. 2d 413 (App.Div.2001); City of Newark v. Cent. and Lafayette Realty Co., 150 N.J.Super. 18, 21 , 374 A. 2d 504 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 528 , 384 A. 2d 508 (1977), and a mortgagee, who has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation, Chemical Bank New Jersey,

2004It is also logical to include the holder of a prior tax sale certificate, as real estate taxes are only a lien on the land assessed and are not the personal obligation of the owner, S & R Assocs. v. Lynn Realty Corp., 338 N.J.Super. 350, 360 , 769 A. 2d 413 (App.Div.2001); City of Newark v. Cent. and Lafayette Realty Co., 150 N.J.Super. 18, 21 , 374 A. 2d 504 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 528 , 384 A. 2d 508 (1977), and a mortgagee, who has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation, Chemical Bank New Jersey,

2004It is also logical to include the holder of a prior tax sale certificate, as real estate taxes are only a lien on the land assessed and are not the personal obligation of the owner, S & R Assocs. v. Lynn Realty Corp., 338 N.J.Super. 350, 360 , 769 A. 2d 413 (App.Div.2001); City of Newark v. Cent. and Lafayette Realty Co., 150 N.J.Super. 18, 21 , 374 A. 2d 504 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 528 , 384 A. 2d 508 (1977), and a mortgagee, who has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation, Chemical Bank New Jersey,

2004It is also logical to include the holder of a prior tax sale certificate, as real estate taxes are only a lien on the land assessed and are not the personal obligation of the owner, S & R Assocs. v. Lynn Realty Corp., 338 N.J.Super. 350, 360 , 769 A. 2d 413 (App.Div.2001); City of Newark v. Cent. and Lafayette Realty Co., 150 N.J.Super. 18, 21 , 374 A. 2d 504 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 528 , 384 A. 2d 508 (1977), and a mortgagee, who has a contractual security interest in the property but no claim against the person absent a note or other personal obligation, Chemical Bank New Jersey,

2000That possibility of Saks' sale, or its own conversion, to a busier, more intense retail department store use—which indisputably could rely on the earlier variances—points up the wisdom of the warning sounded by the New York Court of Appeals in Dexter, supra, 365 N.Y.S. 2d 506 , 324 N.E. 2d at 871 , that "all too often the administrative... determination seems to turn on the identity of the applicant or intended user, rather than upon neutral planning and zoning principles." The lesson is that in granting use variances boards of adjustment must anticipate that users in the same use category as

2000That possibility of Saks' sale, or its own conversion, to a busier, more intense retail department store use—which indisputably could rely on the earlier variances—points up the wisdom of the warning sounded by the New York Court of Appeals in Dexter, supra, 365 N.Y.S. 2d 506 , 324 N.E. 2d at 871 , that "all too often the administrative... determination seems to turn on the identity of the applicant or intended user, rather than upon neutral planning and zoning principles." The lesson is that in granting use variances boards of adjustment must anticipate that users in the same use category as

2000The question is not whether the successor use is "essentially duplicative" of the use for which the variance was granted, as our dissenting colleagues suggest, post at 466, 744 A. 2d at 1185 , but rather whether, considering all relevant factors, the successor use is sufficiently similar to the variant use to afford it the benefit of the variance.

1997The Law Division dealt only with the second issue, holding that under Township of Dover v. Board of Adj. of Tp. of Dover, 158 N.J.Super. 401 , 386 A.2d 421 (App.Div.1978) the governing body lacked standing.

1997The Law Division dealt only with the second issue, holding that under Township of Dover v. Board of Adj. of Tp. of Dover, 158 N.J.Super. 401 , 386 A.2d 421 (App.Div.1978) the governing body lacked standing.

1989In Byram Tp. v. Western World, Inc., 111 N.J. 222 , 544 A.2d 37 (1988), a case involving the same taxpayers and the same property but for an earlier tax year, the Supreme Court held that the actual use of the property satisfied the standards of the act and that the use of the property in violation of a local zoning ordinance had not been established or properly adjudicated.

1989In Byram Tp. v. Western World, Inc., 111 N.J. 222 , 544 A.2d 37 (1988), a case involving the same taxpayers and the same property but for an earlier tax year, the Supreme Court held that the actual use of the property satisfied the standards of the act and that the use of the property in violation of a local zoning ordinance had not been established or properly adjudicated.

1986In re Hendrick, Ibid. ■ The uncontradicted testimony in this case is that all of the above property with the exception of the proceeds payable to the wife after the accident destroying the 1981 Mercury Capri, was sold at least one year prior to the filing of the Voluntary Petition in Bankruptcy.

1985Bakers Basin, 74 N.J. at 104 -105 aff'g. 138 N.J.

1985Bakers Basin, 74 N.J. at 104 -105 aff'g. 138 N.J.

1980The second reported decision, dated June 2, 1978, 162 N.J.

1980Defendant appeals from an order dated March 15, 1979 in the Law Division denying its motion for summary judgment and expressly determining that the barge was permanently located within the State of New Jersey for purposes of the act, consistent with its formal opinion published at 167 N.J.

1979Ass'n v. Commonwealth Title Co., 327 Pa. 93 , 192 A. 635 (Sup.Ct. 1937). *507 The courts in these cases proceeded on a strict real property analysis in denying coverage, reasoning that since the grantor neither represented owning nor owned any interest in the purported abutting street, there was no title defect and hence no liability.

1979Ass'n v. Commonwealth Title Co., 327 Pa. 93 , 192 A. 635 (Sup.Ct. 1937). *507 The courts in these cases proceeded on a strict real property analysis in denying coverage, reasoning that since the grantor neither represented owning nor owned any interest in the purported abutting street, there was no title defect and hence no liability.

1950Bigel v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 129 N.J.

1941Eq. 368 ; Pryor v. Gray, 70 N.J.

1941But the basis for holding defendant liable "is that the mortgage is a fraud upon the creditors and that the mortgagee is a trustee for them and, in case he dispose of the property in violation of the trust, personally liable for its value or for its proceeds." Arnesto Paint Co. v. Brush, 117 N.J.

1934Post v. Stiger, 29 N.J.